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INTRODUCTION
"You pull the ripcord on the parachute you packed ... [n]ot
the parachute you wish you had packed."
Government regulation and licensing of industrial activities that
create the possibility of catastrophic risk reflect "a political value
judgment that these activities provide a social benefit that is greater
than the social cost of the risks that they cause."2 However, when a
catastrophic accident occurs, the cost-benefit evaluations
underlying the value judgment that authorized the activity may
need to be rethought.3  Social rethinking is especially warranted
when the accident could have been prevented had either the
industry or the government more seriously assessed the risk of a
catastrophic event and implemented precautionary steps to avoid
it. This was the conclusion reached by the President's Oil Spill
Commission with respect to the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig
accident in April 2010, which killed eleven platform workers,
injured seventeen more, discharged nearly five million barrels of
oil into the Gulf of Mexico,4 devastated the area's economy and
1. Campbell Robertson, Efforts to Repel Gulf Spill Are Described as Chaotic, Fragmented Response
Cited-Contingency Plans Are Found Lacking in Detail, N.Y. TIMES,June 15, 2010, at Al, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/science/earth/15cleanup.html (quoting Mark
Davis, director of the Tulane Institute on Water Resources Law and Policy).
2. Marcus Radetzki & Marian Radetzki, Liability of Nuclear and Other Industrial Corporations
for Large Scale Accident Damage, 15J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 366, 383 (1997).
3. Cf Jay G. Martin, Implementing Effective Corporate Legal Compliance Programs, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENv'T, Spring 1997, at 14, 14 ("[D]amage that can be caused by a large
company or a group of them acting in concert makes it unacceptable simply to wait and fix
things after the fact. Thus, there is a need to channel business activity constructively and to
identify and address problems before they become catastrophic.").
4. See Nat'l Comm'n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, The
Amount and Fate of the Oil 16 (Staff Working Paper No. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Staff Working
Paper No. 3], available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/Updated%20Amount%20and%2Fate%20of%2Othe%200il%20Working%2Pa
per.pdf ("The emerging consensus among government and independent scientists is that
roughly five million barrels of oil were released by the Macondo well, with over four million
barrels pouring into the waters of the Gulf of Mexico.").
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environment, and to date has cost hundreds of millions of dollars
to clean up.5  Because the Deepwater Horizon debacle was not the
first serious accident at an offshore drilling rig in recent memory,
these failures in oversight are surprising. For reasons this Article
will explore, the companies that engage in offshore drilling for oil
and gas, and the agencies that regulate them, assess the risk of an
operational accident as very low, despite the fact that serious well
blowouts are not infrequent events. That assessment affects both
the stringency of regulatory oversight and the precautionary steps a
company takes to guard against the occurrence of accidents.
Given the recurrence of serious well blowouts during the past
forty years, the inattentive attitude of the offshore oil and gas
industry and the Department of the Interior toward the likelihood
of a serious accident occurring again is even more striking when
compared to the reaction of the nuclear power industry following
the catastrophic partial nuclear core meltdown at Three Mile
Island Unit 2 (TMI-2).6 It took only one major accident to jolt the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the nuclear industry
almost immediately into taking proactive regulatory and
operational steps to dissuade the country from rethinking its
commitment to commercial nuclear power.' From a somewhat
5. See U.S. GoVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-1 1-90R, DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL:
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL FINANCIAL RISKS AND COST REIMBURSEMENT AND
NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES, 1-2 (2010) ("[Tjhe full extent of such costs and the extent to
which they will ultimately be paid by the Responsible Parties or federal, state, and local
governments is unknown at this time and depends on a variety of factors.").
6. The offshore oil and gas industry's reaction is also strikingly different from the
reaction of the United Kingdom, Norway, Australia, and Maritime Canada, all of whom have
made major changes in their offshore drilling regulatory programs in response to accidents.
See Nat'l Comm'n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, A Competent
and Nimble Regulator. A New Approach to Risk Assessment and Management 10-16 (Staff Working
Paper No. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Staff Working Paper No. 21], available at http://
www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/A%20Competent%20and%20Ni
mble%20Regulator%20A%2ONew%20Approach%20to%20Risk%20Assessment%20and%20
Management.pdf. In particular, the United Kingdom and Norway now combine both
prescriptive regulations and performance requirements that force industry "to go well
beyond simple compliance." Id.
7. See NAT'L COMM'N ONII IE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING,
REPORI TO THE PRESIDENT, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF
OFFSHORE DRILLING 235 (2011) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://
www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATERReporttothePresi
dentFINAL.pdf ("For the nuclear power industry, it took a crisis-the partial meltdown in
1979 of the radioactive core in Unit Two at Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station-
to prompt a transformation of its safety culture."). But see Editorial, In the Wake ofFukwuhima,
N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2011, at SR1I (noting that "[t]here are already signs that the [nuclear]
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diffident attitude before the accident at TMI-2 about the likelihood
of a serious nuclear accident occurring, in the period following the
accident, the nuclear industry and the NRC undertook significant
changes to the regulations and cultural mores governing nuclear
power plant operation-largely to regain the public's trust in
nuclear power.8  This Article explores why the respective
approaches to managing risks in the deepwater drilling and
nuclear industries, both of which engage in very risky activities' and
exhibit some common structural and regulatory features,'o have
diverged.
The Article posits that, despite their similarities, there are three
significant differences between the industries that influence how
each has assessed the possible occurrence of a catastrophic
accident, as well as the need to take pre-accident precautionary
measures." The first is that a nuclear accident has the potential to
critically impact both local and distanced public health over a long
period of time, while an accident on the outer continental shelf
(OCS) principally affects the more distant marine environment,
industry and its allies among Congressional Republicans will press the [NRC] commissioners
to bury the recommendations" issued by a task force formed in response to the accident at
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant).
8. See COMMISSION REPORIf, supra note 7, at 229 ("The primary motivation for improving
safety in each instance [referring to civilian aviation and nuclear-fueled electric power
plants] is that neither the public (as consumers and as voters) nor the government would
allow such enterprises to operate if they suffered many accidents.").
9. See id. at 235 ("The risk-management challenges presented by nuclear power are in
some respects analogous to those presented by deepwater drilling: the dependence on
highly sophisticated and complex technologies, the low probability/catastrophic
consequences nature of the risks generated, and the related tendency for a culture of
complacency to develop over time in the absence of major accidents.").
10. Both the deepwater drilling and the nuclear industries are subject to pre-construction
and pre-operation safety and environmental reviews, each has the benefit of a statutory
liability cap and substantial government subsidies, and each provides a product that is in
high demand. Cf id. at 239-40. However, there are also significant institutional differences
between the industries. For example, there are a limited number of fixed nuclear power
plant sites, and these sites use a limited number of well-established technological designs, all
stages of which are highly regulated. By contrast, the oil and gas industry operates in many
different locations and environments, employs different, continuingly evolving technologies
and designs, and is highly fragmented, diversified, and protective of proprietary information.
Cf id. at 240-41.
11. See id. at 239-40 (noting among the similarities between the industries that the
government "possess[es] sweeping authority to dictate the terms" of their actions and the
performance of each can improve if effective private self-policing programs are initiated to
supplement the over-worked, under-staffed, and technically disadvantaged government
oversight programs that lack "technical expertise truly commensurate with that of private
industry").
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the visible effects of which are of relatively short duration. The
second difference is that it is easier to defray the costs of an
accident on the OCS, including the costs of subsequent mitigation
and remediation measures, by passing them through to consumers
than it is in the case of an accident at a nuclear power plant
because state public service commissions control the rate of return
that utilities make. If precedent is any guide, these state
commissions will be unsympathetic to any future requests by a
utility for post-accident monetary relief. 2  A final difference, less
tangible but perhaps the most important, concerns the public fear
of radiation. Put simply, the public is not afraid of oil. This
perception makes it unlikely that the United States nuclear industry
could withstand another serious accident,13 while the deepwater
drilling industry carries no analogous burden. Collectively, these
differences have contributed to a higher standard of care in the
nuclear industry, and also make it unlikely that the offshore oil and
gas industry will naturally gravitate to the more cautious paradigm
adopted by its nuclear counterparts without external pressure."
To substantiate this thesis, Part I of the Article briefly sets out
some background facts on each industry, including their accident
records and a description of the most recent catastrophic accident
in each industry-the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig explosion and
the TMI-2 partial nuclear core meltdown. This Part demonstrates
that major accidents on deepwater drilling rigs happen with greater
frequency than at nuclear power plants. Part II discusses the direct
12. See infra note 376 and accompanying text (discussing the unwillingness of the
Pennsylvania and NewJersey Public Service Commissions to pass on the costs of cleaning up
TMI-2 to their customers).
13. The recent accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear complex in Japan, which was
severely damaged by an earthquake and tsunami in March of 2011, has reignited those fears,
especially given that the design of those plants is similar to several domestic nuclear reactors.
See, e.g., Timothy Hurst, Will Fukushima Pull a Vermont Nuclear Plant Off the Rails?, REUTERS,
Mar. 31, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=US1566155258201
10331 (noting that the Japanese plants "use[] the same General Electric boiling water
reactors with Mark-1 containment vessels and above-ground spent waste storage pools as
those at [the] Vermont Yankee [nuclear power plant] . . . ."); Court Requires Exelon, NRC to
Review Licensing of Oyster Creek Plant, GREENWIRE (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/
Greenwire/2011/03/22/19 ("The Oyster Creek plant, like many other older plants in the
United States, uses the same General Electric Mark 1 reactor design as the crippled
Fukushima Daiichi plant in Japan.").
14. Indeed, the President's Oil Spill Commission suggested that the nuclear industry's
transformation of its "culture of complacency" toward major accidents occurring was "a
useful analogue" for the oil and gas industry, as it seeks to do the same thing. COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 7, at 235.
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and indirect causes of the two accidents, revealing their remarkable
similarities-indeed, shared causes that, to some, made both
accidents "inevitable."1 In Part III, the Article examines how the
occurrence of catastrophic accidents has affected the way in which
each industry assesses the likelihood of another accident and what,
if any, precautionary steps they and their respective regulatory
agencies have taken to avoid a recurrence. In Part IV, the Article
discusses how differences in the type of harm that might result
from an accident in one industry compares to the other, the
importance of economic constraints, and how public perceptions
about the ensuing harm influence each industry's risk avoidance
decisions.
The Article concludes that, while the nuclear industry is far from
perfect, the deepwater drilling industry could learn from the post-
accident steps taken by its nuclear power counterparts-
particularly those that involve rigorous internal and external
auditing of activities, greater public transparency, and internal
corporate restructuring that places responsibility for risky
operations higher up the management ladder and makes
operational safety a company priority.' 6 While few doubt that there
15. See Russell Gold & Ben Casselman, Far Offshore, a Rash of Close Calls, WALL Sr. J., Dec.
8, 2010, at Al (saying the Macondo well blowout was "bound to happen"-perhaps not on
that day or on that particular rig, but an accident of that magnitude was inevitable); see also
JOHN G. KEMENY, TIE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON TiE AccIDENT AT TMI, REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT TiIREE MILE ISLAND 11 (1979) [hereinafter
KEMENY COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://www.threemileisland.org/downloads/
188.pdf (concluding that "while the major factor that turned this incident into a serious
accident was inappropriate operator action, many factors contributed to the actions of the
operators, such as deficiencies in their training, lack of clarity in their operating procedures,
failure of organizations to learn the proper lessons from previous incidents, and deficiencies
in the design of the control room. These shortcomings are attributable to the utility, to
suppliers of equipment, and to the federal commission that regulates nuclear power.
Therefore-whether or not operator error 'explains' this particular case-given all the above
deficiencies, we are convinced that an accident like Three Mile Island was eventually
inevitable.").
16. See Hope M. Babcock, Corporate Environmental Social Responsibility: Corporate
"Greenwashing" or a Corporate Culture Game Changer?, 21 FORDHAM ENVIL. L. REv. 1, 59-68
(2010) (discussing ways to redesign corporate social responsibility programs to be more
effective). Some recent indications of improved industry and NRC transparency are evident
from public meetings NRC staff held in response to the Japanese nuclear plant disaster. See
Hannah Northey, NRC Plans Meetings to Discuss Reactors in N.Y., S.C., GREENWIRE (Mar. 21,
2011), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2011/03/21/16. However, not all believe
the progress in this area has been sufficient. For example, at a 2009 U.S. Senate
subcommittee hearing, Gregory B. Jaczko, the Chairman of the NRC, noted a need for the
NRC to improve its ability "to communicate in plain English . . . [when] we're
communicating complex technical information in a way that the public can understand
[Vol. 37:168
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will be technological improvements made in how oil and gas are
extracted from deep water after the Deepwater Horizon accident,"
the changes this Article recommends implicate how companies that
engage in risky operations might improve their conduct from an
accident avoidance perspective. However, due to the absence of a
sustained public fear of the risks associated with deepwater drilling
that might spark a social rethinking of the industry, it seems
unlikely that the industry will undertake these steps.
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE DEEPWATER DRILLING AND
NUCLEAR INDUSTRIES
Both the deepwater drilling and nuclear industries occupy a
critical place in meeting the country's dependence on energy,
and each requires that the companies engaging in these energy-
producing activities, including the operating crews running the
equipment, undertake significant risks. Not surprisingly, there
have been serious accidents in each industry-the prevention and
containment of which has grown increasingly complex. This Part
of the Article briefly looks at these two industries, their respective
accident records, the specific accidents that form the basis of this
Article, and the human and environmental consequences of each
of these accidents.
without necessarily having .. . a background in nuclear engineering or nuclear science." See
A Hearing on Three Mile sland-Looking Back on Thirty Years of Lessons Learned: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety of the S. Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 111th
Cong. 14 (2009) [hereinafter Senate Three Mile Island Hearing] (statement of Gregory B.
Jaczko, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n). Peter A. Bradford, a former NRC
Chairman, also complained to Congress that recent changes to the licensing process have
lessened public access and brought to its attention the failure of the NRC to adopt a Kemeny
Commission recommendation that the NRC create an Office of Special Counsel to represent
the public at licensing hearings. Id. at 33 (statement of Peter A. Bradford, former Chairman,
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n).
17. WilliamJ. Broad, Taking Lessons from What Went Wrong, N.Y. TIMES,July 20, 2010, at D1
("[T]he BP disaster, like countless others, will ultimately inspire technological advance.").
18. Americans consume 18.7 million barrels of petroleum products a day "to fuel our
economy." COMMIsSION REPOlr, suupra note 7, at viii; see also Carl Hoffman, Investigative
Report: How the BP Oil Rig Blowout Happened, POPULAR MECHANICS, Sept. 2, 2010,
http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/energy/coal-oil-gas/how-the-bp-oil-rig-blowout-
happened?page=all ("Oil and gas leases are the federal government's second largest source
of revenue, after income taxes."); infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (describing the
role of nuclear power in meeting the country's energy needs).
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A. The Oil and Gas Industry
Since the federal government sold the first leases for offshore
hydrocarbon rights in the Gulf of Mexico in 1954'9 under the
auspices of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,20 over fifty
thousand wells have been drilled there.2' Four thousand of these
wells have been drilled at depths greater than one thousand feet,
with seven hundred located deeper than five thousand feet.22
Today, more than seventy percent of all offshore oil and gas
production comes from these giant deepwater drilling platforms.
Offshore oil and gas leasing, which had expanded rapidly both in
the number of wells drilled and in the areas developed in early
years, slowed significantly after a well blowout in the Santa Barbara
Channel in 1969 and was thereafter restricted to the Gulf,24 where
it is largely concentrated today.25  Interior Secretary James G. Watt
attempted to reinvigorate the offshore leasing program in the
1980s 2" but his efforts triggered negative reactions in states and
21localities that had not previously been subject to the program.
19. Kim Harb, The Legal and Policy Dilemma of Offshore Oil and Gas Development, NAT.
REsoURCES & ENv'T., Summer 2004, at 23, 24. For a more detailed discussion of the history
of offshore oil and gas development, including the trend toward deepwater drilling, see
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 21-53.
20. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1953) (amended 1975,
1978, 1986, 1990, 1992, 1994, and 1995).
21. Clifford Krauss & John M. Broder, Spotlight Shifts to Shallow-Water Wells, N.Y TIMES,
Sept. 3, 2010, at BI.
22. Id.
23. Id. ("Although more than 70 percent of all offshore oil production now comes from
jumbo oil platforms plumbing the gulf's deeper waters ... [c]urrently, 3,333 platforms are
drilling in depths of less than 500 feet, compared with just 74 in deeper waters").
24. See Harb, supra note 19, at 24-25 (explaining that rapid expansion of offshore leasing
stopped after "a dramatic blowout from an offshore rig caused the accidental release of more
than seventy-one thousand barrels of oil into the Santa Barbara channel, fouling wildlife and
miles of California coastline," which resulted in "the immediate cancellation of additional
lease sales in the Pacific region for five years, and in the postponement of some initial sales
in the Alaska and Atlantic regions. In Congress, the momentum of this outcry resulted in
the passage of several new laws over the next few years, including the National
Environmental Policy Act and the Coastal Zone Management Act." (citations omitted)).
25. This may change because of recent efforts by the Obama administration to expand
offshore drilling-e.g., the recent grant of an air quality permit to Shell for a drilling vessel
operating in Alaska. See Dan Joling, Shell Gets EPA Permit for Exploratory Drilling in Arctic,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 20, 2011, http://www.adn.com/2011/09/19/2077026/
shell-gets-epa-permit-for-arctic.html.
26. Id. at 25 (explaining that Interior Secretary Watt took the area-wide leasing program
that had been successfully applied in the Gulf and applied it to the entire OCS during the
early 1980s).
27. Id.; see also Ben Lieberman, Congressional Moratorium on Offshore Drilling in the Outer
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Congress responded with annual appropriation riders to limit the
areas of the OCS that could be leased, and a moratorium by the
Bush administration followed in 1990.28 At the present time,
eighty-five percent of the OCS is closed to oil and gas
development-removing from potential production 19.1 billion
barrels of oil, the equivalent of thirty years of current imports from
Saudi Arabia.29 These restricted areas cover nearly the entire coasts
of the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, as well as the eastern Gulf of
Mexico and Alaska.o Offshore drilling in the rest of the Gulf,
however, developed at a record pace following the 1990
moratorium.' This increase in drilling activity in the Gulf,
involving wells that were more technically complex and further
from shore, coincided with the budget of the Minerals
Management Service (MMS), the agency within the Department of
the Interior charged with issuing offshore leases for the
development of oil and gas on the OCS and regulating activities on
those leases, reaching its "nadir."0
Although the April 20, 2010 blowout of the Macondo well and
the resulting fire on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig is, to date, the
worst accident at a deepwater drilling platform since the federal
government authorized offshore drilling, it was not the first
accident on such a drilling rig to have a catastrophic environmental
Continental Shelf Should Be Allowed to Expire, THE HERITAGE FoUND. (Aug. 8, 2008), http://
www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/08/congressional-moratorium-on-offshore-drillin
g-in-the-outer-continental-shelf-should-be-allowed-to-expire ("Beginning in 1982, Congress
restricted more and more areas through annual Department of the Interior (DOI)
appropriations.").
28. Harb, supra note 19, at 25 (describing the use of annual appropriation riders to
withdraw huge areas of the OCS from development, followed by a moratorium); see abo
Lieberman, supra note 27. In 1990, President George H.W. Bush issued a presidential
directive withdrawing new areas from offshore exploration and drilling. These White House
restrictions overlapped with the congressional restrictions. In 1998, President Clinton
extended these restrictions through 2012. However, in response to rapid increases in
gasoline prices, President George W. Bush rescinded them in 2008. Id.
29. Lieberman, supra note 27 (referencing recent DOI estimates); see also Erica Werner,
Ieds: Minimum Impact from Drilling Moratorium, BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 16, 2010, 6:13 AM),
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/fnancialnews/D9I8URK81.htm ("[T]he U.S. consumed
more than 7 billion barrels of oil in 2008.").
30. Harb, supra note 19, at 23. A recent post-Deepwater Horizon accident moratorium was
lifted in October 2010. See discussion infra note 313.
31. See Staff Working Paper No. 21, supra note 6, at 3 n.4 (reporting that "a record
number of wells were drilled in 1997," due in part to the relatively greater amount of oil than
natural gas in deepwater reservoirs, ensuring higher profits for rig operators despite the
higher production costs).
32. Id. at 3.
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impact. The 1969 accident in the Santa Barbara Channel lasted for
eleven days and released between eighty and one hundred
thousand barrels of oil into the channel, killing wildlife and coating
an estimated thirty miles of California coastline with oil.33 In 1970,
a Chevron well in the Gulf blew out and caught fire, damaging
wildlife and drawing million dollar lawsuits from Louisiana oyster
and shrimp fishermen;4 months later, a Shell blowout followed,
killing four men and injuring thirty-seven more. In 1979, IXTOC
I, a Mexican exploratory well two miles deep in the Bay of
Campeche (six hundred miles south of Texas) blew out, spilling 3.5
million barrels of oil36 and affecting miles of Texas coastal barrier
beaches. 7  Oil from that well continued to spew for ten months,
making it the second largest oil spill in history.
In fact, well blowouts are not rare events at all.39 Between 1964
and 2001, blowouts in the Gulf of Mexico occurred on average
once every 3.7 years. 0 A total of sixty-six blowouts have occurred in
33. COMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 7, at 28. Ironically, the well's blowout preventer
worked, but poor well design allowed oil to escape from "near-surface ruptures beneath the
seafloor." Id. Prior to the blowout, Union Oil Company, the owner of the platform, had
received a waiver from the U.S. Geological Survey that allowed it to set casings at a shallower
depth than required. Id.
34. Id. at 29-30.
35. Id. After the Shell blowout, it "took 136 days to bring 11 wild wells under control, at a
cost of $30 million." Id. at 30.
36. Sedco 135F - IXTOC 1, On. RIG DISASTERS, http://home.versatel.nl/the sims/rig/
ixtocl.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2011) (providing data on the IXTOCIdisaster).
37. See Gladwin Hill, lxtocs Oil Has a Silver Lining, AUDunON, Nov. 1979, at 150, 154.
38. Incident News: IXTOC 1, NAT'L OcEANIC AND ATMOSI'I1ERIC ADMIN., http://
www.incidentnews.gov/incident/6250 (last visited Dec. 4, 2011); see also Incident News, IXTOC
I Well Blowout, NAT'i. OCEANIC AND ATMosPHERIC ADMIN. (Feb. 14, 2007), http://
www.incidentnews.gov/entry/517477 ("IXTOC I is currently #2 on the ... list of largest oil
spills of all-time, eclipsed only by the deliberate release of oil, from many different sources,
during the 1991 Gulf War."). Other major accidents have occurred in the North Sea, in the
Atlantic Ocean off of Newfoundland, and in the Atlantic Ocean off of Brazil, where the
world's largest oil rig blew up and sank, killing ten people. Although these accidents caused
little environmental damage, they did result in loss of life. See, e.g., Worlds Largest Oil Rig
Sinks, REUTERS, Mar. 20, 2001, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines01/
0320-02.htm.
39. See William Campbell, Delving Into Deepwater-Before the Blow-Out, in MARITIME
AccIDENT cASEBOOK (2009), available at http://maritimeaccident.org/2010/07/delving-into-
deepwater-before-the-blow-out ("World-wide since 1955 and prior to [the blowout of]
Deepwater Horizon there have been 44 notable blowout events causing 79 deaths, with
significant loss of assets and one event in 1979 causing massive pollution. In this period ...
the mean time between blowouts was 15 months.").
40. See Campbell, supra note 39 (stating that in the thirty-seven year period between 1964
and 2001, the Gulf of Mexico experienced "10 blowouts or 23% of the world-wide events.
This resulted in 27 deaths or 34% of the deaths world-wide. One event, the blowout on the
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the Gulf's offshore drilling history, killing twenty-nine workers
since 1979.4' Between 1964 and 2009, there has been a "steady
stream" of smaller spills from blowouts, ruptured pipelines, and
tanker leaks that have dumped approximately 517,847 barrels of oil
into the Gulf of Mexico, killing thousands of birds and soiling
beaches as far away as Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula. Taken
together, these accidents have released double the amount of oil
into U.S. waters as the Exxon Valdez tanker released when it ran
aground on Bligh Reef in 1989.0 In light of this record, statements
by the industry that its safety record is exemplary seem
"tantamount to deception."
Semi-submersible Sedco 135F[,] caused pollution into the gulf of an estimated 455 to
480,000 tonnes of oil."). By comparison, over a fifty-five year period, British offshore
operations in the North Sea have experienced only two blowouts. Id.
41. Gayathri Vaidyanathan, Offshore Drilling: Gulf Blowouts the Norm for Decades Due to Lax
Regulation, GREENWIRE (July 20, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2010/07/
20/6 ("Subterranean plumes of gas have erupted 66 times in the Gulf of Mexico in recorded
history, killed 29 drillers since 1979 and prompted numerous federal calls for investigations
and improvements. All went unheeded by the industry. .. ."); see also COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 7, at 3 ("Since 2001, the Gulf of Mexico workforce-35,000 people working on 90
big drilling rigs and 3,500 production platforms-had suffered 1,550 injuries, 60 deaths, and
948 fires and explosions.").
42. Steven Mufson, Federal Recorels Show Steady Stream of Oil Spills in Gulf Since 1964, WASH.
PosT,July 24, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/23/
AR2010072305603.html?wpisrcenl-headline.
43. Id. (noting, in addition, that federal records "tell a different story" from that told by
Interior Secretary Ken Salazar, who is quoted as saying that the industry's "history of safety"
in the Gulf of Mexico has provided the "'empirical foundation' for U.S. policy").
44. Id. (quoting American Petroleum Institute President Jack Gerard as saying, "The oil
industry has drilled 42,000 wells in the Gulf of Mexico, and this is the first time an incident
of this magnitude has happened," and further noting that the "BP oil spill is the biggest ever,
but MMS records tell a more complicated story. Performance had been improving but from
a poor baseline."). Furthermore, conditions appear to have worsened in the years
immediately preceding the Macondo well blowout. According to data collected around the
world, after years of showing improvement, the deepwater drilling industry's safety record
suddenly deteriorated between 2008 and 2010. See Russell Gold & Ben Casselman, Far
Offshore, a Rash of Close Calls, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703989004575652714091006550.html (noting that in the U.S. portion of
the Gulf of Mexico in 2009 there were "28 major drilling-related spills, natural gas releases or
incidents in which workers lost control of a well .. . up 4% from 2008, 56% from 2007, and
nearly two-thirds from 2006."). There are many possible reasons for this decline in the
industry's safety record, including problems finding and retaining enough experienced
workers, the difficulty of balancing "safety priorities with profit demands," and "occasional
lapses in the face of lax regulation." Id.
45. Campbell, supra note 39 (referring to industry statements that "blowouts could be
discounted from the decision to drill into deepwater formations because they were rare
events"). Campbell also discusses what is considered a tolerable level of risk in offshore
drilling in the United Kingdom: "I in 100 or I in 1000 years depending on the event and its
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Even without the occurrence of accidents of the same magnitude
as those mentioned above, the environmental impacts of oil and
gas development on the OCS are sufficiently significant to warrant
public concern. "There are over 5,600 offshore oil and gas
platforms in the United States and over 27,000 miles of pipelines in
the areas of the Gulf of Mexico already open to drilling," which
have permanently destroyed deep water habitats4' and constitute a
major source of air pollutant emissions in the Gulf.47 Each year,
drilling operations in this country deposit "an average of 880,000
gallons of oil into the ocean."4 That number can drastically
increase in years with significant hurricane activity-for example,
in 2005, "[h]urricane damage caused at least 124 different spills,
totaling over 17,700 barrels (743,000 gallons) of petroleum
products."49  In addition to oil spills, drill cuttings, which are
contaminated with "drilling fluid used to lubricate and regulate the
pressure in drilling operations," contain toxic petroleum products
and heavy metals that are dumped into the ocean.o Ocean
currents can carry contaminated bottom sediments miles from the
drilling rig, diminishing populations of small bottom-dwelling
marine life that play a critical role in the marine food chain and
potential consequences," a "far cry" from the average blowout frequency of I every 3.7 years
witnessed in the Gulf of Mexico from 1964 to 2001, or even the new average of 1 every 4.2
years since the Deepeater Horizon incident. Id. One explanation for this apparent decrease in
the rate of incidents may be the industry's successful efforts to weaken incident reporting
requirements. See Staff Working Paper No. 21, supra note 6, at 5-7 (describing these efforts
and how the offshore oil and gas industry cited the limited voluntary data as proof that "the
rate of incidents has significantly decreased since 1996" due to "operators focusing on safety
and protecting the environment").
46. Outer Continental Shelf Drilling, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, http://www.defenders.org/
resources/publications/policy-and_legislation/impacts of outer continental shelf drilling
.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2011), at 1.
47. See id. ("Oil and gas activities account for the overwhelming majority of air pollutants:
89% of carbon monoxide, 77% of NO, emissions, 72% of volatile organic compound
emissions, 69% of particular matter emissions, and 66% of sulfur dioxide."). More than
200,000 birds die annually as a result of colliding with these oil and gas platforms, and
marine mammals and sea turtles can collide with support vessels. Id. at 2. Further, onshore
pipelines can "damage sensitive coastal habitats and marshes." Id.
48. Id. at 1. Oil is highly toxic to wetland grasses, submerged aquatic vegetation, birds,
terrestrial and marine mammals, fish, and microscopic animals at the base of the marine
food chain. Id. Oil can also damage tissues in the eyes, mouth, skin, and lungs of marine
mammals. Id. at 2.
49. Id.; see also Oliver A. Houck, Worst Case and the Deepnwater Horizon Blowout: There Ought
To Be a Law, 40 ENVit. L. REP. NEWs & ANALYSIS 11033, 11037 (2010) (noting that
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita spilled approximately eleven million gallons of oil into the
Gulf).
50. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, supra note 46, at 1.
"biomagnifying toxic contaminants in fish we eat."5 1
Further, noise generated by seismic surveys conducted during oil
and gas exploration can permanently harm the hearing of marine
mammals, inducing them to change their behavior, and can even
physically injure them. Construction noise from drilling rigs and
pipelines can disrupt foraging and communication behaviors of
birds and marine mammals.5 3  Noise, collisions, and dredging of
nesting beaches in connection with the laying of pipelines all
threaten the continued viability of sea turtles." The apparent
indifference of the general public to all of these impacts may be
due to the fact that it is largely unaware of what is happening.
1. The Deepwater Horizon Accident and Macondo Well Blowout
Already this oil spill is the worst environmental disaster
America has ever faced. And unlike an earthquake or a
hurricane, it's not a single event that does its damage in a
matter of minutes or days. The millions of gallons of oil that
have spilled into the Gulf of Mexico are more like an epidemic,
one that we will be fighting for months and even years.
The Macondo well was the first well that British Petroleum (BP)56
began to drill in Mississippi Canyon Block 252-a nine-square-mile
plot in the Gulf of Mexico.' The company knew little about the
geology of the lease block and planned to drill the well to twenty
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Sea turtle hatchlings are even more vulnerable to oiling than adult turtles because
they float near the water surface, where spilled oil and tar balls accumulate. Id.
55. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill,
(June 15, 2010), available at www.whitehouse.gov./thepress-office/remarks-president-nation-
bp-oil-spill.
56. In 2010, BP produced more than four million barrels of oil a day from thirty
countries. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 2.
57. The Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, which had been under contract to BP since its first
voyage in 2001, cost $350 million to build. Id. BP paid a little more than thirty-four million
dollars to the Department of the Interior for "an exclusive lease" to drill in Mississippi
Canyon Block 252. Id. at 89. Seven months prior to the accident, the rig had drilled a
35,055-foot well-at that point the world's deepest well. Hoffman, supira note 18, at 3. The
rig was actually the second Transocean rig that worked on the Macondo well; an earlier rig
started drilling in October 2009, reaching a depth of 9,090 feet before it was moved offsite to
avoid Hurricane Ida, which nonetheless caused sufficient damage to the rig that the
Deepwater Horizon rig was brought in as a replacement. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at
92.
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thousand feet to learn more." It had expectations that the results
of this exploration effort would be a production well capable of
generating a large profit for the company. Instead, in a little
more than two years, as a result of the blowout, BP found itself
paying tens of billions of dollars to contain and mitigate the
damage from the spilled oil and compensate hundreds of
thousands of individuals and businesses that had been harmed by
it.co
The Macondo well failed in a "complex way" in part because
drilling an exploratory well in deep water is a "complex
operation."6 ' Although there was no single cause of the Deepwater
Horizon accident -or, as a Washington Post columnist put it, there
is "no smoking gun" because "smoke is coming from so many
places""13-the immediate cause of the blowout was a failure to
contain hydrocarbon pressure in the well." Immediately preceding
the blowout, a cement plug at the bottom of the well failed,
allowing gas to escape into and up the pipe beyond the blowout
preventer so that it could not shut down the well. 5 This failure, an
58. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 89. At the time of the accident, the Macondo
well was being drilled 5,000 feet through Gulf water, and then 13,000 feet under the sea floor
to the underlying hydrocarbon reservoir. Id. at viii.
59. Id. at 89.
60. Id. at 89-90.
61. SeeJoel Achenbach & David Hilzenrath, As Federal Panel Probes Oil Spill, Picture Emerges
of a Series of Iffy Decisions, WASH. POSTr, July 25, 2010, at Al, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/24/AR2010072402594_2.html?
hpid=topnews&sid=ST2010072305432 ("[I]t is increasingly clear that the complex operation
of drilling an exploratory well in the deep water of the Gulf of Mexico failed in a complex
way.").
62. But see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at vii ("The immediate causes of the
Macondo well blowout can be traced to a series of identifiable mistakes made by BP,
Halliburton, and Transocean that reveal such systematic failures in risk management that
they place in doubt the safety culture of the entire industry."); Staff Working Paper No. 21,
supra note 6, at 10 ("[L]axity in regulation and data collection appears to have caused
deterioration in the safety culture of the Gulf").
63. Achenbach & Hilzenrath, supra note 61.
64. COMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 7, at 115.
65. SENArOR BOB GRAHAM & WILLIAM K REILLY, NAITL COMM'N ON TIIE BP DEEPWATIER
HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, CHIEF COUNSEL'S REPORT, MACONDO: THE
GuLF OIL1 DISASTER 95 (2011) [hereinafter CIIEF COUNSEL'S REPORT] ("It is undisputed that
the primary cement at Macondo failed to isolate hydrocarbons in the formation from the
wellbore-that is, it did not accomplish zonal isolation. If the cement had set properly in its
intended location, the cement would have prevented hydrocarbons from flowing out of the
formation and into the well. The cement would have been a stand-alone barrier that would
have prevented a blowout even in the absence of any other barriers (such as closed blowout
preventer rams, drilling mud, and cement plugs).").
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unstable well design, and a series of missed opportunities and
mistakes set off a chain of events that culminated in gas and drilling
muds reaching the drilling rig deck.'6  By that time, it was too late
to activate the blind shear rams in the blowout preventer, which
would have closed the well, or to divert the arriving mud and gas
over the side of the rig. 7 Either one of these steps might have
reduced the risk of igniting the rising gas.' Instead, the escaped
gas from the top of the well ignited and produced a series of
explosions, which quickly led to a massive fire. The rig was
destroyed and sank, and eleven crew members lost their lives.
The Deepwater Horizon accident lasted for 152 days and spilled
nearly five million barrels of oil into the Gulf before the well was
finally plugged in September-two months after BP capped the
well.o The oil spread to the eastern Gulf and Pensacola, Florida
(as well as to other areas of Florida's western shoreline), and
occasional tar balls floated as far west as Texas' coastline.7' The
spill's immediate impact on the marine environment was
devastating; as of November 1, 2010, wildlife responders had
collected 8,183 oiled birds, 1,444 endangered sea turtles, and 109
marine mammals. Some of these animals were dead, and others
will likely have shortened life spans. Nesting areas for birds and
66. See generally COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 89-122 (describing the events
leading up to the accident).
67. Id. at 121. The Commission Report estimates that the explosion occurred six to eight
minutes after the muds started spilling on the rig floor. Id. at 122.
68. Id. at 121.
69. For a chronological description of the accident and the events that occurred on the
rig, see id. at 1-19.
70. For a detailed description of the various attempts to "kill" the well and stop the flow of
oil permanently, see id. at 169. The well was finally plugged on September 19, 2010, five
months after the explosion occurred and two months after the company capped the well,
stopping the flow of oil and gas into the Gulf. See id. (discussing the capping and sealing of
the well). Oil actually stopped flowing from the well in mid-July. Id.; see also Henry Fountain,
Once Well Is Fully Sealed, BP May Go Back for More, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2010, http://
query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940CEFDAl 43CF93AA2575ACOA9669D8B63
(noting that after the valves closed on a new cap at the top of the well in mid-July, oil
stopped flowing into the Gulf).
71. COMMISSION RiPORT, supra note 7, at 177 (describing the reach of the spilled oil).
72. Id. at 181.
73. For example, 100 of 109 marine mammals collected were dead, most of which were
bottlenose dolphins. Over 600 of 1,144 collected sea turtles were also dead. Id.
74. Id. With sixty percent of the data verified, the three "most affected" bird species
appear to be Brown Pelicans, Northern Gannets, and Laughing Gulls. Id. There will also be
"sub-lethal effects" and impacts from the oil "on future populations." Id. But see Leslie
Kaufman & Sheila Dwan, Oiled Gulf May Defy Direst Predictions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2010, at
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sea turtlest were likely destroyed, as were food sources for many of
the affected species." Oyster beds were damaged and closed, and
the long-term impact on oysters (a "keystone species") 7 blue crabs,
and other shellfish, as well as their larvae, has yet to be
determined.79 Several large estuarine-dependent fish species,
DI (reporting that oil damage to wildlife and Gulf habitat has so far been less than predicted
and less than what resulted from the Exxon Valdez spill, but noting that many of these
findings are contested); Gulf Spill Compensation Administrator's Report Predicts Quick Recovery for
the Gulf GREENWIRE (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2011/02/02/
archive/20 (predicting that the Gulf should largely recover from the effects of the oil spill by
2012, including catches for blue crab, shrimp, oysters and finfish, although some oyster beds
"could take six to 10 years to recover," and there will be fewer fish, shrimp, and crabs in some
areas of the Gulf).
75. Audubon Scientists Find Gulf Birds and Oil Too Close for Comfort, BIRD LIFE INT'L, http://
www.birdlife.org/community/2010/10/audubon-scientists-find-gulf-birds-and-oil-too-close-fo
r-comfort (last visited Nov. 2, 2011); Alisa Opar, Oil Spill Update: First Oiled Birds Released
Today, Containment Setbacks, Media Copters Disturb Nesting Birds, AUDUBON MAGAZINE BLOG
(May 10, 2010), http://magblog.aidubon.org/oil-spill-update-first-oiled-birds-released-today-
containment-setbacks-media-copters-disturb-nesting ("Oil washed ashore on the Chandeleur
Islands last week. The uninhabited barrier islands are part of the Breton National Wildlife
Refuge and important nesting and breeding areas for many bird species.").
76. NAT'L MARINE FISiERIEs SERVS., SUMMARY TOTALs (2011), available at http://
www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/oilspill/species-data.pdf; TIIE ENCYCIO'EDIA OF EARTil, Sea
Turtles and the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, http://www.eoearth.org/article/Sea
turtles and-theDeepwater Horizonoilspill (last visited Nov. 2, 2011).
77. "The Macondo well blowout oiled over 650 miles of Gulf Coast habitats, including salt
marsh, mudflats, mangroves, and sand beaches," and "Louisiana's 'fragile delta habitats'
bore the 'brunt of the damage.'" COMMISSION REI'ORT, supra note 7, at 176-77 (describing
the ecological importance of these areas for a variety of species); see also LYNNE CORN &
CLAUDIA COPEIAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL. SPILL, COASTAL
WETLANDS, AND WILDLIFE IMPAGIS AND RESTORAION 13 (2010) ("The list of species that are
likely to have direct mortality or indirect effects from loss of food, nesting habitat, and the
like includes many fairly well-known species: piping plovers, least terns, five species of sea
turtles, the American crocodile, three species of whales, manatees, and three species of
sturgeon."); Melanie Driscoll, Effects of Deepwaater Horizon BP Oil Spill Still Visible One Year Later,
AUDUBON MAGAZINE BLOG (Apr. 13, 2011), http://magblog.audubon.org/effects-deepwater-
horizon-p-oil-spill-still-visible-one-year-later ("So it must be 2011. Because there is oil thick
in some of those marshes, and there are tar balls strewn by wavelets across miles and miles of
beach. And as the temperature climbs, the oil in the system is softening, liquefying, oozing,
bubbling up from within the contaminated sands and soils of the central Gulf. As the oil
liquefies, it will again coat the feathers of birds, many of them lightly enough that they will
still be able to fly, fish, preen, and incubate eggs. These oiled birds will ingest some oil,
which still contains harmful chemicals. They will still stiffer more stress in trying to clean
and waterproof those compromised feathers. Some of them will still carry oil back to their
nests, oiling eggs and nestlings, perhaps causing slower growth, deformities, or even death
among the sensitive chicks. Some birds may not find enough food for their young to survive,
if enough invertebrates, fish or crustaceans died or left the spill-contaminated waters.").
78. A "keystone species" is "an organism that exerts a disproportionate influence on its
habitat and community." COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 178.
79. Id. at 178-80.
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including a wide variety of sharks, game fish, such as swordfish,
marlin, and tuna, and many important Gulf fish, such as red
snapper, grouper, black drum, and mahi-mahi, may have been
affected by the spill.80 The spill also blanketed approximately forty
percent of the offshore waters used by larvae of the northern Gulf-
estuarine dependent species,8' and may have affected twenty
percent of bluefin tuna larvae in 2010, "further placing at risk an
already severely overfished species."82
Many wetland areas and beaches remained oiled long after the
well was capped.13 Nearly eight months after the spill, a centimeter-
thick residue of oil still covered large areas of the deep-sea floor in
the vicinity of the blowout, continuing to kill bottom-dwelling
creatures like worms."' Although the actual amount of oil
remaining in the water was disputed in the days following the
accident, 5 there was no dispute about the "underwater plume of
80. Id. at 178. Many of these species have been tagged with tracking devices so that
scientists can learn how the spill may have affected them. Id. at 180-81.
81. Id. at 178.
82. Id. at 181.
83. See Mark Schleifstein, 131' Reneges on Deal to Rebuild Oyster Beds, Repair We/lands,
Louisiana Officias Say, NEW ORiLEANS TiMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 21, 2011, http://www.nola.com/
news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2011/02/bp renegesondealto_rebuild.html [hereinafter
Schleifstein, BP Reneges on Deal] (reporting that "new tar balls" were washing up on a popular
Louisiana Gulf Coast beach and subsurface sand samples from the beach revealed
carcinogens, including benzene, xylene, and toluene). Oil mat in the nearshore subtidal
zone has repeatedly "coagulat[ed]," providing a new supply of oil). Id. Cleanup contractors
and natural resources officials have reported that "there's still a lot of oil buried back in the
marshes where it was carried during high water events," and "[t]he threat [to coastal beaches
and marshes] is absolutely still there and the oil is absolutely still there." Id. See also Mark
Schleifstein, Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Continues to Foul 168 Miles of Louisiana Coastline, NEW
ORiLEANs TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 30, 2010, http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/
index.ssf/2010/12/gulf of mexico oil-spill-conti.html.
84. Oil Stains Seabed Deep Underneath Gulf of Mexico, GREENWIRE (Dec. 9, 2010), http://
www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2010/12/09/18 ("Scientists have reported centimeters-
thick residue on the deep-sea floor that they suspect is oil ... [and] sea animals, such as
worms that crawl on the floor, appear dead."); see abo COMMISSION REPO~RT, supra note 7, at
182 (saying that there were "unconfirmed reports" of oil deposits on the floor of the ocean
near the Macondo well, as well as "recent reports of dead or dying deepwater corals"); Staff
Working Paper No. 3, supra note 4, at 29 (noting the lack of evidence of "systematic oxygen
drawdown" indicates that "rapid biodegradation might not be occurring"). A June 2010
study found "subsea plumes in the vicinity of the Macondo well that included high
concentrations of natural gas," which appeared to be biodegrading faster than the oil plume.
Id. at 26.
85. See Staff Working Paper No. 3, supra note 4, at 17-21 (concluding that initial
statements by the federal government reflected in the Oil Budget of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) that three quarters of the spilled oil was essentially "gone" created a misleading
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hydrocarbons" in the vicinity of the spill, which the President's Oil
Spill Commission calculated to be "35 kilometers long, 200
kilometers high, and 2 kilometers wide, at a depth of
approximately 1,100 meters."8 6 The release of toxic chemicals with
the spill and the use of chemical dispersants at the well site may yet
have an adverse effect on the deep-sea ecosystem."' Oil droplets
remained in the water column and spots of oil could be observed
on the sea floor as late as August 2011, even though little surface
evidence of the spill could be seen in the Gulf and the immediate
shoreline appeared cleaner."
The closing of vast areas of the Gulf to fishing, the pall that
remained over the safety of Gulf fish and shellfish after fishing,
crabbing, and shrimping resumed, and the effect on tourism in an
area that heavily depends on it" devastated the region's economy.9o
The social and psychological toll on families, especially children,
who had only recently recovered from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
is also expected to be great.9' Tribal and immigrant fishing
impression).
86. Id. at 29.
87. It is unknown how quickly toxic chemicals like polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons
(PAHs), which can kill animals, disperse. A research team from Oregon State University
"reported finding PAHs in the region 40 times higher than before the spill in September."
Toxic Chemoicals Found in Deep Waters After Spill, GREENWIRE (Nov. 3, 2010), http://
www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2010/11/03/22. In May 2010, PAHs were found at
depths of 3,300 feet and eight miles away from the leaking well. Id.
88. See Oil Stains Seabed Deep Underneath Gulf of Mexico, supra note 84 (stating that while the
"exact amount of the oil remains unclear ... there are spots spread across several thousand
square miles of the sea floor"); see also Susanne Pagano, Georgia Study Contradicts Federal
Estimates of Oil Renainingfrom BP Spill in Gulf 41 ENV'i REP. 1869, 1894 (2010) ("Up to 79
percent of the oil released into the Gulf of Mexico by the Deepwater Horizon well has not
been recovered and remains a threat to the ecosystem, researchers at the University of
Georgia and the Georgia Sea Grant program said in a study released Aug. 17.").
89. COMMISSION REPORT, sup.ra note 7, at 186 (describing the Gulf as "the hardest
working of our ocean basins," producing in excess of one-third of the country's domestic
seafood, "including most of the shrimp, crawfish, blue crabs, and oysters," "one-third of all
domestic oil," and containing "four of the top seven trading ports by tonnage;" while the
northern Gulf provides "diverse fish nursery and feeding grounds in the form of expansive
marshes, mangrove stands, swamp forests, and seagrass beds, and hosts some of the best
beaches and waters in the United States for recreation and tourism").
90. See id. at 187-88 (stating that closing 32,000 square miles of the Gulf to fishing created
great uncertainty about the safety of Gulf fish and the public health risk of consuming them,
and public exposure to the spill and its impact on marine species caused "reputational
damage" to "Gulf seafood as a safe brand"). The spill severely affected the Gulf Coast's
estimated annual $19.7 billion tourism industry, even in unoiled areas. Id. at 191.
91. See id. at 191-93. Surveys of Gulf Coast residents indicated a twenty-five percent
increase in medically diagnosed depression and revealed a spike in calls to domestic violence
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communities have been especially hard hit. 2
The extent of the long-term damage to wildlife populations,
especially to endangered species, and the capacities of the Gulf
ecosystems to restore themselves are unknown, as are the
capacities of Gulf Coast communities to rebuild and recover
economically.94  What is known, however, is that the impact of the
oil spill will outlast the cleanup efforts and other visible reminders
of the accident; as one professor of oceanography stated: "These
things reverberate through the ecosystem .. . . It is an ecological
echo chamber, and I think we'll be hearing the echoes of this,
ecologically, for the rest of my life."
hotlines after the rig explosion. Id. at 193.
92. See id. at 193-94.
93. The Department of the Interior and others are continuing to study the potential
impact of the spill on migratory birds and other wildlife that rely on Louisiana's coastal
marshes. Id. at 181. A recent, controversial study by the Associate Director of Texas A&M's
Harte Research Institute undertaken for the oil spill compensation fund concluded that the
Gulf will recover from the effects of the spill by the end of 2012, although full recovery of
oyster beds may take from six to ten years longer. John Schwartz & Mark Schrope, Report
Foresees Quick Gu(f of Mexico Recovery from Spill Damage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2011, at A15; see also
John Schwartz & Mark Schrope, On Gulf Oil Spill Effects, Doing Science with a Deadline, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2011, at A19 (reporting on criticisms of the report and its author and
acknowledging that it was based on available data at the time it was written).
94. Curt Anderson, Long, Costly Legal Battle Looms, GREENWIRE (July 27, 2010), http://
www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2010/07/27/8 ("So far, more than 300 federal lawsuits
have been filed in 12 states. The plaintiffs range from shrimpers to condo owners to the
owners of Ripley's Believe It or Not Museum, all claiming economic losses from the spill.
There have also been wrongful death and injury suits filed by relatives of the 11 men who
died when the Deepwater Horizon rig exploded April 20. Some BP PLC investors [have even
sued] because of the dip in BP's stock."). In addition, Alabama filed suit against BP,
Transocean, and Halliburton, "citing negligence and failure to adhere to industry safety
standards," and seeking "economic and compensatory damages." Susanne Pagano, Alabama
Sues BP, Transocean, Others for Negligence, Safety Violations in Oil Spill, 41 ENV'T REP. 1869, 1897
(2010); see also Alexander Cockburn, Law Professor Warns of Federal Manslaughter Charges over
BP' Deepwater Oil Spill, THE WEEK (Feb. 17, 2011, 7:29 AM) http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk/
75220,news-comment,news-politics,bp-could-face-1Obn-fines-and-jail-time-for-officials#ixzzlFZ
LTYsN2 (reporting that the federal government has announced it will file civil and criminal
claims against the three principal companies involved in the spill and predicting that BP will
face record criminal fines and could face federal manslaughter charges for the eleven deaths
of rig crew members).
95. Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, GulfSpill Is the Largest of its Kind, Scientists Say,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2010, at Al4; see alsoJustin Gillis & John Collins Rudolf, Oil Plume is Not
Breaking Down Fast, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2010, at AI3 ("New research confirms the
existence of a huge plume of dispersed oil deep in the Gulf of Mexico and suggests that it
has not broken down rapidly, raising the possibility that it might pose a threat to wildlife for
months or even years.").
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B. The Nuclear Industry
The nuclear industry emerged almost at the same time as the
offshore drilling industry, with the licensing of the first U.S.
commercial nuclear power plant in 1957 in Beaver County,
Pennsylvania.96  For the past twenty years, nuclear energy has
provided roughly twenty percent of baseload electrical power in the
United States.97  The primary reason for the steady nature of
nuclear power's contribution to the electric power grid is the
improved efficiency of nuclear power plants, which have provided
increasingly reliable power during the past several decades.98
While Deepwater Horizon was far from the first offshore drilling
accident of such magnitude, the accident at TMI-2 on April 28,
1979 was the first Class 9 accident the industry had experienced in
96. See NRC: History, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMMISSION, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/
emerg-preparedness/history.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2011) (reporting that the
"Shippingport Atomic Power Station construction [was] completed at a cost of $72,500,000"
in 1957). "The country's first large-scale civilian atomic power plant started generating
electricity for commercial use on December 18, 1957. The plant, on the Ohio River twenty-
five miles northwest of Pittsburgh, was built in thirty-two months. It [was] 'the world's first
full-scale atomic electric power plant devoted exclusively to peacetime uses.'" Id.; see also
Neal H. Lewis, Interpreting the Oracle: Licensing Modifications, Lconomics, Safety, Politics, and the
IFuture of Nuclear Power in the United States, 16 Ais. L.J. SC. & TECIl. 27, 54 (2006) ("[T]he first
civilian nuclear power plant came on-line in Shippingport, Pennsylvania [in 1957].").
97. Lewis, supra note 96, at 43 (noting that "[s]ince 1990, nuclear power has steadily
maintained a 20% share of electricity production."). To accommodate the public's
vacillating energy needs, electric utilities need access to power generating plants of varying
capacity. See Fred Bosselman, Ecological Advantages of Nuclear Power, 15 N.Y.U. ENvrtI. L.J. 1,
5-7 (2007). The majority of the time, during non-peak hours or seasons, this role is filled by
"baseload" power plants, which operate continuously. Id.
98. Lewis, supra note 96, at 29 n.10 ("[Tihe most important development in nuclear
power during the 90's was increased efficiency. Nuclear power plant operation uptime
increased almost every year from 60% in 1990 to 88% in 2000."). See also Nathan Hultman,
Jonathan G. Koomey, & Daniel M. Kammen, VWiat IItoy Can Teach Us About the Future Costs
of U.S. Nuclear Power, 41 ENVrL. SCI. & TECH., 2088, 2091 (2007), available at http://
rael.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/old-site-files/2007/HultmanetalNticlearViewpoint2007
.pdf (attributing the improvement in the operating capacity of nuclear plants to
"improvements in utilization rates and decreases in service down time"). Plant utilization
rates increased after the NRC changed its rules to permit certain maintenance activities to be
performed while a plant is operating. This shortened the time that a plant is out of service
for refueling because much of the maintenance that could only be done on a plant during
refueling can now be done at almost any time during operation. See Monitoring the
Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, 56 Fed. Reg. 31306 (July 10, 1991)
(amending the NRC's regulations); see also JOIIN GAERTNER, KEN CANAVAN, & Douc TRUE,
ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCI I INST., SAFETY AND OPERATIONAl. BENEFITS OF RISK INFORMED
INI TIATIvES 6-7, 14 (2008), available at http://mydocs.epri.com/docs/Corporate
Documents/SectorPages/Portfolio/Nuclear/Safety-anIOperationalBenefitsl016308.pdf.
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over 3,000 reactor-years of operation in the United States. Since
1979, there have been forty-seven incidents at domestic reactors
that required plants to shut down for more than a year because of
safety concerns,'" but none of these came close in severity to what
happened at TMI-2.'0 ' While the number of nuclear accidents that
have occurred domestically is only slightly lower than the number
of recorded drilling accidents on the OCS,10 2 the environmental
impacts of the nuclear incidents have been substantially less
severe. o0 Each incident, including TMI-2,' 4 was contained with
99. A Class 9 accident is the most serious classification of nuclear power plant accidents.
See A.M. METWALLY, Nuclear Accidents and Associated Environmnental Risk, in PROCEEIDINGS OF
THE 2ND ENviRONMENTAL PHYSICS CONFERENCE 223, 225 (2006), available at http://
www.physicseqypt.org/epcG6/epc632.pdf (describing the NRC accident classification system
as providing guidelines for license applicants "to analyze a set of postulated severe accidents
to show that the facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the
public," while also attempting to establish a relationship between the "anticipated frequency
of occurrence and potential radiological consequences"); see also Lewis, supra note 96, at 48
n.143 ("Three Mile Island and Chernobyl are 'the only major accidents to ... occur[] in
some 12,000 cumulative reactor-years of commercial operation in [thirty-two] countries.'").
100. See Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., We're Not Ready, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2010, at A23
(describing "[a] nother frightening accident" in 2002 at the Davis-Besse plant in Ohio, where
a "hidden leak led to corrosion that caused a near-catastrophe. By the time the problem was
discovered, only a thin layer of stainless steel was left to hold back the disaster."). More
recently, radioactive tritiumn leaked from underground pipes at the Vermont Yankee nuclear
power plant in Vernon, Vermont. See Peter Behr, Experts Weigh Extending the Lives of Nuclear
Power Plants for 80 Years, CLIMATEWIRE (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/
climatewire/print/2010/09/20/1. Before that, in 2007, part of the plant's cooling tower
collapsed. Id.
101. Since the partial core meltdown at TMI-2, there have been accidents of even greater
significance at Chernobyl in the Ukraine and at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear generating
station in Japan; of the two accidents, only the Japanese one has had an impact on the safety
of domestic nuclear reactors. See Hannah Northey, NRC Rethinking Major Safety Requirements
AfterJapan's Disaster, GREENWIRE (June 27, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/
2011/06/27/2 ("The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is reconsidering deep-seated safety
assumptions after a massive earthquake and tsunami crippled a Japanese nuclear plant in
March and revealed potential deficiencies in the United States' own safety guidelines."); see
also infra note 413 (discussing NRC review of nuclear power plants' safety features after the
Japanese accident).
102. See generally supra Part L.A (discussing the accident record of the offshore drilling
industry).
103. Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors, WORLI) NUCLEAR Ass'N (Sept. 30, 2011) http://
www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf06.html.
104. See Laurence Stern et al., Chapter 4: The Tough Fight to Confine the Damage, WASH.
Posr, Apr. 8, 1979, at Al [hereinafter Stern et al., The Tough Fight to Confine the Damage],
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/tmi/stories/
ch4.htm (quoting Metropolitan Edison's chief technical official as saying, "We didn't injure
anybody with this accident; we didn't seriously contaminate anybody, and we certainly didn't
kill anybody.").
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minimal environmental and human exposure. os
1. The Three Mile Island Unit 2 Accident and Core Meltdown
"The TMI accident scared the hell out of us . . . . [T]he
possibility of a serious accident ceased to be a theoretical
possibility, a highly unlikely event, and from that point on we
began thinking much more seriously that accidents can really
happen."'o
The accident at TMI-2' 7 in Middletown, Pennsylvania, occurred
after the 880-megawatt plant had been operating at nearly full
power (ninety-seven percent) for just over three months.'os The
accident started uneventfully, with a mechanical failure (for
reasons that are still unknown) in the secondary, non-nuclear part
of the plant.00 This failure caused the pumps in that system to shut
down,"' which, in turn, shut down the main pumps responsible for
105. See WORLD NUCLEAR ASS'N, supra note 103 ("[The reactor was severely damaged but
radiation was contained and there were no adverse health or environmental
consequences."); see also KEMENY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 12 (reporting that
the NRC indicated the releases of radioactive steam were too small to cause any increase in
detectable cancers); U.S. NUCLEAR REGUiATORY COMM'N, BACKGROUNDER: THREE MILE
ISIAND ACCIDENT 1 (2009) [hereinafter NRC BACKGROUNDER] available at http://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.pdf (noting the average dose
to the approximately 2 million people in the area was only about I millirem, well below the
average exposure of 6 millirem for a chest x-ray). But seeJoby Warrick, Study Links Three Mile
Island Radiation Releases to Higher Cancer Rates, WASH. Post, Feb. 24, 1997, at A06, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longtern/tmi/stoies/study022497.htm
(reporting that a 1997 University of North Carolina study found increases in lung cancer and
leukemia near the plant, contradicting a 1990 Columbia University analysis using the same
data that found no "clear connection between the accident and cancer rates among residents
living near the plant").
106. JOSEPH V. REES, HOSTAGES OF EACH OTHER 27 (1994) (quoting a high level NRC
official).
107. At the time of the accident, Unit I was shut down for routine refueling. J. SAMUEL
WALKER, THREE MILE ISLAND: A NUCLEAR CRISIS IN HISTORIcAL PERSPECIVE 71 (2004).
108. See Laurence Stern et al., Chapter 1: A Pump Failure and Claxon Alert, WASI. POST,
Apr. 8, 1979, at Al [hereinafter Stern et al., A Pump Failure and Claxon Alert], available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/tmi/stories/ch4.htm.
Although the plant began operations shortly before the end of 1978, in the early days of
1979 the plant repeatedly came off line to address various problems, such as leaks in the
piping and pump system. Id.; see also Lewis, supra note 96, at 49; James Cook, Inpo's Race
Against Time, FORBES, Feb. 24, 1986, at 54, 54, 57 (noting that Unit 2 was running at ninety-
seven percent power and comparing it to the Davis-Besse nuclear plant, which had the same
valve closure problem while it was running at nine percent power).
109. For a gripping chronological account of the accident and its aftermath, see generally
H'ALKER, supra note 107.
110. The operators, who were trying to unclog some piping in the secondary water
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bringing cooling water to the reactor."' This situation caused the
reactor to "scram.""' When the primary feedwater pump system
failed, three backup auxiliary pumps were designed to come online
automatically.' 1 However, the control room operators had turned
those pumps off because they had been coming online for no
apparent reason; the operators did not, at the time, know that
water was flowing out of the nuclear core, and they feared
(erroneously) that the core was being flooded with too much
water."4  Having completely misdiagnosed the situation, the
operators actually began to drain water from the reactor.1
Regardless, even if the operators had not shut off the backup
pumps, all three valves in that system had been closed for routine
maintenance and the system would not have been able to pump
any water to the reactor.'
Although the pumps were later activated manually, loss of
coolant from the primary loop and the failure to activate the
circulation system, accidentally blocked the flow of cooling water to the reactor, which
stopped heat removal. Three Mile Island: The Inside Stony-Five Hours in Which 1he Unthinkable
Hapened, SMITIISONIAN NAT'L MUSEUM OF AM. HIST. http://americanhistory.si.edu/tmi/
tmi03.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) [hereinafter SMITI ISONIAN, Five Hours].
11l. NRC BACKGROUNDER, suprra note 105, at 1.
112. When a reactor "scrams," control rods are dropped into the core to block nuclear
fission from occurring or to slow the rate down. In the case of TMI-2, because the plant had
been operating at nearly full capacity, the reactivity in the fuel rods continued to generate
considerable heat even after the control rods were inserted, which caused the remaining
water in the reactor to boil away and left the rods exposed. SMITHSONIAN, live Hours, supra
note 110.
113. See WALKER, supra note 107, at 76 ("About two minutes into the accident, the high-
pressure injection pumps, a part of the ECCS, automatically activated in response to the loss
of coolant from the core.").
114. NRC BACKGROUNDER, supra note 105, at I (noting that the control room operators
relied on pressurizer water levels, which were high, because they did not know that steam
pockets, created by bubbles of steam from the boiling reactor core, were forming, and there
was no instrument in the control room reporting core water levels); see KEMENY COMMISSION
R.PORT, supra note 15, at 98 (explaining that steam bubbles forming in the reactor coolant
system displaced reactor cooling water, which moved into the pressurizer and sent
pressurizer levels higher, suggesting that the "the core was on its way to being uncovered," as
more water was leaving the system than was being added to it); see also id. at 100 ("Steam
bubbles formed by the rapidly over-heating rods forced cooling water away from the fuel
rods."); SMIIISONIAN, Five Hours, supra note 110 (stating that the operators were trained to
prevent an over-filling of the pressure vessel with water and explaining that the operators
though this was happening because the boiling water in the core created the impression that
it was filling with water).
115. KEMENY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 94.
116. Stern et al., A Pump Failure and Claxon Alert, supra note 108, at 3; cf REES, supra note
106, at 17 ("A good benchmark for power plant complexity is the number of valves it has; a
typical nuclear reactor has 40,000-ten times the number in a coal fired plant.").
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auxiliary cooling system caused pressure to mount in the pipes,
triggering the automatic opening of what is known as a pilot
operated relief valve (PORV) . The valve should have closed after
the release of excess pressure, but a mechanical fault prevented this
from happening."' The open valve allowed cooling water to escape
from the primary system instead of being directed into the reactor
core."9 "Temperatures inside the reactor began to soar. Readings
climbed 30 degrees in less than 3 seconds." 20 Even though the
scramming of the reactor halted the chain reaction in the core, the
system was still generating heat and temperatures continued to
climb.'"'
Two minutes into the accident, the plant's emergency core
cooling system (ECCS) activated automatically, 2 2 but an operator
turned off one of the pumps and significantly "throttled back" on
the operation of the other because he feared that the pressure
vessel was filling with water.'2  The operator then compounded this
error by shutting off the four reactor coolant pumps because they
were vibrating badly from excessive amounts of steam, and he was
afraid they would be damaged.'2 4  Thus, approximately two hours
into the accident, after virtually all pumps carrying cooling water to
117. The function of the PORV is to blow off over-heated radioactive water within the
pressure vessel. Stern et al., A Pump Failure and Claxon Alert, supra note 108, at 2.
118. NRC BACKGROUNDER, supra note 105, at 1.
119. Stern et al., A Pump Failure and Claxon Alert, supra note 108, at 2 (describing how the
relief valve, which had automatically opened "to blow off superheated, radioactive water
within the containment structure," failed to close, allowing pressurized steam "to continue
pouring out of the reactor"); NRC BACKGROUNDER, supra note 105, at I (explaining that the
relief valve failed to close, allowing cooling water to pour out of the "stuck-open valve" and
causing "the core of the reactor to overheat").
120. Stern et al., A Pump Failure and Claxon Alert, supra note 108, at 3. Once temperature
indicators in the control room reached 750 degrees, the control room machinery began
printing question marks for the next eleven hours. Id. at 5; see WALKER, supra note 107, at 78
("Later investigations estimated that in some parts of the core, the temperature reached four
thousand degrees Fahrenheit or more.").
121. Stern et al., A Pump Failure and Claxon Alert, supra note 108, at 3.
122. WALKER, supra note 107, at 76 (noting, in addition, that the system "performed
flawlessly"). An ECCS is a backup system that automatically starts and "uses existing plant
equipment to ensure that cooling water covers the [reactor] core." KEMENY COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 15, at 89. The Kemeny Commission defined the ECCS as "[a] backup
system designed to supply cooling water to the reactor core in a loss-of-coolant accident." Id.
at 174.
123. See id. at 76-77 (explaining that the system was turned off because operators feared
the pressurizer was "going solid," i.e. was filling with water, which would have interfered with
the operators' ability to control pressure in the system).
124. See id. at 77.
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the core had been shut off, no water was circulating to the reactor
core, leaving it exposed. 2 5
The intense heat in the core caused a reaction between the steam
forming in the core and the Zircaloy nuclear fuel rod cladding,
which destroyed the cladding and further damaged the fuel rods,
releasing more radioactivity into the reactor coolant.2 6  This
process caused a small explosion due to the production of
hydrogen gas. Radioactive water quickly accumulated on the
floor of the containment building, which activated sump pumps
that moved the water out of the containment structure into tanks in
the auxiliary building.12 8  The activation of the sump pumps,
together with the operator's deactivation of the ECCS pumps and
the fact that three valves had been taken out of service for routine
maintenance at the time of the accident, made the situation much
worse; had these circumstances not all come to pass at the same
time, the accident might have quickly been brought under
control. 29
Over three hours into the accident, a monitor in the
containment building showed radiation at 8 rems per hour, which
125. See Stern et al., A Pump Failure and Claxon Alert, supra note 108, at 5 (reporting that
after "an operator turned off four cooling pumps, two at 1 hour 15 minutes and two more at
1 hour forty minutes into the accident . . . , the water level in the reactor vessel plunged
again, uncovering the core and fuel rods for the first time .... The water level had dropped
at least four feet below the top of the core, uncovering one-third of the fuel rods."); see also
SMITHSONIAN, Five Hours, supra note 110 ("4:05-6:00 a.m. The water in the reactor boils
away, leaving more and more of the reactor's fuel 'high and dry.'").
126. By the time the accident ended, over ninety percent of the cladding around the fuel
rods had been destroyed. KEMENY COMMISSION REP'ORT, supra note 15, at 30; see also Mark P.
Widoff, The Accident at Three Mile Island, 4 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 223, 223 (1982) ("Fuel rods in
reactor core unit 2 (TMI-2) melted because of coolant loss. The meltdown caused highly
radioactive fission byproducts and uranium pellets to be released into the water coolant
system and into the atmosphere.").
127. KEMENY COMMISSION REPORT, siupra note 15, at 99. Though the NRC initially
worried that an explosion within the reactor containment building might occur because of a
large hydrogen bubble in the reactor pressure vessel dome, staff later concluded that the
absence of oxygen in the vessel meant the bubble could neither burn nor explode. See NRC
BACKGROUNDER, supra note 105, at 2. The effect of hydrogen bubbles in reactor
containment vessels was dramatically illustrated by the explosions that partially destroyed two
of the outer containment buildings at the Fukushima nuclear generating station in March
2011. See David Biello, Partial Meltdown Led to Hydrogen Explosions at Fukushima Nuclear Power
Plant, SCIE.NTIFIC AMERICAN, Mar. 14, 2011, http://www.scientificamerican.com/
article.cfm?id=partial-meltdowns-hydrogen-explosions-at-fukushima-nuclear-power-plant.
128. Stern et al., A Pump Failure and Claxon Alert, supra note 108, at Al. Had water
remained in the reactor vessel rather than being diverted to the auxiliary building in the
form of steam, it might have provided some cooling function for the core. Id. at 5.
129. Stern et al., A Pump Failure and Claxon Alert, supra note 108, at 4.
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an hour later caused the building's automatic isolation. 130
Subsequent inspections of the reactor pressure vessel showed that
five feet, roughly half of the reactor core, had been destroyed, and
around twenty tons of uranium had flowed to the bottom of the
reactor pressure vessel.1"' This prompted an executive vice
president of Metropolitan Edison's parent company, GPU Nuclear,
to state that "molten fuel 'flowed like hot olive oil"' during the
accident. 32 Fortunately, the pressure vessel did not fail, and the
five inch steel floor underneath the reactor vessel maintained its
integrity.' Thus, the damaged fuel with nearly all of the
radioactive isotopes remained in the core,'3 sparing the residents
of nearby Harrisburg and other surrounding communities from
what otherwise would have been an environmental and public
health disaster. Had the extent of the emergency been known at
the time-that half of the core had melted onto the containment
floor-the surrounding area might well have been immediately
evacuated. 3 5
TMI-2 is now decommissioned; its fuel has been removed and
sent to a Department of Energy storage facility, along with debris
from the reactor core, the reactor coolant system has been drained,
130. Radiation levels in the plant buildings were high enough to require a declaration of
a general emergency, which did not occur until much later. SMITI ISONIAN, Five Hours, suisra
note 110; see also Stern et al., A Pump Failure and Claxon Alert, supra note 108, at 6 (reporting
that control room alarms were set to go off when radiation in the containment area reached
eight rems); KEMENY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 101-02 ("[At] 7:20 a.m., a
radiation dome monitor high in the containment building was reading 8 rems per hour ....
[T]hose in the control room interpreted the monitor's alarm as meaning that the radiation
present in the containment building at the time was about 800 rems per hour.").
131. SMITHIISONIAN, Five Hours, supra note 110. The full extent of the core damage was not
appreciated during and immediately after the accident. The NRC did not realize that almost
one half of the fuel rods in the reactor had been destroyed until 1987, nor did they realize
that molten fuel had pooled on the reactor vessel floor until a decade after the accident.
Three Mile Island: The Inside Story-Five Score Years of Nuclear Power, SMITHSONIAN NAT'L
MUSEUM OF AM. HIsT., http://americanhistory.si.edu/tmi/tmill.htm (last visited Oct. 2,
2011) [hereinafter SMITHSONIAN, Five Score Years]; seeWAIKER, supra note 107, at 229 (noting
that approximately "70 percent of the core had been damaged," and fifty percent of the core
had melted, causing Metropolitan Edison to abandon any thoughts it had of reopening Unit
2).
132. WALKER, supra note 107, at 229.
133. SMITHSONIAN, Five Hours, supra note 110; see alo WAIKER, supra note 107, at 231
(recounting the reasons why the pressure vessel did not fail).
134. SeeKEMENY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 29-31 (describing the fate of solid
and gaseous radioactive isotopes).
135. WALKER, supra note 107, at 241 (stating that had the NRC realized the nuclear core
had "melted," it would have recommended a "full-scale evacuation," which Governor
Thornburgh would have ordered); accord SMITHSONIAN, Five fours, supra note 110.
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and the radioactive water has been decontaminated and
evaporated.'36  In 1993, the operating license for Unit 2 was
amended to a "possession only" license, which authorized long-
term monitoring and storage at the facility.'3  The current owner
of Unit 1, Exelon, is monitoring the site. 1
The economic impact of the accident on Metropolitan Edison,
the owner and operator of Three Mile Island Units 1 and 2, and on
the nuclear power industry was devastating. In approximately two
hours, conditions at Unit 2 turned what had been a billion-dollar
asset for the company into a multibillion-dollar liability. " It cost
more to clean up Unit 2 than to build it. 141 In the decades that
followed the accident at TMI-2, sixty-five U.S. nuclear power plants
were cancelled."' The NRC issued the last construction permit for
136. NRC BACKGROUNDER, supra note 105, at 4; see albo WALKER, supra note 107, at 229-32
(describing Unit 2 cleanup, including the defueling operation).
137. Industry, DICKINSON C., http://www.threemileisland.org/industry.html (last visited
Oct. 2, 2011). Unit 1 resumed operating in 1985 after the Supreme Court held the National
Environmental Policy Act did not counsel against its restart. See Metropolitan Edison Co. v.
People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983); SMITHSONIAN, Five Hours, supra note
110.
138. In 2001, FirstEnergy acquired Unit 2 from General Public Utilities Nuclear
Corporation (GPU), an electric utility holding company consisting of three operating
companies-Jersey Central Power & Light Co., Pennsylvania Electric Company, and
Metropolitan Edison. Industry, supra note 137. The three operating companies owned
Three Mile Island at the time of the accident, with Metropolitan Edison operating both TMI
Units 1 and 2. Id. In 1982, operation of Units 1 and 2 was transferred from Metropolitan
Edison to GPU to separate "the current actions of the company from those at the time of the
accident." Id. In 1999, GPU sold Unit I to AmerGen Energy, ajoint venture of PECO (later
Exelon) and a British energy company. Id. FirstEnergy merged with GPU, which ended its
existence as an electric utility holding company, leaving the three original operating
components of GPU as subsidiaries of FirstEnergy. Id. FirstEnergy and Exelon plan to keep
Unit 2 mothballed until Unit I's license expires, at which point both plants will be
permanently decommissioned. See NRC BACKGROUNDER, supra note 105, at 4. In 2009, Unit
1's operating license was extended from 2014 to 2034. See Stephen Heiser, NRC Renews
Operating License for Three Mile Island far an Additional 20 Years, NUCLEAR STREET (Oct. 26,
2009, 8:55 AM), http://nuclearstreet.com/nuclear-power..industrynews/b/nuclear-
powernews/archive/2009/10/26/nrc-renews-operating-license-for-three-mile-island-nuclear
-power-plant-for-an-additional-20-years-10261.aspx (noting that Unit I's license extension was
the fifty-fifth renewal by the NRC since the agency started renewing expired operating
licenses); see albo NRC Approves 20 Year License Renewal for Three Mile Island, PA ENERGY
ALLIANCE (Apr. 19, 2011), http://paenergyalliance.com/nrc-approves-20-year-license-
renewal-for-three-mile-island.
139. Herbert, supra note 100.
140. Id. It took nearly twelve years and cost approximately $973 million to clean up TMI-
2. 7Te TMI-2 Cleanup: Challenging and Succesful, Am. NtUCiLEAR Soc'y, http://www.ans.org/
pi/resources/sptopics/tmi/cleanup.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
141. See Cancelled U.S. Commercial Nuclear Reactors, DArA.GOv, http://explore.data.gov/
Energy-and-Utilities/Cancelled-U-S-Commercial-Nuclear-Power-Reactors/fxtq-q53p (last
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a commercial nuclear power plant the year before the accident; the
last licensed plant began operation in 1996.142
Both the deepwater drilling and nuclear power industries are
important contributors to this country's economic well-being.
Regardless, their contributions are not without risks to individual
workers and the environment in which they operate. This Part of
the Article has shown that the risks of catastrophic accidents and
their attendant human and environmental consequences are
realized more often on offshore drilling rigs than at nuclear power
plants. The next part of the Article discusses the remarkable
similarities between the direct and indirect causes of the Macondo
well blowout and the Three Mile Island partial core meltdown,
despite the fact that they occurred in two quite different industries
and over thirty years apart.
II. THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT CAUSES OF THE MACONDO WELL
BLOWOUT AND THE THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 2 CORE MELTDOWN
Unlike TMI-2, where a cascade of events emanating from a single
mechanical failure can be isolated and examined post hoc,
precisely what happened on the Deepwater Hoizon drilling rig is
unknown because the rig was partially destroyed and several people
with critical knowledge of the accident died tragically. Despite the
unknowns, the President's Oil Spill Commission identified the
probable causes of the accident after an exhaustive six-month
inquiry. Direct causes identified by the Commission include the
many operator errors, discussed below, that occurred on the rig
visited Dec. 18, 2011) (click the "xls" file ready for download) (listing sixty-five cancelled
reactors); see abso Amanda Leiter, The PeriLs of a HaflBuilt Bridge: Risk Perception, Shifting
Majorities, and the Nuclear Power Debate, 35 ECOLOcY L.Q. 31, 56 (2008) ("Since 1978 ... no
new plants have been ordered and more than 100 reactor contracts have been canceled.");
Lewis, supra note 96, at 28 ("In the twenty years prior to 1990, one hundred licenses were
issued to operate nuclear reactors. A license for a new nuclear facility in the United States
has not been issued since the Watts Bar 1 facility was permitted in 1996 .... Over one
hundred permits that were issued for the construction of nuclear facilities were withdrawn
during the 7 0's and 80's."); Christopher C. Chandler, Recent Developments in Licensing and
Regulation at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 58 ADMIN. L. REv'. 485, 485 (2006) ("[M]ore
than three decades have passed since a utility company placed an order for a new nuclear
plant in the United States"); Widoff, supra note 126, at 225 ("[E]xpenditures for new
plan[tis and the unprecedented cost of borrowing money have discouraged new
construction.").
142. The last commercial nuclear plant constructed in the U.S began operating in 1996,
and the last nuclear power plant construction permit was issued in 1978. SMIlHSONIAN, live
Score Years, supra note 131.
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both before and during the accident,1 4 1 which may have severely
compromised the ability of available systems to prevent the
accident and increased the risk of what otherwise might have been
an avoidable, or at least containable, accident. When design
deficiencies and failures of key components are added to the list of
causes, the exact same story can be told about the accident at TMI-
2.144 In addition, in each case, pressure to keep operations on
schedule contributed to a culture in which safety was less important
than the economic bottom line and operating risks were under-
appreciated by both management and the operating crews.1
While regulatory failures also contributed to each accident, a
detailed examination of those contributions is beyond the scope of
this Article, except insofar as they may be attributed to industry
pressure. For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to repeat
143. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at vii ("The immediate causes of the Macondo
well blowout can be traced to a series of identifiable mistakes made by BP, Halliburton, and
Transocean that reveal such systematic failures in risk management that they place in doubt
the safety culture of the entire industry."); see also Hoffman, supra note 18 at 2 (saying the
accident "was a chain of important errors made by people in critical situations involving
complex technological and organization systems." (quoting Robert Bea, an engineering
professor at the University of California-Berkeley)).
144. Lewis, supra note 96, at 49 (describing the accident at TMI-2 as "the result of a
combination of personnel error, design deficiencies, and component failures").
145. The President's Oil Spill Commission found a difference among the attitudes of
offshore oil and gas companies toward safety depending on where their operations were
located. The Commission noted that from 2004 to 2009, fatalities in U.S. waters were four
times higher per person-hours worked than in European waters and concluded that this
difference reinforced the conclusion that the problem was "not an inherent trait of the
business itself, but rather depends on the differing cultures and regulatory systems under
which members of the industry operate." COMMISSION REPORr, supra note 7, at 225.
146. This article does not examine the extent to which the principal regulatory agencies
may have been captured by the oil and gas industry and the extent to which this lack of
objectivity interfered with what otherwise might have been more zealous oversight. For those
interested in that topic, see Emily Yehle, Regulators Warned Oil Companies Before Offshore
Inspections-IC, E&ENEWS PM (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/print/
2010/09/22/2 (reporting that DOI Inspector General Reports "in recent years found that
inspectors sometimes considered themselves part of the oil industry, accepted gifts from oil
companies and attended parties with gas and oil officials."). For a discussion of how
evisceration of the Council on Environmental Quality's "worst-case analysis" requirement
during the 1980s contributed to regulatory agencies' failure to conceive of and disclose
prospective effects of the catastrophic accident that overtook the Deepwater Horizon drilling
rig, see Houck, supra note 49, at 11037-39. Houck also describes environmental reviews of
the various phases of the lease approval process that led to the issuance of the exploration
permit to drill the Macondo well as "a stack of babushka dolls, each couching a smaller one,
each painted identically and saying the same misleading thing." Id. at 11037.
147. The President's Oil Spill Commission reported that the American Petroleum
Institute (API) played an important role in resisting new regulations that would have made
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the finding of the President's Oil Spill Commission that "the
regulation of the offshore oil and gas industry in the U.S. Gulf of
Mexico has not been robust, expertly staffed, well funded,
competent or nimble,"14 and that much the same could be said
about the "robustness" of NRC oversight of nuclear power plants
before TMI-2.149
offshore operations safer but also would have increased operational costs. See COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 7, at 225. The Commission also opined that the dependence of the MMS
on API safety standards, which reflected the "'lowest common denominator'-in other
words, a standard that almost all operators could readily achieve[,] ... undermined the
entire federal regulatory system." Id. See also Harold Meyerson, The Many Sins of Deregulation,
WASH. PosT, Aug. 26, 2010, at A13 ("So great was pressure to deregulate business that under
the Clinton Administration, the MMS embraced 'performance-based regulation,' by which
the companies themselves largely set the standards they would labor under."); Yehle, supra
note 146 (recounting how one supervisor directed an inspector not to report a
noncompliance incident on an Exxon Mobil platform, dismissing the incident as "a
misunderstanding," and reporting that problems with the platform still remained as of
September 2010, despite several noncompliance incidents); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Learning
from Disasters: Twenty-One Years After the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Will Reactions to the Deepwater
Horizon Blowout Finally Address the Systemic Flaws Revealed in Alaska, 40 ENvoIt. L. REP. 11041,
11042 (2010) (stating that the commission convened to examine the operational and
institutional failures leading up to the Exxon Valdez incident "noted multiple areas in the
'mega-systems' of extracting and transporting oil in which the official players, both
governmental and corporate, were enmeshed in a culture of complacency, collusion, and
neglect.").
148. Staff Working Paper No. 21, supra note 6 at 1. The Commission staff also attributed
the higher offshore fatality rate of U.S. oil and gas workers to the failure of the Department
of the Interior to "embrace a risk-based oversight approach." Id.
149. One author noted that the "pro-development and anti-regulation" message the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) received from the President and Congress led it to
"ignore[] the industry's institutional arrangements for managing and operating nuclear
power plants-that is, until TMI." See REES, supra note 106, at 31-32. In fact, before TMI-2, a
"flood of license applications in the late 1960s and early 1970s" and the "dramatically
increased size of the individual plants" overwhelmed the agency and caused long delays in
licensing. WALKER, supra note 107, at 41. Nuclear power critics called the licensing process
"a charade," designed to ensure the agency's goal of "licensing and construct[ing]...
nuclear power plants as expeditiously as possible." Id. at 43 (quoting STEVEN EBBIN &
RAPHAEL KASPER, CITIZEN GROUPS AND THE NUCLEAR POWER CONTROVERSY. USES OF
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INFORMATION 31 (1974)).
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A. Direct Causes of the Accidents 1 0
Many factors contributed to the accidents on the Deepwater
Horizon drilling rig and in the control room at TMI-2. Among these
causes were technical failures in key components at both facilities,
the manufacturers' failure to share critical information about these
problems with facility operators, operator errors that occurred both
before and during the accident, poor communication between
critical operating staff and management, and inadequate
emergency response training.
1. Technical Failures
Both the drilling rig and the nuclear power plant experienced
major technical problems prior to the Deepwater Horizon and TMI-2
accidents. A September 2009 audit showed that Transocean, the
owner and operator of the Deepwater Horizon rig, had allowed a
backlog of 390 maintenance jobs to accrue.'5 ' One outstanding job
at the time of the accident included the repair of a leak that had
occurred several weeks prior in the control pod of the blowout
preventer (BOP) , a piece of equipment that played a critical role
in the accident. 53  In violation of federal regulations, Transocean
150. On February 17, 2011, the Commission's Chief Counsel released his final report on
the causes of the accident, which goes into much greater detail than the January 11, 2011,
Commission Report, and lays most of the blame for the accident on BP. See Steven Mufson,
Federal Rport Lays Bulk of Fault for Gulf Spill on BP, WAsH. PosT, Feb. 18, 2011, at A18
(highlighting some of the findings of the report). A copy of the Chief Counsel's final report
can be accessed on the Commission's website, www.oilspillcommission.gov. In the foreword
to the report, the Commission's co-chairs, former EPA Administrator William Reilly and
former Senator Bob Graham, state that "[i]n clear, precise, and unflinching detail, this
Report lays out the confusion, lack of communication, disorganization, and inattention to
crucial safety issues and test results that led to the deaths of 11 men and the largest offshore
oil spill in our nation's history." CHIEF COUNSEL'S REPORT, supra note 65, at ix.
151. Achenbach & Hilzenrath, supra note 61. This audit found that the maintenance that
had not been performed "requir[ed] more than 3,500 hours of work" and "referred to the
amount of deferred work as 'excessive.'" Ian Urbina, Workers on Doomed Rig Voiced Concern
About Safety, N.Y. TIMEs,July 22, 2010, at Al.
152. Achenbach & Hilzenrath, supra note 61. The blowout preventer is "a five-story tower
of valves atop the well bore that can, in principle, lock down and shut off a runaway well."
Hoffman, supra note 18. One of the blowout preventer's pipe rams, which clamps around
the drill pipe and can block the upward migration of methane and fluids, had been
exchanged for an inoperable test version; further, one of the system's control pods, which
activates a shear ram that cuts through the drill pipe and shuts down the well, had a dead
battery. Id.
153. The Chief Counsel's final report, however, absolved defects in the blowout preventer
as a "root cause" of the blowout, as the rig crew only activated the equipment "at best"
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did not shut down operations on the rig when the drilling crew
discovered the leak.'14  Moreover, the BOP was significantly
overdue for an industry required inspection, ' and other key
components, such as BOP rams and valves that malfunctioned
during the accident, were ten years past their inspection due
dates.'5 6 In fact, at nine years old, the drilling rig had never been in
dry dock for repairs. 5  At the time of the accident, there were at
least twenty-six components and systems on the rig that were in
"'bad' or 'poor' condition,"'" including "mechanical problems with
the rig's ballast system . . . that could directly affect the stability of
the ship."'5 9  The rig also had leaking door seals, poor control
panels, and a diaphragm on a major pump that needed to be
replaced.'60 The evidence collected by the Oil Spill Commission
moments before the blowout, and hydrocarbons were well past the blowout preventer and
proceeding rapidly towards the rig platform at that time. Even if the system had functioned
"flawlessly, the rig would have exploded and 11 men would have died." CHIEF COUNSEL'S
REIPOltr, supra note 65, at 198; see also Gaskes May Iave Blown Out on Blowout Preventer,
GREENWIRE (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2011/02/25/9
(reporting that shear rams cut through and closed the riser, but the increased velocity of
crude coming tip the pipe at that point may have destroyed the equipment's gaskets).
154. Hoffman, supra note 18. The drilling crew notified BP's home office in Houston,
which neither suspended operations on the rig until the leak could be repaired nor notified
MMS of the problem. Id.
155. Katie Howell, BP Should Have Shut Down Doomed Rig Weeks Before Explosion, Regulator
Says, GREENWIRE (July 20, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2010/07/20/5 (noting
the blowout preventer was "past due on a three- to five-year inspection required by the
manufacturer and the American Petroleum Institute."). According to an MMS study,
blowout preventers had experienced 117 failures over a two-year period on the OCS at
depths from 1,300 to 6,560 feet. See Houck, supra note 49, at 11035 (noting that 138
recorded failures in waters off of Albania, Brazil, Italy, and Norway did "little" to inspire
confidence).
156. See Urbina, supra note 151, at Al (noting that a Transocean report found that "many
key components-including the blowout preventer rams and failsafe valves-had not been
fully inspected since 2000, even though guidelines require inspection of the preventer every
three to five years"); see also COMMISSION REPolor, supra note 7, at 114-15 (speculating that
the failure of the BOP's emergency disconnect system, which should have closed the blind
shear ram and severed the drill pipe, may have resulted from poor maintenance of the
system).
157. Urbina, supra note 151, at Al (quoting one rig worker as saying, "At nine years old,
Deepwater Horizon has never been in dry dock .... We can only work around so much.").
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. ("While the equipment report says the device's control panels were in fair
condition, it also cites a range of problems, including a leaking door seal, a diaphragm on
the purge air pump needing replacement and several error-response messages. The device's
annulars, which are large valves used to control wellbore fluids, also encountered
'extraordinary difficulties' surrounding their maintenance . . . ." (quoting a Transocean
equipment report)). The Transocean report also noted "the rig's malfunctioning pressure
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regarding the technical and mechanical problems that led to the
accident indicates that it was not "a single unlucky or freak event,
but rather an engineered catastrophe.""
TMI-2 had a similar technically problematic start to its life,
raising serious questions as to whether the plant was brought to full
power before the kinks had been worked out. From the time the
unit went online to the start of the accident, Unit 2 had been shut
down for seventy-one percent of the time (195 out of 274 days).'
According to the Kemeny Commission, this malfunction rate was
significantly worse than the usual forty percent rate experienced by
reactors during their start-up phase.'6 3 Many of the problems plant
operators found during the reactor's first year of operation were
similar to those that occurred during the accident.'6  By
comparison, Unit 1 had an exemplary safety record. 6 5
2. Information Failures
Apart from the technical problems that plagued both facilities,
the companies responsible for key components of the Macondo
well and Unit 2 failed to share critical information about the
integrity of those components with their owners and operators. For
example, critical tests measuring the stability of the cement used to
plug the Macondo well conducted days before the accident as part
of normal temporary well abandonment procedures'6 6 showed
gauge and leaking parts and faulted the decision by workers to use a type of sealant 'proven
to be a major cause of pump bearing failure.'" Id.
161. Achenbach & Hilzenrath, supra note 61 ("The calamity, the evidence now suggests,
was not an accident in the sense of a single unlucky or freak event, but rather an engineered
catastrophe-one that followed naturally from decisions of BP managers and other oil
company workers on the now-sunken rig.").
162. Stern et al., A Watchful Eye on the Black Ink, WASH. PosT, Apr. 9, 1979, at Al
[hereinafter Stern et al., Black Ink].
163. Id. at A2; see also KEMENY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 43 (reporting on
repeated problems with the condensate polishers over the eighteen months preceding the
accident, which were not corrected and "probably initiated the March 28 sequence of
events").
164. See Stern et al., Black Ink, supra note 162, at Al (noting that Unit 2 was shut down for
two weeks in January because of cooling system problems).
165. Three Mile Island: The Inside Story, NAT'L MUSEUM OF AM. HIST., BEHRING CENTER,
http://americanhistory.si.edu/tmi/tmi03.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2011). Unit 1, which
continued to operate after the accident at Unit 2, set a world record in 2003 for "the
continuous operation of a pressurized water reactor." Lewis, supra note 96, at 50.
166. See CHIEF COUNSEL'S REPORT, supra note 65, at 128 (describing the "basic
procedures" followed during temporary well abandonment, including conducting negative
pressure tests).
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anomalies, indicating that the cement was unstable. 67  This
information was not shared by Halliburton, who made the cement,
with BP or Transocean. "" Nor did Transocean share information
with BP about "a similar near miss" blowout incident during
temporary well abandonment procedures on one of its North Sea
drilling rigs that occurred a mere four months prior to the
Macondo well blowout.'69
The same failure to share critical information happened at TMI-
2. For example, a relief valve, designed to blow off over-heated
radioactive water within the Unit 2 pressure vessel that failed to
close during the accident because of a mechanical fault, had failed
on nine previous occasions in reactors "of similar design."o70
Babcock & Wilcox, the manufacturer of the Unit 2 reactor, did not
notify other operators of their reactors, including Metropolitan
Edison, about the problem.'7' Indeed, almost the entire chain of
events that occurred at TMI-2 had occurred in 1977 at a Babcock &
Wilcox reactor at Toledo Edison's Davis-Besse plant, but, in that
case, operators identified and corrected the problem quickly.7 1
Had any of this information been available to the Unit 2 control
room operators, "a simple breakdown would not have escalated
into a disastrous meltdown." 73
3. Operation Failures
In addition to the technical and information failures that
167. COMMiSSION REiOR'f, supra note 7, at 117-18.
168. Id.; see also CHIEF COUNSEL's RE'olr, supra note 65, at 124 (indicating that while BP
engineers were aware that the cement job on the Macondo well would be difficult and that
Halliburton's engineer was not doing "quality work," BP did not review the cement design
(quoting an internal BP document)).
169. CHIEF COUNSEL'S REPOR', supra note 65, at 230.
170. REEs, supra note 106, at 22.
171. Cook, supra note 108, at 54 (explaining that the NRC and Babcock & Wilcox, the
manufacturer of the Unit 2 and Davis-Besse reactors, had investigated the Davis-Besse valve
failure, but had not "alerted utilities with similar plants to take preventative measures").
172. REES, supra note 106, at 22 (noting that researchers at the Tennessee Valley
Authority and the NRC had "postulated and analyzed" the entire sequence of events that
later happened at TMI-2).
173. Id. at 22-23 (noting also that prior to TMI-2 there was no regulatory requirement or
industry procedure for distributing information about "abnormal events" to other utilities, or
for analyzing their safety significance or applicability to other plants); Senate Three Mile
Island Hearing, supra note 16 (statement of Peter B. Lyons, Comm'r, Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n) (saying if information from 1977 Davis-Besse plant accident had been shared with
Metropolitan Edison and if Unit 2 operators "had duplicated the operator response at Davis-
Besse, the nation would not have experienced TMI").
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occurred at both facilities, the drilling rig and control room
operators made bad decisions that effectively turned each accident
into a disaster. 74 These errors made the mechanical and technical
problems of both structures significantly worse,7  as did the initial
failure of facility operators to recognize what was happening. As
illustrated below, these failures can be linked both to inadequate
training and to an ambiguous, confusing flow of important
information during each accident, which the operators either
ignored or misinterpreted. Tragically, if any one of the errors that
occurred at either facility had been corrected at the time they
occurred, the accidents might have been averted. 7
Each crew ignored early warning signals and made questionable
decisions immediately prior to or in the early stages of each
accident. For example, an alarm system on the Deepwater Horizon
drilling rig designed to alert platform workers and prevent
174. One commentator noted, "[T]he Horizon disaster resulted from many human
errors and technical failings in a risk-taking corporation that operated in an industry with
ineffective regulatory oversight." Hoffman, supra note 18. The same commentator criticized
BP's decisions to include the use of single string from wellhead to well bottom instead of
hanging a liner from the last section of casing installed and cemented, to employ six
centralizers instead of the recommended twenty-one centralizers, and not to run a cement
bond log, an acoustic test measuring the success of the cement's bonding with the casing and
surrounding rock formation. Id. at 7.
175. William R. Freudenburg suggests that "'[h]uman error' is a value-laden term ... that
has often been used to describe situations that might more appropriately be blamed on
mismatches between people and machinery." William R. Freudenburg, Nothing Recedes Like
Success? Risk Analysis and the Organizational Amplification of Risks, 3 RISK: ISSUES IN HEAuri &
SAFETY 5, 6 (1992). Human errors "are commonly seen as the 'fault' of the individual
workers involved, rather than of any larger organizational systems . .. [,] tend by their nature
to be preventable and/or correctable... [,] [and] are often identified by official
investigations that are conducted after accidents and technological disasters as having been
key, underlying, causal factors." Id. at 6-7. The problems Freudenburg attributes to
individual workers range from "insufficient levels of capability (due to limited intelligence,
inadequate training, and absence of necessary talents, etc.) to ... low levels of motivation
(laziness, sloppiness, use of alcohol/drugs, etc.)." Id. at 6. These are "'[s]tochastic' human
factors," or "'stochastically predictable' problems," which can be triggered by "fatigue,
negative responses to stress, occasional errors in judgments, or prosaically predictable 'bad
days.'" Id. at 7. Engineered responses to these problems may make matters worse by making
the work more routine and boring. Id. at 8.
176. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 120-21 ("The drilling crew and other
individuals on the rig also missed critical signs that a kick was occurring. The crew could
have prevented the blowout-or at least significantly reduced its impact-if they had reacted
in a timely and appropriate manner. . . . The crew should have diverted the flow overboard
when mud started spewing from the rig floor. While that ultimately may not have prevented
an explosion, diverting overboard would have reduced the risk of ignition of the rising
gas."); see ao WALKER, supra note 107, at 77 ("As a consequence of mechanical failures and
operator errors, what began as a series of minor malfunctions escalated into a major crisis.").
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combustible gases from reaching potential sources of ignition had
been disabled because it had gone off frequently and kept the
drilling crew from getting needed sleep.'" Similarly, in the case of
TMI-2, the control room operators had grown used to ignoring
alarms because they went off all the time. 78  Further, the drilling
crew on the Deepwater Horizon rig made an inexplicable and
unexpected decision in light of prevailing practices to replace
heavy but expensive drilling muds with ocean water,'7 9 and placed
the well plug lower in the pipe than was commonly done,
precipitating the flow of gas up the pipe and reducing the ability of
the crew to contain it.'o The control room operators at TMI-2
made what appeared in hindsight to be an equally inexplicable
decision to turn off critical pumps that had automatically started in
the very early phases of the accident and would have kept the
reactor core flooded with water, preventing a core meltdown."
Moreover, in violation of NRC rules, all three valves on that system
177. David S. Hilzenrath, Technician: Deepwater Horizon Warning System Disabled, WASH.
PosT, July 23, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/0 7 /23/
AR2010072302515.html?nav=emailpage.
178. See Larry Foulke, Thirty Years After TMI: Five Lessons Learned, BULL. OF ATOMIC
SCIENTIsTS (Mar. 23, 2009), http://www.thebulletin.org/print/web-edition/features/
thirty-years-after-tni-five-lessons-learned (quoting a control room operator as saying, "I would
have liked to have thrown away the alarm panel. It wasn't giving us any useful information,"
and also noting that "[t]he operators were overwhelmed and unnerved from the 'alarm
avalanche."').
179. Achenbach & Hilzenrath, supra note 61 (citing additional examples of operational
failure, including BP managers' decision "to skip a typically routine, and time-consuming,
'cement bond log' test that could have detected fissures in the cementing of the well," to not
"use the recommended 21 'centralizers' to position the well prior to the cement job,
deploying just six instead," and to use "the cheaper of two well designs, one with fewer
barriers to rising gas but costing $7 to $10 million less"). Drilling muds play a critical role in
the exploration phase of offshore development: they stop oil from rushing up the pipe and
must remain in place even "as high tech equipment maneuvers in and out of the hole, as
steel tubing is installed to extract the oil, as the many leakage points are sealed ip . . . ."
Benjamin Ross, Danger Culture/Safety Culture, DISSENT, Winter 2011, at 7 (noting also that this
maneuvering is "done by remote control, uising communications lines, power cables, and
equipmentjammed together in a mud-filled tube miles long and inches wide.").
180. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 103 (discussing the fact that BP set the cement
plug deeper than permitted without approval from MMS, and "deeper than usual."). The
Commission also cited BP's decisions to set the plug lower than usual in the riser and to
displace the drilling muds before setting the plug as factors that both "substantially increased
the risk of a blowout." Id. at 120.
181. See WALKER, supra note 107, at 76-77 ("About four and a half minutes into the
accident,... the shift foreman[] ordered that one of the high-pressure injection pumps be
shut down and the other sharply throttled back.").
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had been closed for routine maintenance, 8 2 so that even if the
pumps had not been turned off, they could not have pumped any
water to the reactor. These decisions guaranteed that there would
be a core meltdown."
Additionally, there were several errors that occurred during the
course of each accident that prevented the drilling rig and power
plant crews from avoiding or, at least, containing each
catastrophe. 84  Each crew ignored or misinterpreted critical
technical information that should have informed them that an
abnormal situation was developing." In the case of Deepwater
Horizon, negative pressure tests used to evaluate the primary
integrity of the well repeatedly showed that hydrocarbons were
flowing into the well when they should not have been.8 6  The
drilling crew, refusing to believe what they were seeing, kept re-
running the tests and coming up with various explanations for the
anomalous readings until they convinced themselves that their
assumption (that oil could not be flowing in the well) was
182. Stern et al., A Pump Failure and ClaxonAlert, supra note 108, at 3.
183. See WALKER, supra note 107, at 77 (stating that "[i]n the first one hundred minutes
or so of the accident," if the PORV had been closed, the ECCS had been allowed "to perform
as designed," or reactor coolant pumps had been kept running, "the core would have
remained covered and the emergency would have ended with minimal effects").
184. In both cases, events occurred very rapidly with minimal time to intercept and
correct the errors that led to the accidents. See REES, supra note 106, at 17 (noting that
things can happen very rapidly when a malfunction occurs, as it did in Unit 2 when a critical
valve stuck in the open position, which left managers with very little time to correct the
malfunction). See albo COMMisSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 122 (noting that the drill rig
crew did not have much time to act, as the explosion dooming the rig happened
approximately six to eight minutes after mud first began to spew out of the well onto the rig
floor).
185. See Hoffman, supra note 18. Robert Bea, a professor at the University of California-
Berkeley, calls this behavior the "normalization of deviance," which happens when a
company has become so "used to operating at the margins of safety" that it "regard [s] red
flags as normal . . . ." Id. Red flags "cropped up repeatedly on the Macondo well, with the
frequency accelerating in the four days before the blowout." Id.
186. COMMIssION REPORT, supra note 7, at 119 (the negative pressure tests "showed
repeatedly that... hydrocarbons[] were flowing into the well. The failure to properly
conduct and interpret the negative-pressure test was a major contributing factor to the
blowout."). One possible reason for these failures was that neither BP nor Transocean had
any internal procedures for running or interpreting negative pressure tests and had not
formally trained their personnel in how to perform them. Id. In addition, BP's
abandonment procedures called for the running of two negative-pressure tests; instead, BP
dropped one of these tests, the second of which, had it been conducted "at a different
depth[,] might have given the rig crew another opportunity to recognize [missed]...
signals." CIIlEF COUNSEL'S RE'ORT, supra note 65, at 134-35.
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correct.87  The crew missed telltale signs of an impending
blowout-for example, signs that a spike in pressure had occurred
when pumps were turned off as part of the normal well
abandonment process.'" The crew also inexplicably did not do a
flow check when they observed that there was an anomalous
pressure reading between the drill pipe and so-called "kill line,"
which would have led to an immediate shut down of the well. 89
Similarly, Unit 2 control room operators did not believe the
incredibly high temperature and pressure readings from the PORV
line and the containment building that they were seeing on their
monitors.190 They thought the monitors were malfunctioning,
especially when they began to display a series of question marks for
the ensuing eleven hours.'9 ' The operators ignored other
indications that a serious accident was occurring, including rising
levels of radiation in the reactor buildings. 92 Further, key monitors
were not visible to the operators trying to control the accident,' 3
187. See COMMIsSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 6. The Commission referred to the
Transocean crew as having "started from the assumption that the well could not be flowing,
and kept running tests and coming up with various explanations until they had convinced
themselves their assumption was correct." Id. at 119.
188. See id. at 120-21; see also CHIEF COUNSEL'S REPORT, supra note 65, at 180-81
(commenting that while the Transocean rig crew noted an anomaly less than fifteen minutes
before the blowout started and shut the well down to investigate, the existence of several
anomalies that "should have 'caused alarm'" caused none).
189. COMMISSION REPORT, suIpra note 7, at 121.
190. Laurence Stern et al., 'Too Little Information Too Late,' WAsi. PosT, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/tmi/stories/app2.htm (last visitedJan.
2, 2012) [hereinafter Stern et al., 'Too Little Infomnation Too Late] (quoting the NRC's System
Safety Director as reporting that it took the NRC "until midnight last night [March 29] to
convince anybody that those goddamn temperature measurements meant something,"
because the people faced with a partial core meltdown simply did not "believe[] the
instrumentation as they went along").
191. See Stern et al., A Pump Failure and Claxon Alert, supra note 108; see also Foulke, supra
note 178, at 3 ("[N]ecessary information wasn't readily available in a convenient and
understandable form").
192. SMITHSONIAN, Five Hours, supra note 110.
193. Senate Three Mile Island Hearings, supra note 16 (statement of Peter B. Lyons,
Comm'r, Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n) (reporting that a conversation with a control room
operator during the accident made him no longer think that "a simple explanation of
operator error largely covered the event," but rather that "the design of the control room
and the instrumentation available to him dramatically limited his ability to comprehend the
situation"). In the case of TMI-2, ambiguous and confusing control room indicators, such as
a valve indicator light, designed to go dark and which did go dark during the accident when
the PORV was closed, did not actually reflect the position of the valve. WALKER, supl.ra note
107, at 73-74. Instead, all that it reported was that power was no longer flowing to the
operating mechanism. Id. at 74. This design defect delayed the proper response by the
control room operators. See id. A pressure indicator downstream of the PORV could have
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instruments in the control room did not show that a critical valve
was open, and there were no instruments to inform the operators
of the coolant level within the core.
Finally, each crew also overlooked critical safety systems that
might have prevented, or at least minimized, each accident. Key
members of the crew on the Deepwater Horizon rig failed to use
safety equipment that could have diverted the plume of drilling
muds and gas coming up the pipe overboard or closed the well, in
part because they had not been adequately trained in the
equipment's use.9 5 While these actions might not have prevented
the explosion that led to the rig's destruction, they "could have
given the crew more time and perhaps limited the impact of the
explosion."9 6  Similarly, Unit 2 operators disabled the very system
that could have prevented the core meltdown-the ECCS-
perhaps because they too had never been drilled in how to respond
to an accident of this dimension.9 7
4. Communication Failures
The bad decisions made by key personnel were intensified by
poor to non-existent communication between critical staff
preceding and during the course of each accident. In the case of
Deepwater Horizon, some have suggested that the lack of pre-accident
told the operators the valve was stuck open, but it was located behind seven foot high
instrument panels, requiring the operators to walk around the panels to determine
conditions in the reactor-coolant drain tank, which they were not trained to do because the
pressure indicator was not one of the indicators they were to use after an incident. Id.
194. See NRC BACKGROUNDER, supra note 105, at 1. It was not until two hours after the
accident started that operators realized the PORV could be stuck open and not until a full
hour after that before it dawned on them that the open valve meant the reactor could be
running out of water. See SMITHSONIAN, Five Hours, supra note 110. Although feedwater
pumps were turned on again, the cooling water could not penetrate the molten mass of
collapsed and melted fuel rods, so the internal heating process continued. See id.
195. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 122 ("[T]he rig crew had not been trained
adequately how to respond to such an emergency situation.").
196. Id. at 121.
197. See KEMENY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 10. ("[T]he training of TMI
operators was greatly deficient. While training may have been adequate for the operation of
a plant under normal circumstances, insufficient attention was paid to possible serious
accidents. And the depth of understanding, even of senior reactor operators, left them
unprepared to deal with something as confusing as the circumstances in which they found
themselves."); see abo Stern et al., A Pump Failure and Claxon Alert, supra note 108, at 4
(concluding that the decision to shut down the emergency core cooling system together with
the earlier decision to take three critical valves out of service simultaneously and divert
radioactive water from the containment building to the auxiliary building made the accident
much worse and assured that operators could not reverse or, at minimum, control it).
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coordination between Transocean and BP, both on the rig and
onshore, contributed to the blowout.'" The onboard drilling rig
crew and offshore management in Houston did not communicate
when the well's behavior became irreglar.'99  When the
unthinkable happened and drilling muds began to spill onto the
drilling deck floor, post-accident reports indicate that there was
chaos, with no one (on or off the rig) clearly in charge of
coordinating a response to the accident. 200
Similarly, as the accident at TMI-2 unfolded, no dedicated open
lines of communication existed between the nuclear plant and
either state or county offices of emergency preparedness, let alone
with the NRC in Bethesda, Maryland.20' In the early phases of the
accident, there was minimal communication between Unit 2's
control room operators and company management;202 it was not
until many hours later, well after the core had gone critical, that
anyone talked to the NRC. 20 ' The nearest town was not told of what
198. The Chief Counsel's Report noted that "[i]nadequate communication and excessive
compartmentalization of information contributed to the Macondo blowout." See CHIEF
COUNSEL's REPORT, supra note 65, at 227. It cited cementing and temporary abandonment
processes as key examples of the failure of BP's onshore engineers to communicate risks to
BP workers and contract personnel on the rig. Id. at 228.
199. See id. at 229-30 (reporting that a BP vice president who was on the rig before the
blowout and who had questioned an email he had received attributing negative pressure
tests to "a bladder effect" was not consulted, and neither was any shore-based engineer at the
company's headquarters in Houston).
200. Hoffman, supra note 18. For a riveting account of the accident, including the
pandemonium that occurred on the rig deck after it caught fire, see COMMISSION REPorr,
supra note 7, ch. 1.
201. The NRC "response center had no dedicated lines from the plant or a data
transmission system to speed the flow of information." WALKER, supra note 107, at 92. The
NRC Director of Regulation complained about "frightfully inadequate" site communications,
prompting "installation of dedicated [telephone] lines between the site, the White House,
the NRC, and the governor's office," including a red phone connecting him directly to
White House switchboard. Id. at 146-47. For a general discussion of the problems, see id.
chs. 4-5.
202. See REES, supra note 106, at 17 (explaining that company managers' non-involvement
in daily nuclear power plant operations was modus operandi before TMI-2; after the
accident, it was identified as "one of the industry's 'foremost safety and reliability issues'
(quoting Institute of Nuclear Power Operations)). This pattern of nuclear utility executives
not getting their hands "dirty" was the model followed by the utility industry when they were
operating fossil fired plants, where things were "pretty much left. . . to the plant manager to
run everything." Id. at 18 (quoting the chief executive officer of a nuclear utility).
203. SeeKEMENY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 101 (reporting that NRC Region I
did not learn of the accident until nearly four hours after it started, at which point plant
management had elevated what had been declared a "site emergency" to a "general
emergency" and had evacuated the auxiliary building).
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was happening until days later.20 4 Additionally, the company did
not tell state or federal officials that on the first day of the accident
there may have been a small hydrogen explosion in the
containment building.2 05 One of the NRC Commissioners later
revealed that it took the NRC over five weeks to learn that plant
operators had measured fuel temperatures near the melting point,
and they did not learn until years later, when the reactor vessel was
opened in July 1984, that nearly one-half of the fuel had already
melted when the company reported the accident to the NRC. 20 s
the Director of Regulation, Harold Denton, reported to a meeting
of the Commissioners:
It just seems like we are always second, third hand; [sic] second
guessing them. We almost ought to consider the [NRC] chairman
talking to the owner of the shop up there and get somebody from the
company who is going to inform us about these things in advance if
he can, and then what he is doing about it if he can't. We seem not
to have that contact.20 7
This reluctance to share information made the response of the
federal and state governments to the emergency more difficult and
attenuated.
Metropolitan Edison was also less than forthcoming with the
204. Laurence Stern et al., low the Crisis Was Managed, WASH. PosT, Apr. 9, 1979, at Al
[hereinafter Stern et al., flow the Crisis Was Managed], available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/tmi/stories/ch2.htm. The mayor of
Harrisburg learned of the accident after receiving a call from a Boston radio station asking
for his response to the nuclear emergency. KEMENY COMMISSION REPOK, supra note 15, at
104.
205. Laurence Stern et al., Danger of Day 3-Nuclear Shower If Core Melts, WASH. POST Apr.
9, 1979, at Al [hereinafter Stern et al., Danger of Day 3], available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/tmi/stories/ch6.htm; see also Stern et
al., 'Too Little Information Too Late, 'supra note 190 (reporting that the Systems Safety Director
said to the Commissioners: "[W]e just learned-I don't know-three hours ago, that on the
afternoon of the first day, some 10 hours into the transient, there was a 28 pound
containment pressure spike. We are guessing that there may have been a hydrogen
explosion. They, for some reason, never reported it here until this morning. That would
have given us a clue hours ago. . . .").
206. See Victor Gilinsky, Behind the Scenes of Three Mile Island, BuLL. OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS
(Mar. 23, 2009), http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/behind-the-scenes-of-three-
mile-island.
207. Stern et al., 'Too Little Information Too Late,' supra note 190. Stern et al. also quoted
Commissioner Hendrie as saying, "We are operating almost totally in the blind, [sic]
[Governor Thornburgh's] information is ambiguous, mine is non-existent and-I don't
know, it's like a couple of blind men staggering around making decisions. . . ." Id.
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NRC and Pennsylvania officials about the extent of the accident 208
and some of their post-accident behavior, such as venting steam
from the plant 209 and discharging radioactive water into the
Susquehanna River.2 "' To say that chaos reigned in the days that
followed TMI-2 would be an understatement, as critical plant and
government personnel, as well as the Governor of Pennsylvania,
tried to figure out what had happened, assess the severity of the
accident, and determine what the appropriate response should
be. 211
5. Emergency Response Failures
Finally, both the accidents themselves and the subsequent
damage might have been avoided, or at least reduced in severity,
had operating crews, company management, and government
agencies (including state and local governments) been better
212trained in how to respond to an emergency. In each case,
208. Metropolitan Edison officials were aware a "general" emergency was underway at the
plant and were informing local civil defense officials, mayors, and state officials, though they
did not tell the NRC until three hours later. Stern et al., How the Crisis Was Managed, supra
note 204.
209. Laurence Stern et al., A Disturbing Signal of Vented Radiation, WASi. PosT, Apr. 9,
1979, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/tmi/
stories/ch5.htm. Operators vented steam to relieve pressure building up in a plant holding
tank without informing state or federal officials, which triggered extraordinary planning
actions to protect local residents by these same officials who were unaware that the high
radiation levels were not part of "a spreading accident." Id.
210. Stern et al., The Tough Fight to Confine the Damage, sufpra note 104, at 4 (explaining
that the utility flushed radioactive water into the Susquehanna River from the overloaded
plant holding tanks without approval of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Resources or the NRC, and without telling downstream communities).
211. The NRC Washington headquarters "under-estimat[ed] the seriousness of the
accident" in the first forty-eight hours, and then over-reacted by recommending that
Pennsylvania Governor Richard Thornburgh evacuate pregnant women and young children
and requesting a quarter-million bottles of potassium iodine to block the uptake of
radioactive iodine from the Food and Drug Administration. Three Mile Island: 7Te Inside
Story-Five Days of Crisis, SMITHSONIAN NAT'L MUSEUM OF AM. HIST., http://
americanhistory.si.edu/tmi/tmi04.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2010). The NRC also increased
nearby residents' fears by telling reporters there was a possibility of an explosion in the plant,
which could require the evacuation of a ten to twenty mile radius. Id. at 2.
212. See Freudenburg, supra note 175, at 14 (explaining how organizational failures create
safety risks). Freudenburg uses the Exxon Valdez accident to illustrate the importance of
being prepared for catastrophic accidents and why drills, in addition to comprehensive
response plans, are necessary. The plans in effect on the date of the accident set out plans
for the availability and coordinated deployment of response equipment by various agencies
and for open and clear channels of communication "among previously competitive or even
adversarial organizations," but the reality was quite different. Id. at 26. For example,
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inadequate planning, 213 training,1 and communication meant that
the key parties involved were not adequately prepared to deal with
the risk of a catastrophic accident. The failure to train operators in
how to respond to an emergency of the kind that occurred at both
facilities and how to "engage" critical equipment like the BOP
blind shear ram may have contributed to these systems not being
used as intended.
In the case of the offshore oil and gas drilling industry pre-
Deepwater Horizon, "federal oversight of spill contingency plans
largely amountled] to accepting what oil industry operators [said]
they [could] do, rather than demanding they demonstrate that
they actually [could] do it."2 16  During the Deepwater Horizon
emergency, the "mechanical response equipment ... fell well short
Freudenburg notes that "[clonfusion seems to have been far more commonplace than
communication; a number of important steps either failed to be taken or else fell through
the interorganizational [sic] cracks. Rather than coordinating their activities as effectively as
the components of a well-designed computer program, the various organizations with a stake
in the spill and the clean-up often seemed to have more interest in blaming one another
than in working with one another." Id.
213. According to the President's Oil Spill Commission, both industry and the
government were "woefully unprepared" to respond to and contain the Macondo well
blowout-"[a]ll parties lacked adequate contingency planning, and neither government nor
industry had invested sufficiently in research, development, and demonstration to improve
containment or response technology." COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 243. This
insufficiency occurred despite industry promises made after Exxon Valdez that it would
commit significant funds toward these efforts. Id. See generally Plater, supra note 147
(comparing systemic similarities between the Exxon Valdez and Deepeater Hoizon accidents,
and suggesting that Alaska's recommendations from its investigation of the causes and the
failures of the oil spill response to the Exxon Valdez accident should have informed the
response to Deepwater Horizon accident).
214. See CHIEF COUNSEL's REPORT, supra note 65, at 236 ("BP and Transoccan
inadequately trained their personnel," specifically with respect to "kick monitoring during
end-of-well, nondrilling activities, such as temporary abandonment," and "how to respond to
emergency situations," like what happened on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig); see also
WALKER, supra note 107, at 75 (explaining that while TMI operators scored above the
national average on NRC qualifying exams, the "experience and training of the operators on
duty at TMI-2 when the accident occurred, and of the reinforcements that they soon called
in, did not prepare them to cope with the deteriorating conditions in the plant." They had
been trained only to respond to minor, routine malfunctions and as a result had not
developed "the analytical skills needed to deal with unanticipated problems").
215. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 122; WALKER, supra note 107, at 75; Stern et al.,
A Pump Failure and Claxon Alert, supra note 108, at 4.
216. Robertson, supra note 1, at Al; see abo Hoffman, supra note 18 (noting that offshore
oil spill response plans were "often boilerplate reproductions from one well to another," and
noting that the BP Gulf response plan "referenced seals and walruses, which aren't found in
that body of water, referred to a home-shopping network in Japan and listed scientists who
were dead.").
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of ... [what was] need [ed];" critical booms had to be flown in from
Alaska and skimmer boats came from Norway. These measures
were necessary, despite the fact that the Oil Pollution Act,
supplemented by an Executive Order,219 imposed "a panoply of oil-
spill planning, preparedness, and response requirements on fixed
and floating facilities engaged in oil and gas exploration,
development, and production on the outer continental shelf.,
22 0
Somewhat belatedly, the new director of the Bureau of Ocean
Energy, Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE)
acknowledged that the Deepwater Horizon accident made it clear that
offshore oil and gas companies did not have "sufficient
containment capacity to respond to a major spill."22 ' Given the
paucity of equipment, it was no surprise to experts that the oil
would not be recovered, let alone contained, for many months.22
The March 10, 2009 exploration plan BP submitted to MMS
confidently stated that "in the event of an unanticipated
blowout ... [there] is unlikely to [be] an impact based on the
industry-wide standards for using proven equipment and
technology" to respond to such an occurrence.' However, no one
in the industry had proven equipment or technology, let alone any
contingency plan for a catastrophic accident in water at the depth
of the Macondo well. 2 24  The deepwater drilling industry simply
"ha[d] not developed an oil spill plan for the low probability, high-
217. Robertson, Efforts to Repel Gulf Spill, supra note 1, at A16.
218. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2762 (2006).
219. Exec. Order No. 12,777, 56 Fed. Reg. 54,757 (Oct. 18, 1991); see Robertson, supra
note 1, at Al (explaining that the Presidential Executive Order supplemented the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990).
220. COMMISSION REPOlff, supra note 7, at 80; see also Robertson, supra note 1, at Al ("A
year [after the Exxon Valdez ran aground] lawmakers passed the federal Oil Pollution Act to
ensure that plans were in place for oil spills, so that the response effort would be quick, with
clear responsibilities for everyone involved. Every region of the country was required to have
a contingency plan, tailored for its unique geography, for responding to a spill.").
221. Jad Mouawad, 4 Oil Firms Commit $1 Billion for Gulf Rapid-Response Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
July 22, 2010, at B9.
222. Robertson, supra note 1, at A16 (quoting a response consultant as saying, "I don't
think there's a person in the spill world who would have thought that whole thing would be
contained and recovered."); see also Mouawad, supra note 221, at B9 (quoting an energy
expert as saying, "Companies have used their technology to get into deep water but they
didn't have an adequate plan to intervene at these depths or to contain a large-scale spill,"
and noting that "[i]t has taken BP nearly three months to finally cap its gushing oil well in
the gulf, after repeated failures to plug the well using a series ofjury-rigged devices.").
223. Hoffman, supra note 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
224. Id.
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consequence event when everything fails."22  When the accident
happened, according to a rig worker, "[t]he scene was very
chaotic .... There was no chain of command, nobody in
charge." 226 Although the rig had emergency plans, including places
where crew members were to gather in the event of an emergency,
the crew had not adequately practiced safety drills. 22 ' Further,
disagreements between Transocean and BP and various
government agencies over the size of the spill and possible ways to
stop and contain the flow of oil also slowed down the response and
in all likelihood made it much less effective than it should have
been.228
In the case of TMI-2, no evacuation plan existed for residents of
nearby towns.22 Had an evacuation been required, the affected
local communities would have had to improvise.23o At several
points during the crisis, phone lines either jammed or went
down.2' The emergency response effort became more organized
and effective once the federal government took over planning for
232
any evacuation that might occur. However, tension between the
company and the NRC over who was in charge of controlling the
accident led to flare ups and conflicting stories about what was
225. Id. (quoting Greg McCormack, director of the University of Texas Petroleum
Extension Service).
226. Id. at 12 (quoting Carlos Ramos, a worker on the drilling rig).
227. Id. ("Although the vessel had muster stations and emergency plans, crew members
had never practiced safety drills without warning to simulate a real disaster.").
228. Tension existed between the Governor of Louisiana and U.S. Coast Guard spill
responders, and state and local officials rejected pre-spill plans and created their own
"response structures." See COMMIssION REPORf, supra note 7, at 138-39. There were
conflicting opinions about whether BP should be a "partner" in spill response. Id. at 136.
There was "no clear line between the National Incident Commander's responsibilities and
those of the Federal On-Scene Coordinator," both of whom played roles in the spill
response. Id. at 136. There were also accounts of "boom wars" between the U.S. Coast
Guard, state governors, and local parishes over where booms would be placed to intercept
the spill and a "struggle among the State of Louisiana, the Army Corps of Engineers, the
National Incident Command, and, ultimately [the] White House over berms." Id. at 153-54.
229. See Stern et al., How the Crisis Was Managed, supra note 204.
230. For example, Metropolitan Edison did not tell the mayor of the closest town about
the accident until many days later. See id.
231. Id. at 4; see abvo Stern et al., A Tough Fight to Confine the Damage, supra note 104, at 4
("What might be termed the coup de grace to the day's confusions came late Thursday
afternoon when all phone communications went out between the Three Mile Island control
room and the command post across the river. 'For several hours, there these guys were
trying to keep atop of the situation using walkie-talkies . . . . The whole situation-simply
incredible."').
232. See Stern et al., Danger of Day 3, supra note 205 (describing the federal government's
$1.7 million preparation for area-wide evacuation and radiation emergency).
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happening on-site and whether an evacuation would be required.
B. Indirect Causes of the Accidents
Stepping away from the particulars of the accidents and their
direct contributing causes, several problems within the companies
that owned and operated the drilling rig and the Unit 2 nuclear
power plant may have indirectly contributed to the accidents.
Included among these factors are the economic pressures these
companies faced and an over-reliance on engineering to avoid or
control accidents.
1. Economic Pressures
Economic pressures played an important role in decisions made
by the companies that owned and operated the drilling rig and the
power plant prior to each accident, and may have caused these
companies to cut certain corners and choose the less expensive but
more risky approach to several problems. For example, in the
aftermath of Deepwater Horizon, one worker noted that an
atmosphere of "[r]un it, break it, fix it" prevailed on the rig.1 A
confidential survey by Lloyd's Register Group, a maritime and risk-
management organization, conducted weeks before the accident
reported that many Transocean workers expressed concern about
safety practices but feared reprisals for reporting unsafe
conditions; others said that crew members may not have
233. Stern et al., Black Ink, supra note 162, at A2. Different information being relayed by
the federal government and the company left residents wondering what and whom to
believe. Lawrence Stern et al., Inhabitants Wonder What to Believe, WAsiI. Post, Apr. 11, 1979,
at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/tmi/stories/
chl4.htm (describing confusion over the accident's effect on residents' health and loss of
trust in the company and nuclear power in general, and commenting on "the seeds of
anxiety, distrust and anger sown with the first alarms from Three Mile Island and fertilized
by the confusion and contradictions that marked the official response to the crisis").
234. Urbina, supra note 151, at Al. According to one article, "[W]orkers said that
company plans were not carried out properly and they 'often saw unsafe behavior on the
rig.' Some workers also voiced concern about poor equipment reliability, 'which they
believed was as a result of drilling priorities taking precedence over planned maintenance."'
Id. The same article noted, "Transocean's system for tracking health and safety issues on the
rig was 'counter-productive.' Many workers entered fake data to try to circumvent the
system, known as See, Think, Act, Reinforce, Track . . . . As a result, the company's
perception of safety on the rig was distorted .... " Id. at Al7.
235. Id. ("A confidential survey of workers on the Deepwater Horizon in the weeks before
the oil rig exploded showed that many of them were concerned about safety practices and
feared reprisals if they reported mistakes or other problems."); see alo COMMIssION REPORT,
supra note 7, at 224 (describing the survey).
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understood the safety protocols.23 The survey reported that
"[o]nly about half of the workers interviewed said they felt they
could report actions leading to a potentially 'risky' situation
without reprisal," and concluded that "'[t]his fear was seen to be
driven by decisions made in Houston, rather than those made by
rigbased leaders.' 2 3
According to some, BP also fostered a culture in which unsafe
behavior was not uncommon.2 " Before the Deepwater Horizon
accident, BP "led an industry wave of cost-cutting and
consolidation,"2 3 9 slashing costs, firing engineers, and outsourcing
many critical ftnctions, which left the company reliant on outside
contractors.240 BP also undertook large, risky projects and
employed risky procedures to save time and money without taking
adequate steps to "contain the added risk."241  In this regard, BP
236. CHIEF COUNSEL'S REPORT, supra note 65, at 222 ("An April 2010 Transocean
assessment also found that the maintenance system was not understood by the crew."). The
Lloyd's survey also reported that "Transocean crews 'don't always know what they don't
know. [F]ront line crews are potentially working with a mindset that they believe they are
fully aware of all the hazards when it's highly likely that they are not.'" COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 7, at 224 (quoting CONSULTING SERVICES LLOYD's REGISTER EMEA ABERDEEN
ENERGY, NoTi I AMERICAN DIVISION SUMMARY REPORT 29 (2010)).
237. Urbina, supra note 151, at A17 (quoting the Lloyd's survey).
238. BP's Chief Executive Officer, Robert Dudley, has denied that "cultural failings at BP"
were to "blame" for the "string of accidents." Sarah Lyall, In BP's Record, a History of Boldness
and Costly Blunders, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2010, at Al. Congressman Waxman, however, noted
that "'[t]here is a complete contradiction between BP's words and deeds. You [referring to
Tony Hayward] were brought in to make safety the top priority of BP. But under your
leadership, BP has taken the most extreme risks. BP cut corner after corner to save a million
dollars here and a few hours there . . . . And now the whole Gulf Coast is paying the
price."'). Id. See also Elana Schor, Senators Rap BP Official for Record of OSHA Violations,
GREENWIRE (July 22, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2010/07/22/3
(reporting that one member of the Senate committee investigating BP's OSHA record found
that "BP's claims to prioritize safety first are 'rather offensive' given its record").
239. Lyall, supra note 238, at A14.
240. Id. at A14 ("Mr. Browne ... ruthlessly slash[ed] costs... outsourced many
operations, and fired tens of thousands of employees, including many engineers."). Another
reason why BP and the industry as a whole had an insufficient number of experienced
personnel may be because the industry had eliminated most of its research capabilities, and
academic research was chronically under-funded. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 243.
Filling such a gap with contract personnel is problematic because of differing cultures and
management structures, which, in the case of the Macondo well blowout, led to "conflicts of
interest, confusion, lack of coordination, and severely slowed decisionmaking." Id. at 229.
241. Lyall, supra note 238, at Al4 (quoting preliminary findings by the House Energy and
Commerce Committee that concluded that "[i]n effect, it appears that BP repeatedly chose
risky procedures in order to reduce costs and save time and made minimal efforts to contain
the added risk," and also noting that "[u]nlike some of his more cautious competitors,
[former BP CEO] Browne ignored small projects and went 'after the riskiest, most
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distinguished itself from some of its competitors.2 4 ' BP's rushed
construction and deployment in the Gulf of the sister rig to the
Deepwater Horizon drilling platform, the Thunder Horse drilling rig, is
an example of this time and cost-driven insensitivity toward risks.24
Construction defects discovered on the Thunder Horse rig "cost BP
and its minority partner, Exxon Mobil, hundreds of millions of
dollars in repairs and set production back by three years." 244
Federal records show that BP also had a history of "bypassing safety
systems that could impede routine operations,"4  most notably at
its refineries, which received 760 of the 761 egregious and willful
expensive[,] and potentially most lucrative ventures-'elephants,' in industryjargon. Under
him, BP's share price more than doubled and its cash dividend tripled, making it a darling of
investors."); see also Freudenburg, supra note 175, at 12 (stating that sometimes "the lack of
organizational commitment to risk management may be a predominant source of real risk");
Houck, supra note 49, at 11034 (reporting that only twenty million dollars (0.05%) of the
thirty-nine billion dollars BP invested in new oil and gas exploration between 2007 and 2010
was spent on research and development to prevent and respond to accidents); cf Kazuo
Miura et al., Characterization of Operation Safety in Offshore Oil Wells, 51 J. PETrROLEUM SCI. &
ENGINEERING 111, 111 (2006) (saying that while the term risk analysis "varies widely in the
Oil and Gas industry[,] [i]n most cases it denotes a profitability analysis characterizing each
project in terms of its probability of reaching commercial production and hence revenue.").
242. See Lyall, supra note 238, at A14 ("BP is hardly the only oil company that has taken
on difficult projects with a shaky safety net. But the company's attitude toward risk stands in
contrast to that of its competitors, most notably Exxon Mobil, whose searing experience with
the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989 spurred a wholesale change in its approach to safety."); see also
Jad Mouawad, New Culture of Caution at Exxon After Valdez, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2010, at Op. I
(attributing Exxon's decision to stop drilling the Blackbeard Gulf exploration well after a
kick made drilling team nervous to the implementation of new post-Exxon Valdez safety
procedures that "empowered everyone, even contractors, to speak up about safety
problems," and quoting a Deutsche Bank analyst as saying that while initially Exxon's
decision to abandon the well looked like a "lack of guts," after the Macondo well blowout
"[it] looks a lot more like justified conservatism and prudence, and a prescient awareness
that safety, caution and catastrophic risk avoidance would be key themes as oil companies
were forced to push the envelope in the search for new oil.).
243. See Lyall, supra note 238, at A14 (reporting that "BP's bosses rushed construction of
the intricately designed ... [Thunder Horse platform], moving it to the Gulf before it was
ready to 'demonstrate to their shareholders that the project was on time and on schedule."');
see also COMMIssION REPOR[, supra note 7, at 49-50 (describing the problems BP experienced
with the five billion dollar Thunder Horse project).
244. Lyall, supra note 238, at A14 (also noting that after performing costly repairs in
response to damage caused by an incorrectly installed check valve, "BP discovered ...
rudimentary mistakes in the welding of pipes in the underwater manifold, which connects
dozens of wells and helps carry the oil back to the platform, had caused dangerous cracks
and breaks.").
245. Hilzenrath, supra note 177, at 1 ("Records of federal enforcement ... show that, in
case after case, rig operators paid fines for allegedly bypassing safety systems that could
impede routine operations.").
2012] A Risky Business 111
OSHA violations levied on refineries within a three-year period. 24 6
Although BP maintains that it has "learned how to balance risk and
safety, efficiency, and profit," the record appears quite different.24 1
Indeed, as one industry expert has suggested, it is possible that BP
w "foled"by it ecoomic248was "fooled" by its economic success; in slightly over a decade,
"BP grew from a middleweight into the industry's second largest
company, behind only Exxon Mobil, with soaring profits, fat
dividends, and a share price to match."249
It appears that BP managers on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig,
when called upon to make a risk-based decision, often chose the
cheapest solution, even when doing so elevated the risk of an
accident. 15o This behavior "steadily whittled away at the margin of
error until there was no margin left."15 Many of the anomalies that
federal regulators found in the construction of the Macondo well
involved instances in which well-known industry protocols were not
followed in favor of time and cost saving practices. An official
246. See Elana Schor, Senators Rap B3P PLC Officialfor Record of OSHA Violations, GREENWIRE
(July 22, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2010/07/22/3 (discussing BP's
poor refinery safety record and reporting that "BP had received 760 out of the 761 egregious
and willful OSHA violations slapped on refiners over the past three years."); see also Lyall,
supra note 238, at A14 (noting that a year after the Texas City refinery explosion, "267,000
gallons of oil leaked from BP's network of pipelines in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska," making it "the
worst spill ever on the North Slope," and saying "the cause was preventable ... corrosion in
several miles of under-maintained and poorly inspected pipes. BP eventually paid more than
$20 million in fines and restitution."). The leak went undetected for five days. COMMISSION
REPOlir, supra note 7, at 222.
247. Lyall, supra note 238, at A14 ("Time and again, BP has insisted that it has learned
how to balance risk and safety, efficiency and profit. Yet the evidence suggests that
fundamental change has been elusive.").
248. Id. (quoting Steve Arendt, a safety specialist who was appointed by BP to investigate
the Texas City explosion).
249. Id. at Al.
250. Achenbach & Hilzenrath, supra note 61 (saying that BP "chose the least expensive
option even though it potentially elevated the risk."). See ato CIIIEF COUNSEL'S REPORT,
supra note 65, at 135-39 (recounting various corner cutting incidents, such as prematurely
setting a lock down sleeve during temporary abandonment process to save five and a half
days and two million dollars, and replacing expensive drilling muds with sea water before
setting backup barriers to hydrocarbon flow even though there were available alternative
procedures, which under-balanced the well and created significant, unnecessary risks). The
Deepwater Horizon drilling rig was not the only BP rig that experienced problems. See Lyall,
supra note 238 (discussing problems at another Gulf BP rig, where a valve installed
backwards "caused the vessel to flood during the hurricane, jeopardizing the project before
any oil had even been pumped," and saying that "[t]he problems at Thunder Horse were not
an anomaly, but a warning that BP was taking too many risks and cutting corners in pursuit
of growth and profits, according to analysts, competitors and former employees.").
251. Achenbach & Hilzenrath, supra note 61.
252. Investigators Highlight 20 'Anomalies'in Hours Before Well Blowout, GREENWIRE (July 19,
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responsible for monitoring the drilling rig observed in hearings
after the accident that he approved a drilling plan that many other
experts in the industry described as "deeply flawed."2  Time and
money were major concerns for BP because the well was
significantly behind schedule. In fact, at the time of the accident,
the rig, which had cost BP approximately half a million dollars a
day to lease, 2 5  was forty-three days late for its next drilling
location.5 These scheduling problems, when combined with a
cost-cutting culture, put a higher premium on improving drilling
efficiency than on safety, with the result that "engineering and
operations decisions tilted toward cost and time savings." 5 6
Similar economic pressures may have pushed Metropolitan
Edison to make risky decisions at TMI-2. One such decision might
have been the company's push to bring Unit 2 up to full power
before the problems that had plagued its startup were completely
solved. By bringing the plant to full power before the end of the
federal tax year, the company saved approximately forty million
dollars in taxes." It also increased the likelihood that the
2010), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2010/07/19/8.
253. Marc Kaufman, Carol D. Leonnig, & David Hilzenrath, MMS Investigations of Oil-Rig
Accidents Have History of Inconsistency, WASH. PosT, July 18, 2010, at Al, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/17/AR2010071702807.html
("[A] veteran investigator... responsible for monitoring the Deepwater Horizon rig ...
testified that he approved a BP drilling plan that other oil companies and drilling experts
have said was deeply flawed.").
254. See CHIFY COUNSEL'S REPORT, supra note 65, at 245 (reporting that the BP Deepwater
Horizon drilling lease cost almost $533,000 a day, making it "the single greatest expense for
drilling the Macondo well").
255. The Macondo well was almost six weeks behind schedule on the date of the accident
and more than fifty-eight million dollars over budget. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at
2; see alsoJohn Adams Hodge, flow Environmental Regulators Can Address Human Factors in Oil
Spill Prevention Using Crew Resource Management, 40 ENvt. L. REP. 11048, 11049 (2010)
(stating that after reviewing reports discussing a BP official's direction to replace drilling
mud with seawater over the chief driller's protests, "it is appropriate to ask whether the
desire to make up lost time in the drilling schedule, the attitude of rig workers toward raising
safety concerns, and the presence of management on the rig, among other factors, were
contributing causes to the oil spill.").
256. CHIEF COUNSEL'S REPOlff, supra note 65, at 245. The Chief Counsel's report goes on
to list "[e]xamples of decisions that increased risk at Macondo while potentially saving time,"
including not running a cement evaluation log, not performing additional well integrity tests
after unexpected results from the negative pressure test, not installing additional barriers
during temporary well abandonment, setting the cement plug closer to the wellhead, using
fewer than the recommended number of well centralizers, and displacing mud from the drill
pipe before setting the surface cement plug. Id. at 245-46.
257. Stern et al., Black Ink, supra note 162, at A2 ("The company was able to claim about
$20 million for six months' federal tax depreciation by getting TMI 2 into service before the
company would receive a requested rate increase from the public
service commission and improve the company's rate of return on
~258its common stock. Further, as one scholar has noted, prior to
TMI-2, nuclear utility executives prioritized the continuous
operation of nuclear power plants; repairing a plant meant that it
would be shut down, thus reducing electrical output.2 5' This
created a similar mindset to that found on the Deepwater Horizon rig
prior to the Macondo well blowout-"running the machinery until
it broke."2 " Although Metropolitan Edison denied that safety had
been compromised in the push to bring the plant up to full
power,"' it is possible that management's emphasis on power
production contributed to a safety climate at Unit 2 in which
accidents were more likely to happen than not.
2. A Focus on Engineering as the Primary Barrier Against an
Accident
A second, less obvious contributing factor to the accidents may
have been the excessive reliance of both industries on engineered
solutions to problems. Engineers share a faith in engineered
end of the year . . . and between $17 million and $28 million in investment tax credits-
direct writeoffs.").
258. Id. at Al. Metropolitan Edison's annual report commented on the tax advantage
gained by putting the plant in service. Id.
259. Id. at 23-24 ("The costs of repair and maintenance were obvious, in the eyes of
industry officials, while the benefits were vague and uncertain. Hence these were low
priorities."). It has also been noted that "the pre-TMI nuclear industry was composed of
inward-looking and production-oriented utilities." Id. at 24. A similar concern motivated rig
operators to make a series of decisions about well-cementing procedures out of concern that
the fragile geologic formation they were drilling into might fracture and lead to "lost
returns." COMMISSION REPORT, Supra note 7, at 99-100.
260. REES, supra note 106, at 23.
261. See Stern et al., Black Ink, supra note 162, at Al ('Creitz conceded to reporters after
the accident that Met Ed had gained tax advantages by getting TMI 2 into service in 1978.
But he and John G. Herbein, his vice president for power generation, insisted that there had
been no 'rush' to beat the calendar at the expense of safety.").
262. See Kathryn Mearns, Sean M. Whitaker, & Rhona Flin, Safety Climate, Safety
Management Practice and Safety Performance in Offshore Environments, 41 SAFETY SC. 641, 642
(2003) (saying a "safety climate" is how a safety culture manifests itself in "the behaviour and
expressed attitude of employees."). The authors identify several aspects of a company's
safety climate, including "management commitment, supervisor competence, priority of
safety over production, and time pressure," which "emerge as predictors of unsafe behaviour
or accidents in numerous ... models." Id.; see also Bernhard Wilpurt, The Relevance of Safety
Culture for Nuclear Power Operations, in SAFELY CULTURE IN NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIIONS 4
(Bernhard Wilpurt & Naosuke Itoigawa eds., 2001) ("Safety culture, as a distinct and holistic
concept, first entered scientific discourse in the aftermath of the Chernobyl catastrophe and
is now adopted and adapted by virtually all high-hazard industries.").
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solutions to technical problems. 6 To some extent, they are
conditioned to think that mathematically-based, theoretical
approaches to technical problem-solving are more rigorous, and
hence more valid, than approaches that emphasize "the
importance of qualitative considerations based upon practical
experience." 6 ' This type of mindset thrives in both the nuclear
and offshore drilling industries, which are often on the cutting
edge of problem-solving. The outlook of the NRC prior to TMI-2
provides a strong example of this type of thinking. Because the
NRC considered the likelihood of a catastrophic accident to be
remote, it did not require applicants for nuclear licenses to make
necessary contingency plans given how the plants were
engineered,2 "5 and instead focused narrowly on equipment design
and performance.2' Some say that the hubris of the nuclear
industry26 -its sense of invincibility and reliance on engineering
263. See, e.g., Donald C. Jackson, Considering the Multiple Arch Dam: Theory, Practice and the
Ethics of Safety in a Case of Innovative Hydraulic Engineering, 32 NAr. RESOURCES J. 77, 77-78
(1992) ("When considering water resources development and the decisionmaking process
that controls how hydraulic technologies are implemented, historians and public policy
professionals often view engineering projects as representing a 'single-best' solution to a
problem. After all, modern engineers are supposedly trained to provide efficient, scientific
answers which, although some parties may find them to be politically or socially undesirable,
comprise rational reactions to a situation."); see also Broad, supra note 17, at D3
("[Elngineering, by definition, is a problem-solving profession."). See generally Nathan
Caplan & Stephen D. Nelson, On Being Useful: The Nature and Consequences of Psychological
Research on Social Problems, 28 AM. PsYcITOLOGIsT 199, 202-03 (1973) (citing Abraham
Kaplan's "law of the instrument," which contends that experts tend to view solutions to
problems in terms of their specialized knowledge. "It comes as no particular surprise to
discover that a scientist formulates problems in a way which requires for their solution just
those techniques in which he himself is especially skilled.").
264. Jackson, supra note 263, at 78. Even though a technical solution to a problem may
not always be best, "society as a whole is reluctant to abandon the notion that engineering is
an exact science capable of developing ideal responses to technological quandaries." Id. But
see Broad, supra note 17, at D3 (quoting a British engineer describing structural engineering
as "the art of molding materials we do not really understand into shapes we cannot really
analyze, so as to withstand forces we cannot really assess, in such a way that the public does
not really suspect.").
265. See REES, supra note 106, at 30 ("[N]uclear plant hardware was the regulator's
foremost defense against nuclear accidents.").
266. Chandler, supra note 141, at 493.
267. See REES, supra note 106, at 12-13 (quoting an industry official commenting on the
"traumatic shock" to institutions involved in the commercial use of nuclear power and saying
it was "a shock we needed because of the hubris with which we all picked tip the momentum
of the nuclear age," by which he meant that "nuclear power moved from the first submarine
experience to commercial application, to large-scale use in thousand megawatt plants in
such a short time that there was little potential for adequate feedback of experience into the
overconfident but naive organizations who ... operated the new plants.").
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rather than shared practical experiences-combined with the rapid
development of the industry (absent any serious incidents and
subsequent shared reflection) made an accident of the magnitude
of TMI-2 inevitable.6 Similarly, the deepwater drilling industry
believed that its wells could not fail because of how they were
engineered and, therefore, provided for only minimal redundancy
in the well closure procedures.2 ' 9  However, as the two accidents
show, "the scientific and 'rational' nature of modern technology is
not always as absolute" as people might like to think it is;
"[r]egardless of our desires, safety remains a relative value that only
has meaning in terms of how people choose to evaluate a wide
range of factors and influences, 270 not just the performance
specifications of equipment.
Too narrow a focus on engineering can also lead individuals and
companies involved in risky activities to become so reliant on those
systems that they forget to be afraid.27 ' An internally-perceived
good safety record or a sufficient number of years without a major
accident may create a sense of complacency about a recurrence of
268. Freudenburg, supra note 175, at 12 (reporting on the Kemeny Commission Report,
and saying it "began its investigation looking for problems of hardware, but wound up
concluding that the overall problem was one of humans-a pervasive 'mind-set' in the
nuclear industry at the time, reflecting a problem of organizational hubris that contributed
substantially to the likelihood of accidents."). Another problem the Kemeny Commission
discovered was the dominance of nuclear regulatory requirements, compliance with which
not only consumed the efforts of utility officials, but also created an atmosphere where
regulatory compliance-"going by the book"-was "equated with safety," breeding
complacency and a disinclination to do more. REES, supra note 106, at 19-20.
269. An example of this was the failure of BP or Transocean to have redundant on-shore
monitoring of what was happening on the rig, especially during the negative pressure tests.
See CH IEF COUNSEL'S REPORT, supra note 65, at 242.
270. Jackson, supra note 263, at 100. Jackson goes on to say that what follows from this
thought is that "society, and the legal system, cannot afford to relinquish responsibility over
the technological decision-making process to experts without appreciating the traditions and
technical prejudices that may color their view of what is safe and/or acceptable." Id.
271. Gold & Casselman, supra note 15, at Al; see aLso COMMISSION REPoRT, supra note 7, at
230 (describing changes made in the Navy's nuclear submarine program after the sinking of
the Thresher, including a new "questioning attitude... [that] the officers called chronic
uneasines, summarized in the saying, '[t]rust but verify.'" (quoting NANCY LEVESON,
ENGINEERING A SAFER WORLD: SYSTEMS THINKING APPLIED TO SAFETY 379 (2012)); see abLo
Senate Three Mile Island Hearing, supra note 16 (statement of Gregory B. Jaczko, Comm'r,
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n) (quoting from the Rogovin Report, a study commissioned by
the NRC after TMI-2, which found that "[b]efore March 28, 1979, an attitude of
complacency pervaded both the industry and the NRC-an attitude that the engineer-
designed safeguards built into today's plants were more than adequate, that an accident like
that at Three Mile Island would not occur in a particular jargon of the industry, that such an
accident was not a credible event.").
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an accident.2 7 2 In the nuclear industry, one industry expert noted
that the lack of a major accident in the twenty-five years preceding
TMI-2 caused an attitude to develop that "nothing bad happens ...
[and] nothing ever will."273  Technological advances in the
deepwater drilling industry, led by BP and Transocean, drove the
process at a rate that many thought was unsafe.7 Offshore drilling
in the Gulf of Mexico "was one of the last cowboy environments" in
the industry. What had been impossible a few years earlier
became "routine" as the two companies "banged out record firsts
on the farthest frontiers of technology and geography."2 7" There
was a complete "lack of a sense of vulnerability within the
industry."277
The "typical or 'engineering' responses to [a] problem" may
exacerbate this sort of conduct by making the work even more
routine and boring, to the extent that it requires the- employee
merely to monitor equipment that automatically runs a system-
272. See Frendenburg, supra note 175, at 21 (referring to the Exxon Valdez accident and
stating that "[ilt is entirely possible that the accident of Good Friday, 1989, would not have
occurred but for the tragic complacency engendered by the dozen good years that had
passed before. More specifically, it may have been the very 'success' of earlier trips in and
out of Prince William Sound-literally thousands of them-that helped to make possible a
situation where the captain had retired to his quarters, the ship was under the control of a
third mate who would not have been expected by a formal risk assessment to be at the helm
and the Coast Guard personnel on duty were not bothering to monitor even the lower-power
radar screens that remained at their disposal after cost-cutting efforts of a few years earlier.").
273. Hoffman, supra note 18 (quoting Larry Foulke, former president of the American
Nuclear Society); see aLso KEMENY COMMISSION REPOrI', supra note 15, at 9 ("After many years
of operation of nuclear power plants, with no evidence that any member of the general
public had been hurt, the belief that nuclear power plants are sufficiently safe grew into a
conviction."). An extreme example of the belief that a catastrophic nuclear accident could
not happen was the decision not to have a containment dome on the Chernobyl reactor.
Hoffman, supra note 18.
274. Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., We're Not Ready, N.Y. TIMEs, July 20, 2010, at A23 (quoting the
director of the National Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia University's Mailman
School of Public Health, who said that "[w]e are way, way behind when it comes to the hard
work of preventing accidents and responding to these catastrophes when they happen. With
deep-water oil drilling, we allowed the technological advances to drive the process at a rate
that was unsafe, and we got really badly burned.").
275. Hoffman, supra note 18 (quoting Steve Arendt, an industry expert).
276. Id. A Duke University civil engineering professor, Henry Petroski, observed that
"when you think you've got a robust system . .. you tend to relax." Id.
277. Id. (quoting Steve Arendt, an industry expert). This blind faith in engineered
solutions seems somewhat quixotic when applied to the Deepwater Horizon's blowout
preventer, which Transocean had identified as having 260 separate potential means of
failure. Id. at 3. This fact led Representative Bart Stupak (D-Mich.) to ask, "How can a
device that has 260 failure modes be considered fail-safe?" Id.
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except when there is an emergency. Such jobs are sometimes
described as "involving '99% boredom and 1% sheer terror.' 2 7 9
Perhaps this reliance on engineering is why, prior to the
accidents described earlier, both industries displayed an
institutional lack of concern about the possibility of serious
accidents occurring and, as a result, a lack of attention to avoidance
and containment. Using the Exxon Valdez accident as an example
of the offshore oil and gas industry's unwillingness to take the risk
of an accident seriously, William Freudenburg writes that a
contingency plan to avoid a tanker disaster in Prince William
Sound that had been developed a decade before the Exxon Valdez
accident was systematically dismantled "piece by piece," prior to the
accident,2 ' and that the industry ignored lessons that it might have
learned from emergency preparedness drills conducted prior to
the spill. 2 2  With respect to the Deepwater Horizon accident, the
immediate negative effect of this attitude was that there were too
few containment booms and oil skimmers on hand to respond to
the spill and a crew that had not been trained in how to respond to
such an accident.2 13 The offshore oil and gas industry was (and still
278. Freudenburg, supra note 175, at 8.
279. Id. ("[M]ost people do better if the systems they operate require them to remain
attentive, even at the cost of considerable tension or pressure."). Freudenburg has noted
that "'[i]t's hard to make anything idiot-proof-idiots are far too clever.' The problem is
particularly pernicious in the case of systems that are estimated to have extremely low
probabilities of failure." Id. at 7 (quoting Charles McCoy, Broken Promises: Alyeska Record
Shows How Big Oil Neglected Alaskan Environment, WAul. ST.J., July 6, 1989, at Al).
280. Freudenburg, supra note 175, at 13 (describing the Exxon Valdez accident "as
reflecting a relatively pervasive lack of concern by both Exxon and Alyeska with the
companies' own risk management plans."); see also REES, supra note 106, at 21 (attributing
part of the explanation for the "[nuclear] industry's fixation on NRC regulations" and its
failure to take precautionary measures beyond those regulations to its "normative system's
hardware-centered approach to nuclear safety," and saying that the "pre-TMI normative
system .. . [was] concentrated on hardware related issues-how nuclear plants should be
designed and constructed-while hardly any notice was taken of the institutional
arrangements and processes required to manage, operate, and maintain these plants.").
281. Freudenburg, supra note 175, at 22 (discussing the consequences of emergency
plans "occupying organizationally peripheral positions" in relation to the piecemeal
dismantling of the Exxon Valdez plan).
282. Id. at 25 ("In the case of the Alaska oil spill, the 'drills' on emergency preparedness
conducted before the spill might have suggested to astute observers the need for greater
attention to spill response. Neither the equipment nor the organizations worked as planned,
and the drills 'sometimes were near-disasters themselves.' Such lessons, however, were
evidently overlooked." (footnote omitted) (quoting McCoy, Broken Promises, supra note 279,
at A4)). Freudenburg also notes that "at least five contingency plans were in effect at the
time of the spill." Id.
283. See generally supra Part II.A.5 (discussing the lack of emergency preparedness training
COLUMBIAJOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [
is) in "total denial" about the risks of its operations" -describing
what happened on the Deepwater Horizon rig as a "low probability,
high consequence event,"21 and blinding itself to the possibility of
future well blowouts.2 86
This Part of the Article has revealed the similarities between the
direct and indirect causes of the Deepwater Horizon accident and the
partial nuclear core meltdown at TMI-2, which makes the next
Part's discussion of the differences in the responses of the two
industries surprising. Together, the two parts raise what should be
an obvious question: why have the reactions of the two industries
to their respective major accidents been so different when the
causes were so similar? The answer to this question is addressed in
the final part of this Article.
III. HOW THE OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY AND THE NUCLEAR
INDUSTRY RESPONDED INCONSISTENTLY TO THEIR RESPECTIVE
CATASTROPHIC ACCIDENTS
"The study of failure teaches humility, caution, and the need to
question assumptions. 2 8 7
Given the many parallels between the causes of the two accidents,
the anemic response of the deepwater drilling industry and the
Department of the Interior to Deepwater Horizon, when compared to
the substantially more robust response of the nuclear industry to
and associated equipment to respond to the well blowout).
284. Gold & Casselman, supyra note 15, at Al (quoting engineering consultant David M.
Pritchard); see aLbo Hoffman, sutpra note 18 (quoting Steve Arendt, an industry expert, as
saying that BP viewed its Texas City refinery accident as a "one-off" event, not something
"systematic and pervasive," and that "[t] hey were arrogant and proud of the systems they had
in place. They were in denial.").
285. Gold & Casselman, suprfa note 15, at Al; see also Plater, supra note 147, at 11046
(stating that BP, supported by other oil companies and dependent Gulf Coast communities,
is asserting "the exceptional status of the Deepwater Horizon blowout, the need to press on
with deepwater drilling, and the reasonableness of risks being managed in the Gulf.").
286. Gold & Casselman, supra note 15, at Al. The oil industry also characterized the 1969
Santa Barbara Oil Spill and the Argo Merchant oil tanker accident as "isolated events" in "a
safety-conscious industry." Rick S. Kurtz, Coastal Oil Pollution: Spills, Crisis, and Policy Change,
21 REV. OF POL'Y RES. 201, 214, 216 (2004) (explaining the oil industry's strategy of
portraying individual accidents as isolated events, as "opportunit[ies] to enhance an already
safety conscious industry," and as unfortunate, but necessary, consequences of undertaking
risks necessary "to meet the nation's energy needs and ensure economic progress").
287. Jim Meigs, Editor's Note, How BP Ignored History's Lessons, POP'UlAR MECHANICS, Oct.
2010, at 12.
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the partial nuclear core meltdown at TMI-2, is puzzling." Since
the accident, the offshore oil and gas industry has resisted
numerous efforts to strengthen regulatory requirements. 2
Moreover, none of the changes industry leaders or Department
officials have proposed is directed at improving the safety culture in
which deepwater drilling for oil operates.290 By contrast, in the
288. Another example of a quick response to a catastrophic accident involving nuclear
power was the Navy's response to the loss of the atomic submarine Thresher, where fifty-four
days after the accident a new SUBSAFE system was established that focused on maintaining
the submarine hull's watertight integrity and the operability and integrity of critical systems,
thereby controlling accidents and facilitating recovery from flooding hazards. See
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 230.
289. See, e.g., API Responds to Offshore Energy Proposal, UNITE) PRESS INT'L (Sept. 14, 2011),
http://www.upi.com/BusinessNews/Energy-Resources/2011/09/14/API-responds-to-offsh
ore-energy-proposal/UPI-10841315997989 (quoting Erik Milito, director of upstream activity
at the API, who stated that "[a]ny additions to already intricate regulatory processes should
allow for new exploration and responsible development of our domestic offshore energy
resources without unpredictable barriers or delays."); Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Regulator Confronts
Critics in Oil Industry, HoUs. CHRON., Sept. 13, 2011, http://www.chron.com/
business/energy/article/Regulator-confronts-critics-in-oil-industry-2169246.php (stating that
"[d]espite finding common ground on the new rulemaking, some oil industry
representatives have tangled with regulators over other rules and the pace of permitting
since the deadly explosion and oil spill," and quoting the head of BOEMRE, Michael
Bromwich, as saying "[t]hese groups continue to distort the facts, and, in some cases, use
undisclosed or incomprehensible methodologies to suggest that the slower pace of plan and
permit approval is part of a strategy to slow down offshore energy."); Amy Harder, One Year
After the BP Spill: What's Changed and What Hasn't, Gov"r EXECUTIVE (Apr. 20, 2011), http://
www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0411/042011-bp-anniversary.htm ("As much as API has done to
lead on the regulatory and safety front, it has also launched a war against the administration
and congressional Democrats."); Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Oil Spill Panel Ideas Face Political, Industry
Resistance, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 11, 2011, http://www.chron.com/business/
energy/article/Oil-spill-panel-ideas-face-political-industry-1683913.php ("Oil and gas
industry leaders stressed they already are making changes, and blasted a prime commission
finding that the disaster exposed widespread safety problems .. . . Industry representatives
reacted coolly to the commission's call for new offshore drilling fees as a way to fund new
regulations and resources at the Interior Department's Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, Regulation and Enforcement."); Loren Steffy, Oil Industry Can't Have It Both
Ways, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 16, 2010, http://www.chron.com/business/steffy/
article/Loren-Steffy-Oil-industry-can-t-have-it-both-ways-1703033.php ("API wants to put the
brakes on congressional zeal for new regulations aimed at preventing another disaster."); see
also Katie Howell, New Reports Detail Lax Federal Oversight, GREENWIRE (Feb. 9, 2011),
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2011/02/09/7 [hereinafter Howell, New Reports
Detail Lax Federal Oversight] ("Government regulation of offshore drilling has been poorly
funded, under industry assault, and plagued by bureaucratic confusion.").
290. Ross, supra note 179, at 8 ("The real job of regulation is to alter incentive structures
so that the necessary institutions and attitudes, referred to as 'safety culture,' are created
within the organizations that do the work."); see also Mearns et al., supra note 262, at 642
(defining safety culture as an "assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and
individuals, which establishes that, as an over-riding priority plant safety issues receive the
attention warranted by their significance," and noting the importance of a safety culture
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aftermath of TMI-2, the nuclear industry and the NRC immediately
implemented numerous changes that responded to the direct and
indirect causes of the accident.
A. The Response of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry and the
Department of the Interior to the Macondo Well Blowout
"I think it would be a mistake to dismiss our experience of the
last year simply as a 'black swan,' a one-in-a-million occurrence
that carries no wider application for our industry as a whole.""
The deepwater drilling industry has made changes since the
Macondo well blowout; however, industry skeptics might view much
of what it has undertaken as geared towards deflecting further
government regulation and convincing the Department of the
Interior, as well as Congress, that it should be allowed to resume
deepwater drilling in the Gulf.m For example, some questioned
whether a July 2010 commitment of one billion dollars by four of
the largest oil companies in the world to create a rapid-response
system to deal with deepwater oil spills in the Gulf29 ' was part of an
"because it forms the context within which individual safety attitudes develop and persist and
safety behaviors are promoted." (citation omitted). For a more detailed definition of safety
culture, see SAFETY CULTURE IN NUCLEAR POWER OIERATIONS xix (Bernhard Wilpurt &
Naosuke Itoigawa eds., 2001) (saying that the term "safety culture" covers "all relevant actors
in their nuclear safety-oriented interorganizational [sic] relations" and includes "the four
phases of thinking about safety: technology, individuals, the interactions of the social and
technical subsystems, and the interorganizational relationships in their impacts on systems
safety").
291. Clifford Krauss, BP Chief Says Industry Must Change to Guard Against Spills, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 2011, at B9 (quoting BP's Chief Executive Officer, Robert Dudley, in a public address
to oil industry executives).
292. See supra note 285. In October 2011, the Obama administration granted BP its first
drilling permit in the Gulf since the Deepwater Horizon accident. See Clifford Krauss, BP to
Irill Again in the Gulf of Mexico, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2011, 3:05 PM), http://
green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/26/bp-to-drill-again-in-the-gulf-of-mexico/?ref=gulfofme
xico20lO#. No new legislation has emerged from Congress in response to the spill. See Katie
Howell, Will the Latest Gulf of Mexico Spill Reiort Prompt Any Legislative Action?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/09/15/15greenwire-will-the-latest-gulf-of-
mexico-spill-report-pr-13000.html.
293. Mouawad, supra note 221, at BI, B9 (saying oil company executives admitted the
spill served as "wake-up call" for an industry that had "invested billions of dollars to develop
oil and gas resources in ever-deeper waters offshore, but neglected to devise spill-response
technology that would be effective in thousands of feet of water"). Commenting on the
system, Exxon Chairman Rex W. Tillerson said, "It's doubtful we will ever use it, but this is a
risk-management gap we need to fill in order for the government and the public to be
confident to allow us to get back to work." Id.
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attempt to deflect several bills pending in Congress that threatened
294to limit or end deepwater drilling in the region. The money was
used to fund a new company, called the Marine Well Containment
Company, which offers modular containment equipment that can
be mobilized within twenty-four hours of a spill and operate at the
site of a spill within weeks.9 Although the President's Oil Spill
Commission praised the concept, the Commission also criticized
the initiative for its limited scope and the potential lack of long-
term commitment by the industry." To show that it is capable of
self-regulation, the industry also established an industry-wide task
force to consider new safety standards, more frequent rig
inspections, and new requirements, including certification for
blowout preventers and general improvements in the design of
wells. 29 ' As of the writing of this article, three separate task forces-
addressing offshore safety, oil spill response preparedness, and
subsea well control-have proposed recommendations to the
298Department of the Interior.
However, the industry as a whole has refused to accept that what
happened on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig reflected an
industry-wide problem. Senior executives at other oil companies
have issued statements saying that they would have designed the
Macondo well differently and that "the accident would not have
happened had rig workers and their supervisors followed industry
294. Id. at B9 ("Oil companies hope the initiative, the product of four weeks of intensive
efforts involving 40 engineers from the four companies, will help persuade government
regulators and the administration to allow them to resume offshore drilling in the Gulf of
Mexico as soon as possible. Oil companies are also seeking to deflect a series of bills being
considered in Congress."); see also Phil Taylor, Permit Delays Could Have Dire Economic Impacts,
Industry Study Warns, GREENWIRE (Jan. 25, 2011), http:www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/
2011/01/25/6 [hereinafter Taylor, Permit Delays] (reporting that an API official
recommended containment services provided by Marine Well Containment Co. and Helix
Energy Solutions Group Inc. as a way for the government to restart the offshore oil and gas
production process).
295. COMMISSION REPowr, supra note 7, at 244.
296. The President's Oil Spill Commission criticized the new company because it is
designed to respond only to a Macondo-type well blowout, and not, for example, to a spill
like the Ixtoc I blowout, where the rig collapsed on top of the well. COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 7, at 244-45. In addition, the company's spill-response equipment cannot go as
deep underwater as currently available drilling technology. Id. There is concern that the
new company might share the fate of a similar company the industry created after the Exxon
Valdez accident but did not financially support. Id.
297. Mouawad, supra note 221, at BI.
298. Press Release, API, Oil and Natural Gas Industry Calls for Offshore Safety Changes
(Sept. 7, 2010), available at http://www.api.org/Newsroom/call-safety-changes.cfm.
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procedures, conducted adequate tests, and been properly
trained.""' Perhaps this is one reason why the industry has not yet
acted on the Oil Spill Commission's recommendation to develop
an independent safety organization modeled on the Institute of
Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) .30 Like its nuclear counterpart,
such an organization might help the industry improve its overall
safety record, promote a stronger safety culture within the industry,
and develop performance objectives for individual companies.so0
Nor has the industry responded to the Commission's concern
about decreased industry support for internal and external
academic research, which has, among other things, decreased the
availability of experienced personnel who "can grasp the
complexity of offshore operations and make quick and correct
. * ,, 302decisions.
BP as a company has failed to overhaul its inadequate safety
culture, one of the main causes of the well blowout, in responding
to the accident. BP's immediate post-accident response was to
launch a public relations campaign to deflect the negative publicity
concerning the spill, which has been the industry's typical response
to an accident. 30 Their campaign included a glossy brochure
299. Krauss, supra note 291, at 9.
300. COMMISSION REPORT, sufra note 7, at 234-41 (noting parallels between the nuclear
and oil industries that would support adopting an organization modeled after INPO, but
cautioning against wholesale adoption of the INPO model); see also infra notes 356-360
(discussing INPO in more detail). INPO was created in response to a recommendation of
the Kemeny Commission that such an organization be created to perform the dual functions
of developing safety standards and systematically auditing both industry and individual plant
performance. SeeKEMENY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 68.
301. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 235 (describing INPO). The Commission
was much enamored by this "self-policing" idea and credited it with improving nuclear power
plant efficiency, significantly reducing the number of automatic emergency reactor
shutdowns per year, and reducing collective radiation accident rates by a factor of six
compared to the 1980s. Id. at 239; see also Hodge, supra note 255, at 11050-56 (describing
and touting the benefits of the civil aviation administration's "Crew Resource Management"
program and "Aviation Safety Action Reporting Program," and proposing the
implementation of similar programs in the oil industry).
302. COMMISSION RI'or, supra note 7, at 229 (quoting the chair of the University of
Texas' Department of Petroleum and Geosystems Engineering). It also does not appear that
the industry has acted on the Oil Spill Commission's recommendation that it "benchmark"
its 1993 safety and environmental standards against globally recognized best practices and
update those standards immediately. Id. at 242.
303. See Kurtz, supra note 286, at 212 (noting that between 1960 and the early 1970s,
"[i]mage manipulation," whereby spills "were portrayed as anomalies in a safety conscious
industry," was commonly used to maintain the status quo); cf Schleifstein, BP Reneges on Dea,
supra note 83 (reporting that state wildlife officials who complained about BP's decision not
to pay Louisiana to "rebuild oyster beds, repair damaged wetlands and build a fish hatchery"
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setting out the company's recommendations for preventing future
accidents and touting "advances" made in managing hydrocarbons
and well-control fluids, the use of dispersants, and improvements in
operational coordination and risk management.3 0 4  Following the
immediate aftermath of the accident, BP finally joined the
industry's billion dollar effort to build a rapid response oil
containment system in the event of another accident in late
September 2010, contributing underwater well containment
equipment and offering its technical personnel to "advise the
group in its effort to develop spill-response equipment., 5  In the
summer of 2010, BP also established a new division to monitor the
safety of its operations, which led to the suspension of some
operations in Alaska and the North Sea when the projects failed to
meet the new safety standards.on While these initiatives show
promise of some change in BP's safety mindset, time will tell
whether the company's culture has actually changed and whether
suggested that the decision reflected BP's move from a public relations strategy to a litigation
strategy, focused on disputing BP's liability for damage to the state's oyster beds).
304. Marc Kaufman, BP Says Lessons from Gulf Spill Could Prevent More Incidents, WASH.
POST, Sept. 3, 2010, at A4 (reporting on recommendations contained in BP's "glossy 'Lessons
Learned'" report issued on Sept. 2, 2010); see abso Plater, supra note 147, at 11046
(commenting that "BP has been far more successful than Exxon in removing dead and dying
oiled wildlife from visibility on the coast, in managing medical reports on workers exposed to
dispersants, and managing the press."). The nuclear industry has also recently engaged in
promotional advertising, presenting itself as the carbon-neutral energy alternative and the
answer to controlling greenhouse gas emissions. See, e.g., Press Release, Nuclear Energy Inst.,
NEI Launches Advertising Campaign on Nuclear Energy's Economic, Clean Air Benefits
(Feb. 2, 2010), available at http://www.nei.oig/newsandevents/newsreleases/nei-launches-
advertising-capaign-on-nuclear-energy's-economic-clear-air-benefits/ (announcing a seven-
month press campaign including six print advertisements, web-based advertising, and radio
spots, touting the use of nuclear energy to reduce greenhouse gases, "power plug-in electric
vehicles and reduce our dependence on foreign oil."); see aLso Peter Wallsten & Dan Eggen,
U.S. Takes Conservative Approach in Revponse to Nuclear Crisis in Japan, WASH. POST, Mar. 17,
2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/us-nuclear-advocates-try-to-Iimit-political-
impact-of-japan-reactor-crisis/2011/03/17/AB6sr0kstory.htmi (reporting that the nuclear
industry "has dramatically stepped up its federal lobbying and campaign contributions," and
noting in particular that the Nuclear Energy Institute, an industry lobbying organization, has
spent more than $6 million on lobbying since 2008, "spurred on by federal subsidies and
potential climate-change legislation.").
305. Katie Howell, BPEni~sts in Oil Majors' 'Rapid Rvponse'Effort, E&ENEWS PM (Sept. 20,
2010), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/print/2010/09/20/6 (noting that BP initially
failed to join industry efforts to build a containment system over the summer).
306. Julia Werdigier, BP to Pay First Dividends Since Gulf of Mexico Spil N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 2,
2011, at B3; see also Krauss, supra note 291 (reporting that BP applied new safety standards in
halting operations at a production platform in need of repair work and an oil field requiring
pipeline integrity work, and is "rewarding people for doing that. .. [as] part of the cultural
change" at the company).
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that change has percolated down to the level of a facility operator.
Nearly a year after the accident, BP's Chief Executive Officer,
Robert Dudley, issued a belated apology for the rig explosion and
its impacts.o7  His statements indicated that he, at the very least,
appeared to understand that his company needed to "earn back"
the trust of other offshore oil and gas companies, as well as the
trust of "state and federal leaders and .. . Gulf Coast residents and
customers . . . .,,os He indicated that BP had improved its oversight
of cementing contractors through the use of "new standards, a new
approval process, and stringent contractor lab quality audits."
Dudley also stated that the company will not use "dynamically
positioned" drilling rigs unless it can demonstrate that the drilling
rig would be able to "shut the well in with 'real plans,"' would have
equipment on standby with the capacity to drill a relief well, and
would have the ability to "launch an emergency response that
builds on lessons from the Gulf of Mexico accident."31 0 As BP has
promised much before in response to accidents, 3' it remains to be
seen whether any of these promises will be carried out.
Furthermore, since none of these proposals address numerous
direct causes of the Macondo well blowout, such as communication
and information failures and lack of emergency response training,
or indirect causes, such as economic pressures and an over-reliance
on engineered solutions, it is doubtful whether they will make a
major contribution to averting another major offshore accident.
The Department of the Interior's response to Deepwater Horizon
307. Susanne Pagano, BPs CEO 'Sorry'for Gulf Accident, Addresses Safety, Responsibility Issues,
42 ENV'T REP. 477, 509 (2011); see also Babcock, Corporate "Greenwashing, " supra note 16, at
15-17 (describing the difficulty U.S. CEOs have apologizing compared with other nations,
and the general ineffectiveness of those apologies).
308. Pagano, supra note 307, at 509 (quoting Robert Dudley).
309. Id.
310. Id. (noting that BP was conducting "a major review of its risk management system to
ensure consistent standards are applied in a 'disciplined way' across BP . . . .").
311. A "fundamental change" in risk management has been "elusive" for BP, as illustrated
by BP's failure to fix safety violations at its Texas City refinery. One article reported that
"[r]evisiting Texas City in 2009, inspectors from the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) found more than 700 safety violations .... Most of the penalties ...
were because BP had failed to live up to the previous settlement fully. In March of this year,
OSHA found 62 violations at BP's Ohio refinery, proposing $3 million more in penalties."
Lyall, supra note 238. OSHA Administrator Michaels noted that after the Texas City refinery
accident, "[slenior management told us they are very serious about safety, but we observed
that they haven't translated their words into safe working procedures and practices, and they
have difficulty applying the lessons learned from refinery to refinery or even from within
refineries." Id.
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has been somewhat stronger than that of the industry, although its
actions have been less than robust and might still be cabined by
external political forces if history is any indicator of things to
come.3 12  For example, the Department imposed a six-month
moratorium on deepwater oil drilling, stopping work on thirty-
three offshore rigs in the Gulf, 3 3 but it subsequently lifted the
moratorium a month ahead of schedule in response to heavy
lobbying by industry leaders and the Gulf state congressional
delegation.' A few weeks before it lifted the moratorium, the
Department issued new environmental and safety regulations for
both deep and shallow water wells.3 15 However, the new regulations
312. For years, the industry successfully lobbied the Department to allow it to have
voluntary, as opposed to mandatory, safety and environmental management plans. See Staff
Working Paper No. 21, supra note 6, at 5-6. A paper published by the Commission staff
described the industry's successful lobbying campaign to oppose stronger incident reporting
requirements and any increase in lease rental rates to generate funds to support MMS'
expanding workload. Id. It noted that during the time it took to finalize the rule there were
246 fires or explosions on drilling rigs, causing at least twenty-one injuries or fatalities. Id. A
month after weaker incident reporting rules were issued, the industry cited the "limited
voluntary data" produced under those rules in comments "opposing a requirement that all
operators have a documented safety and environmental management plan." Id. at 6-7.
313. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 152. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana enjoined the continued enforcement of the moratorium, holding that it
likely violated the Administrative Procedure Act. Id.; see also Hornbeck Offshore Services,
L.L.C. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627, 638-39 (E.D. La. 2010), appeal dismissed as moot, 396 F.
App'x 147 (5th Cit. 2010). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a request
to stay the district court's ruling. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 152. The
government issued a second, revised moratorium, which was also challenged; before the
district court could rule, the Department lifted the moratorium. Id. However, the district
court held the government in contempt for failing to obey its original preliminary injunction
order. See Hornbeck Offshore Services, LLC v. Salazar, No. 10-1663, 2011 WL 454802, at *3
(E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011). The parties disputed the actual effect of the moratorium. SeeJohn
M. Broder, Report Says Milling Ban Had Little Effect, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2010, at A17
[hereinafter Broder, Drilling Ban] (discussing the economic effects of the moratorium and
noting that 2,000 of the 9,700 workers on rigs affected by the moratorium lost their jobs or
moved away and another 6,000 to 10,000 workers in associated industries lost work, but
"overall employment in the five Louisiana parishes most dependent on offshore oil...
remained constant... largely because of the jobs created by the cleanup."); Werner, supra
note 29 (saying job losses have been short-lived and significantly "smaller than ... previously
predicted" because oil companies used the moratorium to repair rigs and kept skilled
workers on the payroll while waiting for the ban to lapse, and that there was "no net"
regional job loss because BP hired personnel for cleanup crews and expended massive
amounts of money for the recovery effort).
314. See, e.g., COMMIsSION REPORIT, supra note 7, at 152 (quoting Louisiana Senator
Landrieu, who called the moratorium "unnecessary, ill-conceived," and said it "has actually
created a second economic disaster for the Gulf Coast that has the potential to become
greater than the first.").
315. Id. (describing new regulations to address well casing and cementing requirements,
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give BOEMRE only thirty days within which to conduct an
environmental assessment (EA) of an application for exploratory
drilling and approve or return that application, '" and give the
public only ten days to comment on both." These timeframes are
woefully insufficient for a meaningful review of extremely complex
and technically challenging applications. The regulations also
failed to adopt many of the Oil Spill Commission's
recommendations, including requiring a risk-based performance
approach to regulating individual offshore facilities, operations,
and the environment, requiring offshore operators to provide
detailed plans for source control in their oil spill response plans
and drill permit applications, regular third-party audits at specified
intervals, whistleblower protection for employees who notify
regulators of safety lapses, stiffer fines, and consultation with the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Fish and.
Wildlife Service, and the Environmental Protection Agency in the
leasing decision-making process.3 's Even with these weaknesses and
omissions, the new requirements ran into heavy opposition. Both
industry and congressional critics quickly complained that the new
rules will slow the processing of drilling permits to a trickle3 '9 and
will have dire effects on the industry,320 while supporters of the
blowout preventers, safety certification, emergency response, and worker training).
316. The requirement for an environmental assessment is a change from prior use of a
categorical exemption. See Phil Taylor, Interior Accepts First Application for Deepeater
Exploration, E&ENEws PM (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/print/2011/
01/28/2 [hereinafter Taylor, Interior Accepts First Application].
317. Id.
318. See Steven Mufson &Juliet Eilperin, Oil Spill P'anel Recommends Tighter Rules, Money for
Gulf Coast, WASII. PosT, Feb. 26, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2011/01/. See generally COMMISSION REPOlIr, supra note 7, at 249-91.
319. Broder, Drilling Ban, supra note 313. But see Taylor, 1ernit Delays, supra note 294
(reporting that BOEMRE blames permitting delays on the fact that "not a single operator"
has been able to "demonstrate[] in a permit application that it has access to and can deploy
containment resources to deal with a deepwater blowout and spill . . . .").
320. Taylor, Permit Delays, supra note 294 (reporting on an API study that found that the
new rules would cause permitting delays that would "make nearly a third of deepwater-
production projects uneconomical, leading to substantial losses of government revenue,
fewer jobs and a greater dependence on foreign sources of oil . . . ."). The API study also
warned that even without permitting delays, total Gulf production would decline by "the
equivalent of 340,000 barrels of oil a day in 2019," while a "two-year delay would lead to a
680,000-barrel-per-day decline in 2019"-equivalent to "about 12 percent of total current
U.S. production and equal to all of the oil produced in Alaska. . . ." Id.; see also John M.
Broder, Tougher Rules Urged for Offshore Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2011, at A12 (describing
how Republicans in Congress have blocked the promulgation of any new offshore drilling
rules and spending for their implementation and have resisted raising the current seventy-
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regulations have struggled to make the safe operation of offshore
oil and gas drilling a priority in Congress.3 2 '
BOEMRE resumed issuing permits for deepwater drilling in
February 2011, when it approved an application for a deepwater
drilling permit under the new regulations to a company that had
begun drilling in 6,500 feet of water four days before the Macondo
well blowout.3 2 2 Until this applicant, no operator had been able to
show that it could access and deploy containment equipment in the
event of a deepwater blowout and spill.3 2 3  BOEMRE's cautious
approach to the resumption of deepwater drilling, like its new
regulations, drew the ire of both courts' and Congress.32  Political
five million dollar liability cap for accidents). For a discussion of the regulatory challenges
ahead, see Howell, New Reports Detail Lax Federal Oversight, supra note 289 (reporting that
"[c]reating a 'more competent and nimble regulator' entails significant challenges,
including "the reluctance of the oil and gas industry to acknowledge that its Gulf drilling
standards lag those in other countries" and "political realities in Washington," which are
focused more on "slashing spending" than "beefing up federal oversight."). Cf. Hoffman,
supra note 18 (describing how the oil industry's objections to a 2009 MMS effort to make the
elements of a voluntary safety and environmental management program mandatory killed
the initiative).
321. See, e.g., H.R. 501, 112th Cong. (2011), a bill to strengthen drilling oversight,
introduced by Representative Markey (D-MA) on January 26, 2011. A similar bill cleared the
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, but never made it to the floor for a
vote. See Implementing the Recommendations of the BP Oil Spill Commission Act of 2011,
H.R. 501, 112th Cong. (2011). See also Ayesha Rascoe, Lawmakers Vow to Push Oil Spill Bi4
REUTERS, Jan. 26, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/26/us-oilspill-
congress-legislation-idUSTRE70P6CF20110126 (discussing Representative Markey's bill and
Senator Bingaman's continuing commitment to passing comprehensive legislation).
322. Phil Taylor, Interior Issues First New Deepwater Penit, E&ENEws PM (Feb. 28, 2011),
http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2011/02/28/1 [hereinafter Taylor, Interior Issues First
New Deepwater I'eroit]. As of March 2011, BOEMRE had issued thirty-seven permits for new
wells in shallow water since the moratorium was lifted. John Broder & Clifford Krauss, Oil
Drilling to Resume In the Gulf's Deep Waters, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2011, at BI (reporting that the
Director of BOEMRE made "clear that each new permit would be closely reviewed on a well-
by-well basis and that the old system of rapid approvals of drilling permits had been
permanently changed.").
323. One reason BOEMRE issued a permit to this company, Noble Energy, was the fact
that the company had not only met all of the new safety and environmental regulations, but
had also contracted with another company that had the capability to cap a blowout and
handle a discharge of oil approximately equal to the amount of oil that leaked from the
Macondo well for three months. Broder & Krauss, supra note 322.
324. Taylor, Interior Accepts First Application, supra note 316. The same Louisiana district
court judge who directed the Department of the Interior to lift its leasing moratorium and
then held it in contempt ordered the Department to take action on five pending deepwater
drilling permits on February 17, 2011. See Ensco Offshore Co. v. Salazar, 781 F. Supp. 2d
332, 340 (E.D. La. 2011).
325. For example, Senator David Vitter (R-IA) put a hold on President Obama's
nomination for the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service until BOEMRE issued fifteen
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animosity also greeted the Secretary of the Interior's reorganization
of MMS and subsequent creation of BOEMRE, even though this
change followed directly from a recommendation of the
President's Oil Spill Commission to separate the former agency's
revenue collection functions from its offshore leasing and
permitting duties.2 This opposition was fueled by the fear that
additional red tape might unnecessarily delay the issuance of
drilling permits."' However, permit applications are being
approved32" and Shell recently received permission to move forward
on its plan to drill exploratory wells in Alaska.2
deepwater drilling permits. See Taylor, Interior Issues First New Deepwater Permit, supra note 322.
Now that the pace of permitting has increased, it remains to be seen whether congressional
criticism will abate. See Phil Taylor, Interior Issues 4th Deepwater Permit, E&ENEws PM (Mar. 22,
2011), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2011/03/22/5 (announcing the issuance of the
fourth deepwater drilling permit in a month, to Exxon Mobil for a previously permitted well
approximately 240 miles off the coast of Louisiana, at 7,000 feet).
326. Phil Taylor, Salazar Completes Division of Former MMS, GREENWIRE (Jan. 19, 2011),
http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2011/01/19/2 [hereinafter Taylor, Salazar
Completes Division]; Tom Zeller,Jr., Mineral Agency's Split Follows Nations' Lead, N.Y. TIMES, May
11, 2010, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/12/us/12agency.html.
According to the Department, most of these changes were consistent with regulatory and
organizational changes recommended by the Oil Spill Commission. Id. Separating the
promotional aspect of MMS from the agency's regulatory functions is reminiscent of the
division of the AEC into the Energy, Research and Development Administration (ERDA),
which is now part of the Department of Energy and serves a promotional role, and the NRC,
which serves a regulatory role. The AEC was divided in 1974 with passage of the Energy
Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891. See REES, supra note 106, at 28. However, the
NRC was primarily staffed with former AEC staff and thus "inherited the AEC's 'regulatory
tradition.'" Id. (quoting EuABETi ROLPil, NUCLEAR POWER AND PUBLIC SAFETY 155
(1979)).
327. Taylor, Salazar Completel Division, supra note 326.
328. For example, on March 21, 2011, BOEMRE approved a plan submitted by Shell
Offshore, Inc., to drill three deepwater wells in the Gulf of Mexico more than one hundred
miles off of the Louisiana coast in waters almost three thousand feet deep on a producing
lease approved in 1985. Phil Taylor, Interior Approves First Deepvater Exploration Plan Since BP
Spill, E&ENEWS PM (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/print/2011/03/
21/3. Shell's plan was accompanied by an environmental assessment and included an
opportunity for public comment. Id. (quoting Secretary Salazar as saying that Shell's plan
provides a "template" for how other companies can comply with new rules). Shell had
originally submitted its application to drill these wells on October 28, 2010, but revised it
several times before it was finally accepted by the agency. Taylor, Interior Accepts First
Application, supra note 316 ("An email to the company this morning indicates the application
was originally received on Oct. 28 but has been revised seven times before today's
acceptance."). In February, Shell, at its own initiative, further amended its application to
change the worst case scenarios proposed in the application. Phil Taylor, Shell Revises Gulf
Exploration Plan, E&ENEWS PM (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2011/
02/22/2.
329. See Jill Burke, Shell Oil Gets Tentative Arctic Offshore Drilling Green Light from Feds,
ALASKA DISPATCH (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.alaskadispatch.com/article/shell-oil-gets-
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It would be a stretch to say that the initiatives implemented by
the industry and BP in response to the Macondo well blowout
constitute, in the Oil Spill Commission's words, "bold action to
make clear that business will no longer be conducted as usual in
the Gulf," or that the offshore oil and gas industry has "seize [d] the
opportunity to demonstrate that it is fully committed to subjecting
its own internal operations to fundamental change and not merely
because it is being forced to do so."33o None of BP's changes
address the company's inadequate safety culture that led to the
Deepwater Horizon accident in the first place. As for the
Department's initial attempt to tighten its offshore oil and gas
drilling regulations and to reconstitute itself into a less internally
conflicted organization, it is unlikely that either will be achieved in
the long run, given congressional pressure to restart the industry.
B. The Response of the Nuclear Industry and the NRC to the
Three Mile Island Unit 2 Core Meltdown
"Indeed, far from being forgotten, the lessons of TMI have
influenced-and continue to influence-the industry's agenda
,'332for regulatory reform in fundamental ways.
While the deepwater drilling industry has instituted few changes
that respond to the causes of the Deepwater Horizon incident, the
accident at TMI-2 caused the NRC and the nuclear industry to
"revise their views on the kinds of protection needed to avoid major
accidents in the future."333  Both the industry and the NRC had
tentative-arctic-offshore-drilling-green-light-feds.
330. COMMIsSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 247; see also Justin Mullins, There's More to
Disasters than Mechanical Failure, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 18, 2010, at 11 (criticizing BP for
identifying only technical causes for the Macondo well blowout and quoting an industry
specialist as stating that "[t]he fact that BP has failed to identify its organisational [sic]
structure as a factor in the accident is itself an indication of a problem with its safety
culture").
331. See Broder & Krauss, supra note 322, at BI (saying many in Congress are
"complaining of burdensome rules that are thwarting the development of domestic energy
resources"); see also Howell, New Reports Detail Lax Federal Oversight, supra note 289 (noting
that a recent Oil Spill Commission staff report found that problems with regulatory oversight
remain "despite the regulatory overhaul at Interior").
332. REES, supra note 106, at 12.
333. Widoff, supra note 126, at 225. Some of the changes the NRC made after TMI-2
share features of the approaches of the United Kingdom and Norway to new offshore
drilling regulations after their catastrophic deepwater accidents. See Staff Working Paper No.
21, supra note 6, at 10-16. Examples of these initiatives include the United Kingdom's use of
a safety assurance review (or "safety case") that "puts the burden on operators seeking a
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vastly "underestimated the potential for serious nuclear accidents
prior to the TMI accident" and, as a consequence, were not
prepared to deal with such a situation when it arose. In response
to TMI-2, the NRC implemented numerous changes that addressed
the direct and indirect causes of the accident. The first set of
changes was directed at the specific factors that directly contributed
to the accident. 5  The second was designed to improve the
industry and the agency's capacity to assess the risk of such an
accident. The final set was directed at changing the culture of
complacency arising from technical hubris that permeated both
the industry and the NRC prior to TMI-2. As discussed in greater
detail below, these latter changes called for subjecting utilities to
greater internal and external scrutiny of their operations,
enhancing the role of management in the operation of nuclear
plants, and making environmental protection and safety company-
wide priorities.'" Until the NRC made the second and third sets of
drilling license to demonstrate they have identified all the hazards and risks associated with a
particular activity and [have] a plan to manage those risks," and sets a risk management
standard to a "level as low as reasonably practicable." Id. at 10, 13. Norway requires its
licensees to implement internal safety controls and use risk analyses, has implemented risk-
based regulations, and uses a process similar to the British "safety case" in its review of license
applications. Id. at 11-12. Both the United Kingdom and Norway have moved toward a
more performance-based approach to regulation (like the NRC), away from one that is
mostly or entirely prescriptive. Id. at 23. The United Kingdom, Norway, Australia, and the
Maritime Canadian Provinces require reporting of major uncontrolled hydrocarbon releases,
investigations of which are a priority and are summarized in annual reports that provide
"detailed operational and occupational statistics." Id. at 11. For a more detailed comparison
of these regulatory programs, see id. app. B.
334. Widoff, supra note 126, at 225.
335. See Paul David, Roland Maude-Griffen, & Geoffrey Rothwell, Learning by Accident?
Reductions in the Risk of Unplanned Outages in U.S. Nuclear Porver Plants After 77tree Mile Island, 13
J. OF RISK & UNCERTAINTY 175, 175 (1996) ("In the year after the accident, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) introduced its TMI Action Plan, which emphasized reducing
operator error through control room redesign and increased training.").
336. Critics of nuclear power plants are not satisfied with these changes and contend
serious risks remain. For example, some point out "the increased risk of likelihood of either
a natural disaster (for example an earthquake or flood) or a terrorist attack at a nuclear
plant," and note that these risks are not "confined to energy-producing reactors; they extend
to the various components of the nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, and, if a
closed fuel cycle is used, fuel reprocessing facilities." Leiter, supra note 141, at 58 ("The
Three Mile Island accident in Pennsylvania and the Chernobyl disaster in the former Soviet
Union highlight one of the most salient nuclear power risks-the chance of leakage from or
meltdown of a reactor."). Other concerns associated with nuclear power include "the
possibility that technological proliferation could lead to weapons proliferation," safely
disposing of "massive quantities of radioactive waste produced by existing and new facilities,"
the need to enact regulatory reforms to assure "the safe reinvigoration of the nuclear sector,"
and "the political will to push the necessary reforms through the relevant legislators and
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changes, "nuclear plant hardware was the regulators' foremost
defense against nuclear accidents."3 37
One change the NRC made almost immediately was to no longer
dismiss "Class 9" accidents, the most serious kind of accident that
can occur at a nuclear power plant, as improbable and, therefore,
unworthy of consideration in assessing the plant's vulnerability to
an accident. 33  This required the expensive redesign and
retrofitting of plants and communications plans.3 39  The NRC also
upgraded and strengthened many of the systems that were at issue
in the accident, which included requiring that plants have the
ability to automatically shut down-substantially reducing the
opportunity for human error. 4 0  Also in direct response to the
causes of TMI-2, the NRC revamped operator training and staffing
requirements, improved control room instrumentation and
operating controls, and enhanced instructions for what operators
should do during an emergency, including how to react to
confusing signals.' The NRC further required that it be
immediately notified in the event of an accident and established an
operations center at its Bethesda, Maryland headquarters (staffed
twenty-four hours a day) . It also required licensees to test their
emergency drill and response plans several times a year and
include state and local participants in the tests.3 13
Following TMI-2, the NRC and the nuclear industry also began to
agencies." Id. at 60-63. Critics also want any movement away from prescriptive to
performance-based regulation to be accompanied by the involvement of agency and
company senior management in risk assessment and management. See Thomas P. Grumbly,
Comparative Risk Analysis in the Department of Energy, 8 DUKE ENVn.. L. & POLY F. 23, 28 (1997)
("[W]ithout senior level management support, cross-cutting programs and analyses are not
successful. Such programs require nurturing in order to successfully facilitate the coherent,
protective change from a rigid compliance-based program to an open program that is based
on establishing priorities with citizens and regulators, and that reduces risk to the public, the
workers, and the environment in a cost effective manner .... [C]redible external review,
including peer-review, is essential.").
337. REES, supra note 106, at 30.
338. Widoff, supra note 126, at 225; see also Radetzki & Radetzki, supra note 2, at 368 ("In
general, the safety characteristics of nuclear reactors have been much improved over the 10-
15 year period between the Harrisburg event and the time when the PSAs [probabilistic
safety assessments, which rated the likelihood of a core meltdown occurring as between
16,000 and 25,000 reactor years] were undertaken.").
339. See Widoff, supra note 126, at 225-26 ("If nuclear power can be made safe only at
prohibitive cost, it ceases to be a viable energy option.").
340. NRC BACKGROUNDER, supra note 105, at 3.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
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change the way in which they assessed risk, showing the seriousness
with which they viewed the risk assessment process. The NRC first
instituted risk-informed regulation, which "weighs empirical risk
data along with other factors" to focus attention on "specific design
and operational issues that pose a greater risk to public safety."3 4
This replaced a regulatory approach that relied on incorporating
adequate safety margins into plant design requirements as a way to
prevent or mitigate accidents based on nonspecific (i.e., non-
quantified) risk probabilities.
It took longer to improve the capacity of the industry and the
NRC to assess the probability of an accident happening,"" which
occurred in the mid-1990s with the increased use of probabilistic
risk assessments (PRAs) .34 A PRA assesses the many variables that
can surround an initiating event, including the uncertainties and
limitations of human performance and the reliability of the
protective systems that might be involved in that event.34" PRAs are
also used to study "the frequency of the initiating event."," 9  The
goal of the NRC in using PRAs was to replace the older
"deterministic risk assessment methodology," which based risk
probabilities on a single design-based accident-like the rupture of
a reactor pressure vessel-and protected only against a single
failure.5 o While the increase in PRAs was not directly a response to
344. Chandler, supra note 141, at 493.
345. See id. Reese notes that the NRC's approach to licensing before TMI-2 "stressed"
engineering safety-"nuclear plants should be designed conseratively"-and the design
principles that incorporated this concept included "wide margins for error," "redundant
systems," and "emergency safety systems" because it was "assumed" even with "conservative
designs, some components and systems would still fail." REES, supra note 106, at 30.
346. See REEs, supra note 106, at 30 (listing the use of risk assessment "to identify
vulnerabilities of any plant to severe accidents" as an example of "a major change" that has
"occurred since the accident").
347. Chandler, supra note 141, at 492 ("In the summer of 1995, the NRC announced its
policy goal of increasing the use of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques in all areas
of nuclear regulation."). In 2000, NRC issued the first complete version of its Risk-Informed
Regulation Implementation Plan. Id. at 493; see abso Bill Corcoran, Understanding Histomy to
Interpret the Present, NUCLEAR PIANTJ., Sept.-Oct. 2010, at 41 (saying the oil exploration and
extraction industry uses probabilistic risk assessment and citing the Macondo well blowout as
an example of its lack of success).
348. Chandler, supra note 141, at 492 n.43; see atbo U.S. GOV'T AccOUNTABILIIY OFFICE,
GAO-06-1029, OVERSIGHT OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY HAs IMPROVED, BUT
REFINEMENTs ARE NEEDED 31-32 (2006) [hereinafter OVERSIGHT- OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
SAFETY] (describing the probabilistic risk assessment process and how it is used by the NRC).
349. Chandler, sulpra note 141, at 492.
350. Id. at 492 n.44 (describing the traditional deterministic risk assessment method as
using "design-basis accidents such as the rupture of a reactor vessel and protections against a
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TMI-2, both risk-informed regulation and the use of PRAs
acknowledge the importance of people in the chain of accident
causality and in the prevention of accidents, and lessen reliance on
engineered solutions. Each of these changes is a change the
offshore oil and gas industry should consider in responding to the
causes of Deepwater Honzon.
In contrast to the response of the offshore drilling industry and
the Department of the Interior to the Macondo well blowout, the
NRC also directly attacked the organizational and operator
indifference that led up to TMI-2 through augmented external
and internal review of plant operations.5 For example, the NRC
now requires that at least two NRC inspectors live near each plant
and work exclusively on that plant; they are rotated periodically to
avoid regulatory capture.3 " The NRC also expanded performance-
single failure to exhibit the spectrum of qualitative risk considerations taken into account");
see Leiter, supra note 141, at 37-38 n.24 (saying that the public's reactions to risk, which
often "can be attributed to a sensitivity to the technical, social and psychological qualities of
hazards ... are not well-modeled in technical risk assessments").
351. Rees attributes this to the fact that nuclear power plants were simply engrafted onto
the existing procedures and mores that guided the operation of much less complex and
dangerous fossil fired plants. REES, supra note 106, at 15 (commenting on the "fossil fuel
mentality" that pre-Three Mile Island nuclear utilities had and how it "colored many aspects
of organizational life," including how employees were "selected, trained, rewarded and
managed, as well as the way tasks got defined"). Rees explains organizational and operator
culture at nuclear power plants by noting that "[w]hile leadership and management
practices deal with effective management principles and skills ... organizational
environment/operator culture focuses on attitudes, norms, practices and history, and their
role in creating an atmosphere that affects nuclear operational performance." Id. at 34; see
abo OVERSIGHT OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY, supra note 348, at 35-38 (discussing how
after a slow start in implementing procedures to identify and address problems caused by the
plant's safety culture, the NRC has made strides toward that end, even though doing this has
generated some concern among stakeholders).
352. After TMI-2, the NRC instituted two new programs for evaluating plant
performance, including the extent and effectiveness of plant management's involvement in
plant operations and decision making-the Diagnostic Evaluation Program (DEP) and
Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance. Each focuses on the utility's management
and organizational practices, with special attention to plant operators' culture. These
reviews are rigorous and repeated with the goal of improving plant safety. DEP evaluations
are available for public review. NRC BACKGROUNDER, supra note 105, at 3; see also REES, supra
note 106, at 34-35. The industry greeted these initiatives with some ambivalence. See id. at
37 (saying there is "ambivalence" within the NRC about the new programs addressing
management practices, which is why they are more "attention-focusing" than "solution-
focusing").
353. NRC BACKGROUNDER, supra note 105, at 3; see also 10 C.F.R. § 50.70 (2010) (detailing
the resident inspector program); REES, supra note 106, at 33-34 (discussing the importance
of the resident inspector program requiring two or three NRC inspectors to work full-time in
each nuclear plant).
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oriented and safety-oriented inspections,3 5 ' and instituted a "watch
list" of "troubled nuclear power plants," 5 5 subjecting plants on that
list to more frequent inspections. While it would be infeasible to
have government inspectors at every deepwater drilling rig, the
offshore oil and gas drilling industry's safety record might similarly
be improved by more rigorous and frequent inspection of rigs and
the companies that manufacture key component parts, and by the
implementation of a watch list consisting of companies whose
accident record appears more problematic than other companies.
Nine months after the accident at TMI-2, in response to NRC
encouragement, the nuclear industry created the Institute of
Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) to provide a unified industry
approach to generic nuclear regulatory issues.""' INPO
disseminates information about operating experiences at various
nuclear plants to member utilities,"' performs regular on-site plant
evaluations, accredits reactor personnel training programs, and
provides technical assistance to help correct recurring equipment
and maintenance problems.5 INPO plant evaluations, which focus
on plant safety and reliability in multiple areas having to do with
plant operations and maintenance, as well as personnel training,
354. See David et al., supra note 335, at 175 ("[T]he TMI accident also prompted the NRC
to monitor plant operations more closely, increasing both plant inspections and the requisite
detail in utility reporting of abnormal operating events."). Enhanced NRC monitoring in
the late 1980s resulted in "unprecedented multiyear shutdowns in several plants the agency
deemed to be operating unsafely." Id. at 175-76.
355. Matthew L. Wald, Scathing Report Is Issued on Illinois Nuclear Utility, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
27, 1997, at Al (noting that thirteen plants were on the list in 1997, six of which
Commonwealth Edison owned). The NRC has since replaced the formal "watch lists" with its
Reactor Oversight Process (ROP). For a description of the ROP, see Detailed ROPIDescription,
NUCLEAR REG. COMMISSION, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/rop-
description.html#mainContent (last updated Mar. 25, 2011).
356. See Robert A. Szalay, The Reaction of the Nuclear Industry to the Three Mile Island Accident,
365 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. OF SCI. 222, 226 (1981) (describing the INPO's role in setting
industry standards for training and certifying operators and supervisory personnel, for
training the "management chain" responsible for overseeing safety practices, and for
"evaluating utility performance against those standards"); see aLso Senate Three Mile Island
Hearing, supra note 16, at 31 (statement of Marvin Fertel, President, Chief Exec. Officer,
Chief Nuclear Officer, Nuclear Energy Institute) (describing INPO's origins and functions).
357. This change went to perceived communication problems within the industry. But see
Senate Three Mile Island Hearing, supra note 16, at 11, 25 (statement of Peter B. Lyons,
Comm'r, Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n & statement of Peter A. Bradford, former Chairman,
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n) (attributing the 2002 Davis-Besse plant incident to the same
"complacency and excessive concern for the finances of the power plant" that had led to the
accident at TMI-2).
358. David et al., supra note 335, at 176.
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are made available to the NRC, which uses the evaluations as a
check on whether the agency's oversight process has overlooked
"any performance issues." 3'9 By the late 1980s, all utilities that were
either operating or building a nuclear power plant were members
of INPO, which subjected them to rigorous third party audits once
every two years and also helped assure that information about
problems encountered with various nuclear components is shared
widely in the industry.360 The Oil Spill Commission recommended
that the deepwater drilling industry create a new safety institute
modeled on INPO to supplement governmental oversight, which
would require that it have technical expertise equivalent to that in
the industry and no ties to industry lobbying agendas and interests,
disqualifying industry trade associations like the American
Petroleum Institute. 31 The industry has yet to implement the
Commission's recommendation.
Why then, did the nuclear industry and the NRC respond more
quickly and vigorously 62 to TMI-2 than deepwater drilling industry
leaders or the Department of the Interior responded to the
Macondo well blowout? The next part of the Article posits that,
despite similarities between the two industries and the causes of the
two accidents, there are fundamental differences between the
industries and the nature of the activity in which each is engaged
which may explain the dissimilar responses.
359. U.S. OVERSIGHT OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFElY, supra note 348, at 9; see Wald,
supra note 355, at Al (reporting on the NRC shutdown of Commonwealth Edison's Zion
plant near Chicago based on a bad INPO review, which found that the "plant's operations
showed serious weaknesses in safety management and a 'complete lack of progress' in
addressing its problems," and noting that four more reactors faced a possible shutdown).
360. David et al., supra note 335, at 176. The combined efforts of INPO and the NRC led
to an increase in the number of full scale control room simulators from twelve prior to the
TMI-2 accident to seventy-one by 1988. Id.
361. COMMIssION REPORT, supra note 7, at 239-42; see also Babcock, Corporate
"Greenwashing, "supra note 16, at 59-63 (discussing the importance of rigorous internal self-
auditing to improving a corporation's environmental social responsibility).
362. It appears the response was cost effective as well. See David et al., supra note 335, at
193 (saying that industry analysis showed "large reductions in outage risk" after TMI-2,
attributed to "safety reform efforts"). The specific safety reforms the authors highlight are
new NRC and INPO monitoring programs, innovations in personnel training, changes in the
design of control rooms, plant instrumentation, and plant maintenance practices. Id. at 193.
But see Senate Three Mile Island Hearing, supra note 16, at 11 (statement of Peter B. Lyons,
Comm'r, Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n) (saying the potential safety significance of a large
cavity in the Davis-Besse reactor head from corrosion sent "shockwaves through NRC and the
industry"); id. at 35 (statement of Sen. Jeff Merkley) (noting that the Davis-Besse nozzles
were not inspected even though it was common knowledge that they leaked).
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IV. SOME CRITICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE OFFSHORE OIL AND
GAS AND THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRIES THAT MAY HAvE INFLUENCED
THEIR RESPECTIVE REPONSES TO RISK
"We've studied radiation for one hundred years .... We know
a lot about it. But it's invisible. A colleague said, 'If I could
paint it blue and see it, it wouldn't be such an issue.' 363
While there are significant differences between the nuclear and
deepwater drilling industries, there are also institutional
similarities. For example, the responsible company in either
industry is strictly liable for the costs of an accident,364 and each
industry has the benefit of a monetary cap on liability.31 In neither
situation is the cap sufficient to encompass the actual damages that
occur from a catastrophic accident,366 which leaves the government
or individuals to assume the remaining response costs. 67  Each
363. Peter Hessler, The Uranium Widows, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 13, 2010, at 30, 35-36
(quoting Dr.John Boice, founder of the National Cancer Institute's radiation-epidemiology
branch).
364. See Radetzki & Radetzki, supra note 2, at 378 (explaining theoretical justification of
strict liability). The authors also explain the Oil Pollution Act's strict liability regime for oil
pollution damage from oil spills. Id. at 375-76.
365. Id. at 379 (explaining that the "real motivation for the potentially reparation-
reducing stipulations regarding channeling and limitation of liability, from which the
nuclear and oil transport industries benefit, is the preconception that these industries are
desirable and therefore should be supported," unlike other risky industries). For a more
detailed discussion of why, "compared to traditional tort liability, the liability of the nuclear
[industry], and of oil transport" are "particularly treated," see id. at 378. The Oil Pollution
Act caps liability for damages from spills from offshore facilities at seventy-five million dollars
unless gross negligence or willful misconduct is involved, federal safety regulations are
violated, or a facility does not report the accident or cooperate in removal activities; then,
liability is unlimited. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 283. Claims of up to one billion
dollars above the seventy-five million dollar cap for certain types of damages can be paid out
of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, which is funded by an eight-cent tax on domestic and
imported oil. Id.
366. The President's Oil Spill Commission asked Congress to significantly increase the
liability cap and financial responsibility requirements for offshore facilities. COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 7, at 284.
367. One difference between the two industries is that there is a mixed system of public
and private insurance in the nuclear industry, in which the government becomes the
"insurer of last resort." Radetzki & Radetzki, supra note 2, at 379 ("[Tlhe liability of the
nuclear industry for third party damage is limited by international conventions, national
legislation, and by the financial resources at the disposal of the industry"). Radetzki and
Radetzki justify government insurance of the nuclear industry by noting that "[t]he social
license to operate the risky industries, in combination with the market failure of insurance,
provides a motivation for public support action in the form of a transfer of the top risk to the
government, at least until private market solutions, appropriate to the task, have been
industry has also benefited from government subsidies, 68 each is
composed of large corporations,3 6 9 and each provides a product
that is in high demand, for which there are not yet widely available
alternatives.
Both industries are also subject to what Professor Oliver Houck
labels "risk creep.,,3 7 0 Risk creep occurs when an activity starts small
and gradually becomes bigger and more complex, and, as a result,
less safe.' Thus, over time, both the size and complexity of the
underlying activities in each industry have become greater and
riskier. The transformation is sufficiently gradual that it masks the
fact that the underlying activity has radically changed even though
perceptions about and responses to it have not.
Furthermore, both industries are regulated by agencies that have
internally conflicting views of their regulatory responsibilities. On
the one hand, the government is a regulator of offshore oil
development and nuclear power with a mission to protect public
safety and the environment from collateral harm; on the other, it is
a promoter of what are considered socially beneficial activities.
developed. The government becomes, in this way, an insurer of last resort, a not
unreasonable position, given that the spread of risk is one of the fundamental motives for
establishing societies." Id. at 381. For a detailed description of the mixed private and public
system of insurance used in the nuclear industry, see id. at 374 (explaining that the domestic
liability structure makes nuclear plant operators "strictly liable for damages up to $254
million," which is guaranteed by mandatory insurance, with a risk sharing pool of all nuclear
plant owners covering any excess and Congress covering any additional shortfall).
368. See id. at 379 (explaining that "transfer of the top risk from the nuclear industry,
either to the government, or to the damaged but potentially uncompensated third
parties ... can be regarded as a subsidy of the nuclear industry.").
369. Nuclear Power in the USA, WORLD NUCLEAR Ass'N, http://www.world-nuclear.org/
info/inf4l.html (last updated Oct. 2011); see also Martha Hamilton, Nuclear Power Plant Sale
Shows Power Shift, WASH!. PosT, Mar. 27, 1999, at El (noting that the sale of Three Mile Island
Unit 1 for $100 million signaled a fundamental change in the electric utility industry's
structure from "a network of nearly 200 regional monopolies into a handful of national
competitors that will vie for customers the way long-distance phone companies do").
370. Houck, supra note 49, at 11034.
371. Id. at 11034 (describing the evolution of oil and gas drilling from "onshore ... low-
impact conditions" that "moved gradually into more sensitive Gulf wetlands and then open
water .. . that like the differentiation of species, at no time presented something so radically
different that we recognized we had a new animal" as an example of "risk creep").
372. Radetzki & Radetzki, suprra note 2, at 381 ("The government has a dual role vis-1-vis
risky industrial activities. On the one hand, it is concerned with public safety, and so should
regulate such activities, or forbid them outright. On the other hand, it should help in
overcoming the private inhibitions to venture into the risky fields, if the long-run benefits to
society are deemed to be greater than the social cost of assuming that risk."). Radetzki and
Radetzki note that "[t]he public assumption of the top catastrophe risks may be justified by
infant industry or strategic trade arguments, i.e. that the activity is of value to society but that
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In both cases, the government must not allow its promotional
activities to tip the balance such that the social costs of assuming
the risk exceed long-term social benefits.7' This precarious
balance places a premium on companies-like those under study
in this Article-adhering to the regulations that accompany the
license that society gives them. Society allows the companies to
operate with the understanding that complying with these
regulations creates benefits "greater than the costs of the rare
disasters that they might cause."
Nonetheless, the similarities between the two industries have not
led to similar concerns about safety because the differences
between them overwhelm their commonalities. For example,
although the electric utility industry, of which nuclear power is a
part, is a public monopoly,37" it has no assurance that state agencies
that set electricity rates will allow utilities to pass through the costs
of a major accident to its customers. The one time this happened,
in the case of TMI-2, the New Jersey Public Service Commission
denied such a request but allowed Metropolitan Edison to pass
through the costs of buying replacement power because the
company had a legal obligation to supply power to its customers. 76
The oil and gas industry is fiercely competitive, but there are no
checks on a company like BP, other than the marketplace, that
prohibit it from passing on the costs of accidents to consumers.
it would not be established if it had to carry the overall responsibility for the risks it creates."
Id. at 383.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 381 ("[Tlhe existence of regulation and the absence of prohibition can be
seen as a license, an expression of society's (basically political) evaluation of these activities:
so long as the regulations are adhered to, the benefits are deemed by society to be greater
than the costs of the rare disasters that they might cause.").
375. Widoff, supra note 126, at 238 ("As no significant market forces operate in the world
of public utility monopoly, the government must monitor the nuclear industry and must
maintain the highest standards of accountability within the industry."). Another
consequence of utility monopolies behaving "as if each were [sic] an island unto itself" is that
no "serious attention" is given to the "operating experience (including accidents) of other
nuclear plants." REES, supra note 106, at 23.
376. Widoff, supra note 126, at 224-25 ("[Two state regulatory commissions] were willing
to pass [GPU's replacement power] repurchase costs along to GPU customers."). Widoff
explains that "[two regulatory] commissions ... expressed the view that bankruptcy of GPU
and its subsidiaries [was] not desirable. If GPU were to go out of business, TMI cleanup
expenses merely would shift to some other entity and another utility company would have to
assume responsibility for providing electric service." Id. at 237.
377. See Gold & Casselman, supra note 15, at 2 (reporting that the Macondo well blowout
will cost BP and its partners an estimated forty billion dollars).
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Thus, the fear of the economic consequences of a nuclear accident
substantially motivates nuclear power companies to be very
careful. 7" The oil and gas industry does not share this concern as a
whole, and individual companies appear able to withstand the
consequences of catastrophic accidents.379
However, the most significant differences between the two
industries are the type of harm generated by a nuclear accident
compared to that from an oil spill and the uneven resultant public
reactions.3 so The principal concern after a nuclear accident is the
effect on public health. Public health is rarely a concern after a
well blowout;38 ' visible environmental damage is relatively short-
lived, occurs some place far away, is generally localized, and
appears to be reversible as well as capable of remediation and
containment. Radiation, on the other hand, is invisible, long-lived,
can affect a comparatively widespread area, and cannot be
reversed, contained, or remediated." When radiation is released
378. Widoff, supra note 126, at 237 ("The effects of nuclear accidents on the financial
future of nuclear construction are considerable."). The costs of a nuclear disaster are "so
severe that it is practically impossible for even the largest electric utility company to bear
them." Id. at 223; see also Radetzki & Radetzki, supra note 2, at 382 ("[T]he public
assumption of only the top risk necessarily implies a huge deductible in most instances over
and above the limited insurable amounts[] available to the firm that conducts the risk
activity. For accidents of catastrophic proportions, the deductible would typically be so large
as to threaten the survival of the firm."). But it is also noted that "the 'realistically' assessed
third party accident costs represent 0.2 per cent of total power generation costs . . . ." Id. at
369. This fear is lessened somewhat by a public subsidy which allows the government to
supplement the utility's private insurance. See id. at 366.
379. The spill appears not to have had a major financial effect on BP. See Krauss, supra
note 291, at B9 (reporting that BP shares "have recovered well over half of the value lost"
after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and that the company "recently reinstituted a dividend"
that it had suspended after the blowout); see aLbo Werdigier, supra note 306, at B3 (reporting
that BP, despite posting its first loss in nearly twenty years-$3.7 billion-paid out dividends
to its shareholders, and that BP announced a reduction of its production operations, a
doubling of exploration spending by investing in developing economies like Brazil, Libya,
andJordan, and the sale of two of its refineries, including the Texas City refinery, the site of
the explosion that killed fifteen workers); B3P to Cut Production, Focus on Exploration,
GREENWIRE (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2011/01/31/11
(reporting that BP will reduce production to 3.6 million barrels per day, reducing its 2009
production levels by a tenth, and that experts expect long-term growth for BP from its
exploration for unconventional gas).
380. See Rob Stein, Radiation Threat Can Take Great P1ychological Toll, Experts Say, WASIHI.
PosTr, Mar. 15, 2011, at A9 (explaining that humans fear radiation even though it is "a far
less potent carcinogen than other toxic substances").
381. But see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 191-95 (calling for an assessment of
direct and indirect mental and physical health impacts from the blowout, including anxiety
about socioeconomic affects).
382. See KEMENY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 81 ("Never before have people
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into the environment, "[i]nvisible contaminants remain a part of
the surroundings-absorbed into the grain of the landscape, the
tissues of the body and, worst of all, into the genetic material of
survivors. An 'all clear' is never sounded. The book of accounts is
never closed."3 3 When this happens, the most effective response is
to evacuate the area exposed and to monitor radiation levels in the
air, soil, plants, groundwater, and surface water; this was the course
of action taken after the accident at TMI-2.
The bottom line is that the public is afraid of radiation; it is not
afraid of oil and gas.' The American public was introduced to
radiation with the dropping of atomic bombs on two major
Japanese cities.38 6 That event is indelibly burned into the American
consciousness, and with it, the fear of radiation.3 "' Despite the
impressive worldwide safety performance of the nuclear industry, 3
been asked to live with such ambiguity. The TMI accident-an accident we cannot see or
taste or smell ... is an accident that is invisible. I think the fact that it is invisible creates a
sense of uncertainty and fright on the part of people that may well go beyond the reality of
the accident itself." (quoting Theodore Gross, Provost of the Capitol Campus of
Pennsylvania State University)).
383. See Paul Voosen, Iumans 'Wired'for Terror over Remote Radiation Threats, GREENWIRE
(Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2011/03/18/1.
384. See supra notes 135, 137 and accompanying text.
385. But see Hessler, supra note 363, at 30 (describing Uravan residents' support for
opening a new mine despite the fact that the government previously leveled their town when
it deemed the town too radioactive to survive after supplying uranium yellowcake for the
Manhattan Project).
386. See Widoff, supra note 126, at 229 n.53 ("[Ilt is vitally important to remember the
fear with respect to nuclear energy that exists in many human beings. The first application
of nuclear energy was to [drop] atomic bombs, which destroyed two major Japanese cities.
The fear of radiation has been with us ever since and is made worse by the fact that, unlike
floods or tornadoes, we can neither hear... nor smell radiation." (quoting KEMENY
COMMIsSION REPOrf, supra note 15, at 19)); see also Radetzki & Radetzki, sufra note 2, at 368
(outlining a three-step risk analysis for the nuclear power industry, which considers "the
likelihood that a severe accident" will occur, that there will be "an ensuing severe radioactive
emission," and "the value of the damage to third parties, in terms of life, health and physical
destruction").
387. Stein, supra note 380 (concluding that "the searing images of victims of Nagasaki
and Hiroshima" and "the way radiation is portrayed by popular culture" may cause public
fear of radiation).
388. Lewis, sufna note 96, at 48-49 ("With almost 3,000 reactor-years of experience,
nuclear energy's safety performance over the past [ten] years is virtually unparalleled in
American industry. If we look at reactor performance and lost-time accident rates, nuclear
plants are among the safest places to work in the entire industrial sector." (quotingJohn E.
Kane, Senior Vice President of the NEI)); see also Radetzki & Radetzki, supra note 2, at 368
(noting that in "more than 6,000 years of reactor operations in the OECD," only "one core
meltdown actually occurred (Harrisburg 1979)"). This calculation will change after the
catastrophic accident at Fukushima Daichi Nuclear Power Station in Japan, where a
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especially by comparison to the other accident-prone industries,
the incident at TMI-2 ineradicably seared the American conscience,
even though there was no loss of life or measurable environmental
harm.390 Seven years later, the accident at Chernobyl "grimly"
reminded "the world of the dangers of unsafe operation" of
nuclear power plants. 9  In Chernobyl, thirty-two people died
almost immediately from radiation exposure, and many more
attributable fatalities are expected in the future. Huge tracts of
land near the plant were severely contaminated and remain so to
combined 9.0 earthquake and tsunami crippled the plant's capacity to cool its nuclear core,
which resulted in a partial core meltdown and the escape of cesium and radioactive iodine to
the surrounding area, as well as a hydrogen explosions that damaged the outer containment
building of two reactors. See William J. Broad, Danger Posed by Radioactivily in japan Hard to
Assevs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2011, at All; see also Cancer from Japan Disaster May Be Hidden,
MSNBC.COM, Nov. 20, 2011, http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/45376302/ns/today-today
-health/t/future-cancers-fikushima-disaster-may-be-hidden/#.TsmOE2BOUqQ Debra Black,
The Plan for Fukushima's Nuclear Waste, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 19, 2011, http://
www.thestar.com/news/world/article/1088526-explainer-fukushima-cleanup.
389. See Radetzki & Radetzki, supra note 2, at 370 ("A US study concludes that 'the
maximum number of people who could be killed in a worst event is probably greater for
dam failures than most any other kinds of hazards."). Radetzki and Radetzki note that in
1984, explosions and fires at a LPG plant in Mexico City killed at least 500 people, injured
another 7,231, and required evacuation of 39,000, and the 1985 release of toxic chemicals at
Union Carbide's insecticide production plant in Bhopal, India, killed an estimated 5,000
people and caused permanent damage to 200,000 more. Id. at 371. Monetary costs of non-
nuclear disasters may also be extreme. Id. at 372 ("If the $2.2 billion cleanup bill after Exxon
Valdez's release of 38,000 tons of oil provides a true reflection of the cost to society from that
accident, then one could easily imagine a release of ten times that amount of oil in an
environmentally sensitive area, carrying a cost in the tens of billions of dollars.").
390. Lewis, supra note 96, at 48 ("The Three Mile Island nuclear incident in 1979
catalyzed American sentiment and damaged the reputation of the nuclear power industry.");
see abo Radetzki & Radetzki, supra note 2, at 367 n.2 ("The negative psychological
implications [from the TMI accident] were considerable. Some 144,000 persons were
evacuated from their homes in consequence of the accident."); KEMENY COMMISSION
REPOR', supra note 15, at 8 ("What is quite clear is that [the Three Mile Island accident's]
impact, nationally and internationally, has raised serious concerns about the safety of nuclear
power.").
391. Lewis, supra note 96, at 48. Lewis notes, "Chernobyl represents the classic fear of the
destructive capability of nuclear plants, as the concrete sarcophagus entombing Reactor No.
4 grimly reminds the world of the dangers of unsafe operation :... Most importantly,
Chernobyl represents the incredibly destructive potential of poorly regulated civilian nuclear
power plants." Id. at 51.
392. Radetzki & Radetzki, supra note 2, at 369 (discussing the 1986 "Chernobyl disaster"
and stating that "[a]n early estimate of the Chernobyl damage, in which thirty-two persons
died from radiation at an early stage[,] ... many more late fatalities were expected, and
large tracts of land were severely contaminated suggests total costs of $15 billion to $20
billion."). Radetzki and Radetzki note that these "values reflect the low GDP per capita level
of Ukraine, and the relatively low population density of the reactor's environs." Id.
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this day.9 After Chernobyl, the world became even more
frightened of nuclear power.3 As scholars have noted, "the mere
imagination of damage on this scale is bound to arouse strong
public sentiments and to cause insurers, accustomed to actuarially
predictable risks, to shy away from the nuclear business." 39
The result is that nuclear power occupies an extreme position on
the dread scale of risks-risks that have the potential "to produce
massive consequences in the event of accidents," even when the
likelihood of such accidents occurring is miniscule .3" The "affect
heuristic," which results in people instinctively underestimating the
risks of engaging in beneficial activities and overestimating
involuntary risks,"9  may explain why people overestimate the
enormity of "dread risks."098 Negative feelings towards activities that
stimulate the "dread risk" can "lead individuals to assess the level of
the risk as high."399  Indeed, the attributes of nuclear power-it is
uncontrollable, potentially catastrophic or fatal, involuntary,
invisible, irreversible, complex, and puts unborn generations at
risk-read like a "laundry list" of risk aggravating factors. 400 These
393. Id. But se Hessler, supra note 363, at 33 ("After more than twenty years of extensive
study, there is no consistent evidence of increased birth defects, leukemia, or most other
radiation-related diseases.").
394. Leiter, sufna note 141, at 60; see Lewis, supra note 96, at 52 (speaking of Chernobyl's
global impact, and saying "[i]rrespective of the statistical realities of the safety of nuclear
power, there is still a generalized, articulable fear of nuclear power plants," leading countries
like Germany and Belgium to "abandon nuclear power as an electricity option," although
other countries like China, India, Pakistan, Brazil, and South Korea maintain an interest "in
expanding their nuclear capacity").
395. Radetzki & Radetzki, supra note 2, at 369.
396. Freudenburg, supra note 175, at 2 (emphasis omitted).
397. Leiter, supra note 141, at 41-42 (defining the phenomenon of affect heuristics as a
descriptive term for the effect perceptual and analytic biases have on public perception); see
aLso Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic: Global Warming, Teroism, and Other
Problems, 23 PAC, ENFL. L. REv. 3, 10 (2005) (noting that the human mind also relies on the
"availability heuristic" in evaluating individual risk perceptions, by making a decision based
on the "ease with which [it] can recall an example in which the risk came to fruition."). See
generally Hope M. Babcock, Iesponsible Environmenial Behavior, Eneigy Conservation, and
Compact Ruorescent Bulbs: You Can Lead a Horse to Water, But Can You Make It Drink?, 37
HOFSTRA L. REv. 943 (2009) (discussing how certain cognitive heuristics influence personal
environmental decisions that serve as a barrier to reform); Hope M. Babcock, Assuming
Personal Responsibility for Improvinglte Environment: Moving Tow)ard a Ne,, Environmental Nonn,
33 IL1Rv. ENvt. L. REv. 117 (2009) (same).
398. Leiter, supra note 141, at 42 (describing "dread risks" as being those risks that are
uncontrollable, inflicted involuntarily, and have lethal consequences that are inequitably
distributed across society).
399. Id. (emphasis omitted).
400. Id. at 64. These factors include "'dread, uncontrollable, potentially catastrophic,
Vol. 37:1142
2012] A Risky Business 143
heuristic and risk biases can lead people to be extremely afraid of
401 ' 402
nuclear power and stimulate a strong avoidance reaction.
The American public's fear of radiation and nuclear power
plants has not diminished since TMI-2. 03  People understand that
nuclear technology is an unforgiving and inexact science, and that
the production of nuclear energy "is fraught with danger."
Critics of nuclear power who oppose recent licensing changes that
would lengthen the operating lifetime of nuclear power plants and
accelerate the licensing process05 take little comfort from the
fatal, inequitably distributed, place future generations at risk, involuntary, not observable,
unknown, new, irreversible, human created, complex, and unfamiliar."' Id. (quoting
Gregory N. Mandel, Technology Wars: The Failure of Democratic Discourse, 11 Mid i. TELECOMM.
TiECi. L. REV. 117, 161 n.152 (2005)). "In short, nuclear power occupies an 'extreme
position [I in psychometric factor space[].' Id. (quoting Paul Slovic et al., Decision PIrocesses,
Raltionality and Adjustment to Natural Hazards, in 26 TiIE PERCEPTlON OF RISK 220, 229 (Paul
Slovic ed., 2000)).
401. Leiter, sup)ra note 141, at 64. As nuclear generation is often promoted as an antidote
to global climate change, this fear, which is stronger than the fear of climate change, may
undermine the saliency of that appeal. See id. at 60 (saying that to the extent that the
nuclear industry's restart is being proposed as an alternative to global warming, this could be
derailed by a "serious, widely reported accident-or even a near miss").
402. See Stein, supra note 380, at A9 ("What we know from experience is the psychological
footprint from a nuclear disaster can not only be massive but in many ways greater than the
effect of radiation." (quoting Steven Becker of the University of Alabama)).
403. See, e.g., Peter Behr, Foes Renew Protest Against Reactors Chosen by Duke and Progress,
CLIMATEWIRE (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2011/01/11/3
(reporting on opposition to Westinghouse's APl000 reactor design (a 1,100 megawatt
pressurized water reactor) because a vent at the top of the containment building would allow
radioactive steam to escape, "like a whale's blowhole," during core meltdown (quoting
Arnold Gundersen)). On February 10, 2011, the NRC published notice of the AP1000
reactor design and accompanying environmental assessment for public comment. Jenny
Mandel, NRC Requests Public Comments on API000 Reactor Design Application, GREENWIRE (Feb.
11, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2011/02/11/11.
404. Widoff, supra note 126, at 238; see also Oversight on the Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Clean Air, Climate Change, and Nuclear Safety of the Comm. on Env't
and Pub. Works, 109th Cong., 10 (2006) (statement of Sen. Obama) ("As the NRC knows, the
viability of nuclear power rests in large part on the public having full confidence in the
health and safety precautions taken at these facilities. When events occur that surprise the
public, even if the potential risks are within federal health and safety standards, it's
understandable that people are skeptical and concerned about nuclear power."); Radetzki &
Radetzki, supra note 2, at 382 ("[M]ore generally,... the survival of the entire industry
depends on its ability to prevent serious accidents from occurring").
405. See also Lewis, supra note 96, at 31-40 (noting criticism that changes have
transformed the approval process from a licensing process to a rulemaking one, have
severely constrained nuclear opponents' ability to challenge nuclear power plant siting and
licensing, and have reduced the rigor of public "scrutiny" of licensing applications because
the process separates local concerns from reactor's proposed design). For a general
discussion on the change from licensing to regulation, see generally id. at 40-41, 56
(describing changes the NRC made in the nuclear licensing process to reduce inefficiency
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industry's safety record.'" For example, even though extending
the operating lifetime of existing reactors avoids the costs and time
required to build a new reactor, the proposal to double the
operating lifetime of existing reactors from forty to eighty years"0s
has run into public opposition. As one critic stated:
The notion that the lack of a recent major accident makes such an
occurrence a 'remote possibility' that therefore justifies safety
deregulation is the same irresponsible thinking that set the stage for
the BP disaster. As that calamity illustrates all too well, the more
complex the technology involved, the greater the chance of
catastrophic failure, despite safety redundancies being built into the
systems. One of the crucial lessons from the oil spill in the Gulf is
that measures to accelerate licensing, cut corners on safety and
generally undermine regulation can lead to tragic consequences. Oil
spill disasters and radiation disasters will continue to happen, and
thus we need to drastically change the direction of our energy
future.w
and uncertainty in the nuclear licensing process prompted by a 2002 Department of Energy
initiative, Nuclear Power 2010, designed to "jumpstart the commercial nuclear power
industry").
406. See Leiter, supra note 141, at 36 n.20 (discussing the result of a 1999 poll and
explaining that "[p]ast accidents, misrepresentations by the nuclear industry... and a
growing mistrust of many institutions, especially institutions associated with nuclear power,
such as the DOE, have made the public apprehensive about the technology. And all signs
indicate that this apprehension runs deep. On the other hand, Americans support the idea
of leaving the nuclear option open, perhaps as a trump card against future energy shortages
or as the only demonstrated energy alternative for dealing with global warming. In
summary, while the public may support this technology in the future, there is little basis to
say that the future is now." (quoting Eugene A. Rosa, Public Acceptance of Nuclear Power: Deja
Vu All Over Again?, PHYsIcs & Soc'Y, Apr. 2001, at 20, available at http://www.aps.org/tinits/
fps/newsletters/2001/april/ap5.pdf)). Many believe that "in the current political
environment, a large-scale national commitment to nuclear power would be virtually
impossible." Id. at 36; see also Anne Paine, TVA Plans Spark Safety, Enviro Concerns, GREENWIRE
(Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2010/10/07/archive/14?terms=TVA+
plans+spark+safety+enviro+concerns (reporting on negative public reaction to the Tennessee
Valley Authority's (TVA's) plans to increase by thirty percent its commitment to nuclear
generation through the construction of four new nuclear reactors in the next eight to twelve
years, and quoting a local resident cleaning up from TVA's 2008 coal ash spill as saying, "We
have the possibility, unfortunately, for bad things to happen.").
407. SeeBehr, supra note 100.
408. The NRC has already extended the license term for about half of the nation's
reactors for twenty years, but this most recent round of extensions would double the lifetime
of these and potentially other reactors. Id. Theoretically, all of a plant's components,
including the reactor vessel itself, could be swapped out for newer parts as the plants age,
and indeed many of them have been because of the extreme conditions inder which
reactors operate. The question is whether doing this makes economic sense. It
409. Press Release, Michele Boyd, Physicians for Soc. Responsibility, Experts Warn
[Vol. 37:1144
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Public fear does not appear to be a factor affecting the offshore
oil and gas industry. Although oil shares some of the
characteristics that place radiation much higher on the "dread
scale," the public does not fear it nearly as much. Therefore, there
is minimal psychological pressure on the offshore oil and gas
industry to exercise extreme caution when drilling in deep water.
Indeed, recent polling shows that while the public's support of
nuclear power predictably diminished after the nuclear power
plant accidents in Japan, support for deepwater oil and gas drilling,
which had waned after the Macondo well blowout, has substantially
* 410increased.
TMI-2, by demonstrating that catastrophic nuclear accidents are
a reality, followed by the horrific consequences of Chernobyl,
shook the country's tenuous commitment to nuclear power as a
source of energy."' These accidents reaffirmed the public's fear of
radiation, making it very unlikely that unless the nuclear industry
Legislative Deregulation for New Reactors Would Repeat BP Mistakes (June 23, 2010) (on
file with author). The press release quotes a Washington-based public interest lawyer as
stating that "[t]he parallel here to the Gulf oil permitting is the proposed short-circuiting of
legal processes that are designed to identify and address risks ahead of time. Proposed
legislation would, for example, eliminate the independent review now conducted by NRC
judges on uncontested issues and would make it easier for the government to avoid
consideration of less dangerous alternatives to reactors. The BP spill provides an object
lesson regarding the risks of eliminating legal processes for rigorous government oversight of
safety and environmental risks because BP was allowed to start drilling without conducting
the type of rigorous environmental analysis that is normally required by federal law. In the
case of new reactors, the NRC has already seriously weakened key aspects of the legal process
for reactor review." Id.
410. See Kate Howell, Polls Show Dropoff in Suppart for New Reactors, E&ENEWS PM (Mar. 22,
2011), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspin/2011/03/22/1 (saying that the Pew Research
Center reported a five percent increase from October 2010 in the number of nuclear power
opponents, while a poll from the Civil Society Institute reported that fifty-eight percent of
Americans are "'less supportive of expanding nuclear power' than they were a month ago,"
and reporting that the Pew Research Center poll also showed a thirteen percent uptick in
support for deepwater drilling since the previousJune).
411. See Widoff, supra note 126, at 225 ("While the effects of the accident on health will
not be known for many years, the newly perceived risk of a major accident already is having a
profound impact on the nuclear power option."); see also Norimitsu Onishi, Henry Fountain,
& Tom Zeller, Jr., Crisis at Pair of Reactors Underscores Japan's Fear Of the Nuclear Industry, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2011, at A12 (citing James M. Acton of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace as having said that "the nuclear industry would be shaken" by the
accident, and noting that the public did not buy the industry's argument after Chernobyl
and TMI-2 that newer reactors incorporated better safety features, and that they would
demand that safety measures at nuclear power plants be revisited, perhaps causing delay in
development).
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took quick, proactive steps to regain the American public's
confidence in nuclear power, the country would rethink its
commitment to nuclear energy -and it still may, especially after
413the recent nuclear accident in Japan. As a consequence, one of
the biggest checks on the nuclear industry having another
catastrophic accident is the assured knowledge that the American
public would not tolerate it. 4 14 The nuclear industry had no choice.
412. See Radetzki & Radetzki, supra note 2, at 370 ("The nuclear industry appears to have
a very special place in terms of public fears, even though empirical facts and PSAs do not
suggest it should." (citation omitted)). Leiter, who opposes the restart of the nuclear
industry, takes some comfort from the fact that although, at the time she wrote her article,
the NRC had twenty-two applications to construct and operate thirty-three new nuclear
generating plants, "regulatory constraints, a potentially rate-limiting supply chain for reactor
parts, and the need to train new nuclear operators" made it unlikely that any new reactors
would be finished before 2020. Leiter, supra note 141, at 56. On the other hand, she
remains concerned about the effect of legislative incentives on the viability of the industry,
like those contained in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which, among other things, "created a
$125 million per year per gigawatt tax credit for up to six gigawatts of new nuclear power
(about six large plants) for up to eight years of operation," "extended the Price-Anderson
Act's liability indemnification provisions (and pool of funds) for another twenty years to
2025," authorized DOE "to reimburse utilities for up to $500 million in costs related to NRC
delays," and "established a federal loan guarantee program, backing up to 80% of
construction costs." Id. at 57.
413. Reflecting on lessons learned from TMI-2, the NRC almost immediately after the
Fukushima Daichi accident ordered a review of the safety features of all operating reactors
and put on hold the review of applications seeking to extend the operating lifetime of older
reactors. See Hannah Northey & Anne C. Mulkern, Earthquake Risks Must Be Reanalyzed for
U.S. Reactors, GREENWIRE (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2011/03/24/
archive/4?terms=Earthquake+risks+must+be+reanalyzed+for+U.S.+reactors; see also NUCLEAR
REGUlTORY COMM'N, OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION,
NRC INFO. NOIiCE 2011-05: TO IOKU-TAIHEIYOU-OKI EART IQUAKE EFFEcoS ON JAPANESE
NUCLEAR POWFR PIANTs (2011), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/201 1/ML1 10760432.pdf (informing all 104
operators of nuclear plants of the effects of the earthquake on Japanese nuclear power
plants and asking all operators to review the information for its applicability to their facilities
and to consider appropriate action); Peter Behr, U.S. Nuclear Plants are Safer thanJapan's, but
Operational Quality Needs Work, CLIMATEWIRE (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/
climatewire/2011/03/21/archive/I?terms=behr (describing the NRC notice); Christa
Marshall, Nuclear Revival Plans Continue in Some States, CLIMATEWIRE (Mar. 21, 2011), http://
www.eenews.net/climatewire/print/2011/03/21/4 (discussing the mixed reaction in the
states to the Japanese nuclear accident); Northey, supra note 101 (reporting that the NRC
executive deputy director for reactor and preparedness programs, Martin Virgilio, said that
"the [NRC] is reanalyzing its safety requirements, both voluntary and mandatory, for
combating the loss of electricity to plants and ensuring key safety equipment is operable and
accessible during an emergency"). But see In the Wake ofFukushima, supra note 7 (expressing
some doubt that the nuclear industry and its "allies" in Congress will accept the NRC's recent
post-Fukushima proposals to protect against similar disasters in this country, as they would
"drive up costs").
414. See KEMENY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 81 ("The reality of the accident
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If the industry wanted to survive TMI-2, it had to substantially
reform itself."" No such choice faces the deepwater drilling
industry.
V. CONCLUSION
What happened on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig "was not the
product of a series of aberrational decisions made by rogue
industry or government officials that could not have been
anticipated or expected to occur again." 4 1  If this had been the
case, then preventing future accidents would be as simple as
preventing BP from deepwater drilling and removing key
personnel from government positions. Rather, as the President's
Oil Spill Commission found, "the root causes" of the accident "are
systemic and absent significant reform in both industry practices
and government policies, might well recur." 417
The nuclear industry implemented such significant reforms after
TMI-2, after similar findings by the Kemeny Commission. There
are lessons here for companies engaging in other types of risky
activities and for the agencies that regulate them. As shown here,
the chain of causation that leads to any accident generally has at
least two major components: technological failure and human
error. Both in calculating the likelihood of an accident and in
taking steps to prevent one, companies and regulatory agencies
[at TMI-2], the realization that such an accident could actually occur, renewed and
deepened the national debate over nuclear safety and the national policy of using nuclear
reactors to generate electricity."); see also, In the Wake of Fukushima, supra note 7 ("The
industry should have learned after the accident at Three Mile Island that public confidence
is fragile.").
415. See KEMENY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 7-8 ("Our findings ... simply
state that if the country wishes, for larger reasons, to confront the risks that are inherently
associated with nuclear power, fundamental changes are necessary if those risks are to be
kept within tolerable limits.").
416. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 122.
417. Id. The Kemeny Commission reached the exact same conclusion with respect to
preventing a recurrence of the TMI-2 accident. See KEMENY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
15, at 12 ("To prevent nuclear accidents as serious as Three Mile Island, fundamental
changes will be necessary in the organization, procedures, and practices-and above all-in
the attitudes of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and, to the extent that the institutions
we investigated are typical, of the nuclear industry."); see also REES, supra note 106, at 15-16
(discussing the nuclear industry's cultural failings); Plater, supra note 147, at 11046 (saying
the systemic failures that caused the Macondo well blowout make the reductionism that
happened after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, where the ship's captain's drunkenness was labeled
as primary cause of the accident, impossible).
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must attend to both elements. This can be done through frequent
external third party audits conducted by technically proficient
individuals to help assure that operational personnel are well
trained in responding to the early stages of an accident, including
accepting and reacting to puzzling anomalies in the data, and by
keeping information about operational and equipment problems
flowing within the specific company and its industry both before
and during an accident. Audits of corporate management and
suppliers of major components should also be done to ensure that
procedures are in place to spot and quickly respond to problems,
like the results of the tests on the stability of the cement for the
Macondo well plug, which showed repeated failures that were not
made available to the drill rig operator. Watch lists and more
frequent inspections of problematic companies by well-trained and
well-funded government employees operating under strict conflict
of interest rules could also intercept problems before they result in
an accident.
However, there is still the puzzle of how to offset the economic
benefits of sacrificing safety to the bottom line, as happened in the
case of Metropolitan Edison and BP. As long as sufficient
economic benefits exist, companies will not be dissuaded from
engaging in risky behavior. One way to lessen these economic
benefits is through substantial fines that recover whatever profits
the company made from its actions; but for large companies like
BP, such fines are just the cost of doing business.' Judicial
recoveries for harm caused by risky behavior also hold out the
possibility of encouraging less risky behavior, but litigation is a
lengthy, costly, and sometimes unsatisfying process for the
plaintiffs. Perhaps the best way is to make information about the
performance of companies engaging in risky activities available to
the public.1 Information about a business's performance, if
perceived as risky and potentially harmful by the public, might
harm its "reputational capital,"4 2 0 driving away customers and even
418. SeeVictor B. Flatt, Act Locally, Affect Globally: How Changing Social Norms to Influence the
Private Sector Shows a Path to Using Local Government to Control Environmental Harns, 35 B.C.
ENV[L. AFF. L. REv. 455, 465 (2008) ("[E]nforcement penalties that do not capture the
benefit of the violation to the violator may be considered ineffective and problematic.").
419. See Babcock, Corporate "Greenwashing, " supra note 16, at 63-65. To some extent the
NRC has done this through its official websites, but more could be done to keep the public,
especially those living near a nuclear reactor, informed about that facility's performance.
420. Id. at 14-20 (discussing the relevance of reputation sensitivity in some companies);
see also Neil Cunningham et al., Social License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go
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41investors. Such an economic loss might balance the scale against
the economic gain realized through cutting a safety corner.
History shows that the deepwater drilling industry has weathered
catastrophic accidents before and emerged unchanged-indeed, it
is displaying the same resistance to change now that it always has
shown. For this time to be different there must be a strong belief
in that industry that, unless changes are made in how it assesses
and manages the risks of its operations, the public will not tolerate
an accident of this magnitude again. Since the public fear that
drove the response to TMI-2 appears to be non-replicable in the
case of deepwater drilling, even given the horrific environmental
and economic consequences of the Macondo well blowout, it seems
unlikely that this type of social rethinking will occur. If it does not,
there is little to drive the deepwater drilling industry to reform
itself.
Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 307, 319 (2004) (explaining how a company's
reputational capital can be depleted through "criticism or expand [ed] by praise").
421. See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, Angry Shareholders Confront Exxon Chief Over Alaska Spill,
N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1989, at B5 (describing the company's annual meeting, where angry
environmentalists and others confronted Exxon's chairman); see alsoJohn Antczak, BP Gas
Boycott: Gulf Spill Not Impacting Consumers' Choice, HUFFINGTON POSIT, (May 5, 2010, 1:02 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/05/bp-gas-boycott-gulf-spill-n-563952.html
(saying the Exxon Valdez accident "triggered protest rallies, and consumers returned some
10,000 of Exxon's seven million credit cards to the company"). The public, news media,
environmental activists, and even properly informed customers can also act as effective
"watchdogs" on company performance, providing additional enforcement resources to over-
worked and under-staffed government inspectors. See Babcock, Corporate "Greenwashing,"
supra note 16, at 64.
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